

**“Followership” in Response to Post-Cold
War WMD Proliferation from 1989 - 2005:
Britain, Australia, and Israel**

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Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Full Name
ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
ACDA	US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AG	Australia Group
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty
ASO	Australian Safeguards Office
BMDO	Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
BTWC/BWC	Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention
BW	Biological Weapons
CBDE	Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment
CBW	Chemical and Biological Weapons
CD	Conference on Disarmament (former Committee on Disarmament)
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
COCOM	Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
CPI	US Defense Counterproliferation Initiative
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CTC	United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee
CTR	Cooperative Threat Reduction
CW	Chemical Weapons
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs (Australia)
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia)
DSTO	Defense Science and Technology Organization
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry (UK)
EC	European Committee
ENCD	Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament
FCO	British Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FSU	Former Soviet Union
G7	Group of Seven
G8	Group of Eight
GCHQ	Government Communications Headquarter
HC	House of Commons
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEC	Israeli Atomic Energy Commission
IAEL	International Atomic Energy List
IL	International (industrial) List
IML	International Munitions List
JVOG	Joint Venture Oversight Group
KEDO	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
MNC	Multi-National Corporation
MOD	Ministry of Defence (UK or Australia by context)
NAC	New Agenda Coalition
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBC	Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons
NIS	Newly Independent States
NNWS	Non-Nuclear Weapons State
NPR	Nuclear Posture Review
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSA	Non-State Actor
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
NW	Nuclear Weapons
NWFZ	Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
NWFZME	Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Middle East
NWS	Nuclear Weapons State
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
PTBT	Partial Test Ban Treaty
SEATO	South East Asian Treaty Organization
SIS	Secret Intelligence Service (UK)
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UN	United Nations
UNMOVIC	United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WMDI	Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative
WMDFZ	Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone
WWII	World War II

Abstract

This dissertation examines whether "the West" acted as a cohesive unit in response to weapons of mass destruction proliferation (WMD) from 1989 – 2005. Adapting organizational psychology's followership framework I examine if Britain, Australia and Israel accepted the Western leadership antiproliferation goals and if they responded with similar action to WMD proliferation. This analysis helps to determine if the Western alignment acted to attain mutual goals using mutually accepted means in their antiproliferation efforts.

While the examination of each state's policies can stand as an independent case study in antiproliferation, we further our understanding of alignment cohesion through the followership comparative framework. This framework uses a neo-classical realist systemic structure to analyze constructivist identity within the alignment to determine alignment cohesion. Conclusions regarding antiproliferation efforts, identity and "followership" rely on qualitative analysis based on events data and content analysis.

The central question of this research is: how and why did Western alignment cohesion change in response to proliferation in the post-Cold War? This analysis shows that the unity of purpose between the three "follower" states –Australia, Britain, and Israel – was high at the outset of the post-Cold war period. The evidence and analytic framework indicate that this was because the states accepted the leader's vision for countering proliferation and maintaining the status quo. The "follower identities" of these states changed significantly throughout the 1989 -2001 period as Britain, Australia, and Israel each sought to redefine the goals and actions of the Western alignment in response to WMD proliferation. The three "follower

identities" rose, however, as a result of policy changes by both the leader and the three "followers" after September 11, 2001 – and the subsequent attempts at proliferation by states like Iraq, Iran and North Korea, as well as non-state actors like al-Qaeda. As each of the states became a higher-level follower, the level of “followership” rose within the alignment subsystem signifying cohesion within the subsystem.

This demonstrates the value of the followership paradigm in examining the issue of cohesion in response to proliferation in the post-Cold War. This approach also resolves the tension between realist and constructivist analytical frameworks in the examination of alignments.

Introduction

The end of World War II, in 1945, was a time of both great euphoria and grave concern for many. In the immediate post-war period, the United States (US) moved to a position of power and leadership, reinforced by its monopoly on nuclear arms. In response, other nations – specifically the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) – feared that this emerging power, and the resultant changes to the international balance, ran counter to their interests. Consequently, while the US sought to maintain its nuclear monopoly, the USSR worked to revise the emerging status quo and acquire nuclear capabilities. This status quo – revisionist dichotomy over the rise of US power was short lived, with the USSR detonating its first nuclear weapon in 1949.

During this same period, and as a result of this conflict over power distribution, states that had been world leaders, such as France and England began to rebuild, while others, like East and West Germany and Poland became satellites of the victors. Thus, within five years of the war's end there were two predominant - or super - powers in the world, each recognized as the leader of a group of states or alignments.

This struggle over power distribution, and the forming of alignments to help maintain or revise the systemic polarity, had a number of precedents in history. In each, states acted to change the distribution of power in the world. Some of these changes led states to attempt further revisionism, so that the power distribution would be in their favor. These eras, in which world power was in flux, were important transitional periods in the international system.¹

The resulting rise of the US and USSR as superpowers after the post-World War II transitional period led to two alignments struggling to maintain an even distribution of power over the next 40 years, a period known as the Cold War. At the same time, states that possessed nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) capabilities also tried to maintain the status quo by limiting weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation.

The end of the Cold War, and the disbanding of the USSR in 1989, left the US as the sole remaining superpower. As a result, some states sought to revise this new power distribution by acquiring NBC capabilities, leading to another transitional period.² This rise in the potential spread of, and access to, WMDs compelled the US to redefine its strategies and policies to counter WMD proliferation, while recruiting other states in this endeavor. Subsequently, the US was widely seen as the leader of Western antiproliferation efforts in the post-Cold War. This led to the “prevalent assumption that Western states have responded collectively to proliferation with an essentially cohesive strategy.”³

Since the mid-1900s, advances in the social sciences had a sweeping effect on the study of leadership. In the world of business the application of organizational psychology led to the development of Leadership Studies and consequently the study of Followership. In the field of International Relations the study of Leadership emerged as an important sub-discipline. The role of Followership in International Relations is far less well developed and has received little attention.⁴

According to some researchers of organizational psychology, understanding the identity of followers in relation to the leader can help determine effective leadership, the level of cooperation among the followers and even the probability of

success in their mutual endeavor.⁵ It is possible to gain a deeper understanding of follower – leader relations, the role of the follower in an alignment, and the level of cohesion in response to changes in the distribution of power in the international system by applying the followership paradigm to the international system,.

In this dissertation I adapt the organizational psychology's followership framework to verify international group cohesion during the post-Cold War transitional period. Applying this framework provides a way to further our understanding of Western antiproliferation, examine the effectiveness of US leadership in response to changes in power distribution, and to verify the validity of the "prevalent assumption" of a collective Western response to WMD proliferation.

Chapter 1: Research Framework

Interestingly, while studies of change in the international order include research grouping nations based on their similarities, looks for patterns in power distribution, or changes based on cause and effect, there is a lack of literature about the dynamics of the world during transitional periods.⁶ While researchers acknowledge that change is part of the international system, some, like A.F.K. Organski, argue that the variables, like the number of powerful states, are irrelevant to change.⁷

If Organski's argument that the number of powerful states does not matter in a transitional period, since these periods represents power distribution in flux, is correct then the question arises: what does influence the outcome of a transitional period? The timeframe of the transitional period also seems irrelevant, since some may be fast, resulting from the outcome of war, and others may take longer as states develop long-term interactions that establish a stable power distribution. Rather than the number of powerful states, or the amount of time change takes, the transition from one systemic possibility to another seems to rely on states accepting the new distribution of power as in their interest. If states are unwilling to accept the apparent outcome of a transitional period, they try to influence the power distribution, either unilaterally or with help, so that the outcome accommodates their interests. Within this shell of competing interests there are many factors that can influence power distribution.

Similar to the post-World War II, the post-Cold War transitional period seemed to be leaning towards a strong unipolar system, since the US was the only superpower. In response to the potential US hegemony, states and terrorist

organizations used WMD proliferation as one of the primary means of influencing the transitional period's outcome. The power distribution at the beginning of the post-Cold War was not maintained throughout the post-Cold War transitional period because of North Korea's nuclear testing, Iran, Libya and Iraq's WMD proliferation, India and Pakistan's nuclear capabilities, Aum Shinrikyo's use of chemical weapons, and al-Qaeda's attempts to acquire WMD capabilities. Each of these eroded the US hegemonic movement leaving a weak unipolar system.⁸

This dissertation specifically examines if and how state and non-state WMD proliferation acted as a catalyst for strategic cohesion among Western states during the post-Cold War transitional period. Thus, it focuses on the means by which some states and terrorist organizations tried to change the power distribution in their favor. Adapting organizational psychology's followership framework can help determine the level of alignment cohesion during a transitional period because conclusions about unity of purpose are derived in this paradigm from the conflict over interests vis-à-vis power distribution and the similarity of identity, in terms of actions and goals, of the states seeking to preserve the international balance. Applying this framework I am compare the responses of three states - Britain, Australia and Israel - to WMD proliferation and changes in US antiproliferation policies from 1989 through 2005. This comparison can help determine if Western states acted collectively to attempts at revision in the distribution of power, and verify the accuracy of assumed Western cohesiveness.

Research Problem

In examining international cooperation I must contend with the generally accepted notion that the study of cohesion is a top-down process that is dependent upon the leadership and can disregard the followers in the relationship.⁹ According to Andrew Fenton Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, there are two types of leaders, dominant or benevolent. The dominant leader does not have followers but rather subordinates or minions who collaborate with the leader due to coercion.¹⁰ The benevolent leader entices followers to accept the need for action towards a goal.¹¹

One of the primary goals of leadership, however, is to foster cooperation through a commonality of purpose, regardless of which leader *type* is involved.¹² Since “leadership consists of getting things accomplished through others...those ‘others’ are critical to the leader’s effectiveness.”¹³ Thus, the examination of alignment cohesion need not concentrate on the state exercising influence, but rather on the states that submit to influence.¹⁴

As such, the follower is a key factor in the examination of cohesion. While leadership is the exertion of influence to set goals, followership is a commonality of purpose to achieve them.¹⁵ In essence, “followers want to feel as if they are partners with their leaders in accomplishing goals and defining a path to the future,” even if the contributions made by the leaders and followers are unequal.¹⁶

Variables

This research is divided into three levels of analysis – the individual unit level, the sub-systemic level, and the systemic level – to allow for the concentration on the weaker states as the primary means of determining group cohesion. Each of these

analysis levels directly correlates to one of the three variables in the followership paradigm presented here.

The dependent variable, the level of followership, corresponds to the sub-systemic level of analysis and represents alignment cohesion. It is the analysis of the sub-systemic level - the similarity of group identity within the alignment – that helps verify the validity of assumed alignment cohesion by comparing the states' group identities over time.

The intervening variable - the level of each state's group or "follower" identity - is a function of the correlation between the state's goals and actions and the groups norms as determined by the leader's goals and actions. By studying this individual unit level, it is possible to determine each follower states' identity within the group.

This determination of each state's follower identity, changes to those identities, and consequently alignment cohesion, requires a transitional period at the systemic level - the international milieu. Analysis of the status quo - revisionists dichotomy, inherent to a transitional period, is essential in the determination of alignment cohesion. Thus, the level of systemic power distribution revision, and the subsequent formation of a status quo alignment, is the independent variable in the examination of followership.

This dissertation argues that the level of systemic revisionism influences the similarity between the alignment follower's identities. The greater the level of systemic revisionism, the higher the level and similarity of follower identities, and

thus, the greater the level of followership. This model of examination can be used to examine members of either status quo or revisionist alignments.*

Research Goals

The primary goal of this dissertation is the analysis of alignment cohesion in the post-Cold War using organizational psychology's followership framework.** The model created here adds to our understanding of cooperation and expands alignment theory by incorporating a social construct for examining weaker state identities in the group. This approach helps resolve some of the tension between realist and constructivist theories by applying the constructivist perspectives of state identity to examine the level of followership within a neo-classical realist framework.

It also furthers the examination of state responses to proliferation. As such, it builds on analyses by Richard Stubbs,¹⁷ Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal,¹⁸ Charles Ferguson and William Potter,¹⁹ and David Cooper²⁰ by applying them to new, more specific, realms.

Assumptions

Three basic assumptions stand behind this dissertation. 1. There is a status quo alignment in response to proliferation during the post-Cold War. 2. The US leads this alignment, as it did the Cold War Western alignment. 3. Britain, Australia, and Israel are all members of this alignment.

* See Appendix 1 for a graphic representation of the variable interactions.

** See Appendices 2 & 3: Followership Types and Hierarchy of Followership

Research Questions

The main question this research seeks to answer is: How and why did Western alignment followership change in response to WMD proliferation from 1989 - 2005? In order to answer this, I need to examine the weaker members and discover what factors influenced change in the state's follower identities.

Hypotheses

In seeking to answer this question, it is important to first address why Western alignment cohesion may have changed. Jeremy Pressman argues that, terrorism and WMD proliferation were two means by which states attempted to counter the rise of American hegemony in the post-Cold War.²¹ Thus, states (like Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Iran) and non-state actors (like Aum Shinrikyo, al-Qaeda, and the Abdul Qadeer Khan – A.Q. Khan – network) participated in WMD proliferation in the post-Cold War to change the distribution of power on the systemic level. In response, some Western policymakers argued that the rising number of attempts by state and non-state actors (NSAs) to procure WMDs pointed to the accuracy of the assessment that proliferation was one of the predominant ways to change the distribution of power, and thus the international status quo, after the Cold War.²²

Thus, the systemic level of analysis seems to suggest that, since these weapons were perceived as “useful, and even desirable, even though the Cold War...ended,” the level of revisionism rose as state and non-state actors tried to change the power distribution through WMD proliferation.²³ As a result many Western leaders tried to guard against this change and maintain the status-quo.

As the level of proliferation rose, the “follower identities” of the weaker states in the Western alignment should have changed, with their antiproliferation policies

moved closer to, or complementing, the group's norms as determined by US antiproliferation policies. It seems, however, that while Western alignment cohesion changed significantly from 1989 to 2005, follower states were less likely to accept the norms established by the US through much of this time.

While the follower identities of Britain, Australia and Israel all appeared to be highest-level, or "exemplary," immediately after the Cold War – suggesting a high level of followership (cohesion) – this changed significantly after Operation Desert Storm as these states were less inclined to perceived WMD proliferation as systemic revisionism and were less likely to accept the groups antiproliferation norms determined by the US. Only after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and the perceived connections between terrorist organizations and possible WMD suppliers did Britain, Australia and Israel's follower identities return to a high level and coincide and to raise the level of followership (cohesion).

Methodology

This dissertation examines the level of followership in response to WMD proliferation by determining identity similarity among the followers. As an empirical research project, conclusions regarding each state's identity rely on qualitative analysis. In particular, this project consists of a comparative analysis of the policies of three state based on a combination of both events data and content analysis. The examination of each state's responses to the WMD proliferation can stand alone as a case study in antiproliferation. By examining the follower identity through a comparative framework, the case study's further our understanding of international group cohesion in the post-Cold War.

Alignment Followership

Followership is determined by comparing the states in a social construct approach. This requires the examination of the weaker alignment members' identities and comparing them. The data used includes speeches made by policy makers, press releases by the policy making bodies of each state like the State Department (or Foreign Office) as well as national security strategy statements (or the equivalent).

Textual analysis determines if WMD proliferation was recognized as systemic revisionism and whether there was a rise in the level of revisionism in the system. In order to identify the systemic revisionists, and thus examine alignment cohesion in response to WMD proliferation in the post-Cold War, I integrate Charles Ferguson and William Potter's four elements of the WMD proliferation "chain of causation." According to Ferguson and Potter, these elements are necessary for the creation and detonation of a WMD.²⁴ In addition, I apply David Cooper's three strategic responses

to WMD proliferation as part of the analytic framework in this dissertation.²⁵ Cooper argues that these strategies represent the spectrum of possible state responses to proliferation.²⁶

If WMD proliferation is recognized as systemic revisionism, then changes in the level of revisionism should influence each state's follower identity. Contestation within the sub-system (between the leader and followers as well as amongst the followers) should influence the alignment antiproliferation norms, and help to clarify the leader's strategy in response to the WMD proliferation chain. I can then determine how each state is incorporating Coopers antiproliferation strategies as part of their follower identity.

The follower identity is established by comparing changes in each state's antiproliferation goals and actions to the alignment antiproliferation norms determined by the leader. Analysis of statements made by policymakers in national and international frameworks establish changes in each state's goals, if any exist. The steps taken by Department of Treasury, the Department of Defense (or the equivalent) and other executive branch departments to halt proliferation represent the actions of each state. National export controls, military and economic responses, and legislation deriving from among others the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1540 also help establish the actions taken.

Statements made in, and actions resulting from, multilateral regimes, international treaties, and international initiatives (like the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Australia Group (AG), Nuclear

Suppliers Group (NSG), Paris Group, UNMOVIC and other treaties, as well as Memoranda of Understanding and conventions also help to establish goals and actions. Research and analysis by institutions and organizations (such as Brookings, Aspen, IISS, CFR, CSIS, IASPS, Olin Institute, SDSC, Lowy Institute, and MRC), help bolster the primary source findings.

Using the information from these sources I examine each state's follower identity and demonstrate changes in each follower identity over time. By comparing the follower identities I am able to determine the level of followership in the alignment and show how the followership level has changed during the research period.

If there is no clear perception of revisionism, or if there is no similarity of identity throughout the time examined, then the alignment may not exist or its is characterized by pragmatic (lowest level) followership. If followership cannot be attributed to the alignment, or the followership level is pragmatic, then the assumed unity of purpose among Western states in response to proliferation may be incorrect and should be rethought.

Case Study of Followership

WMD Proliferation

The WMD Proliferation Chain of Causation

As mentioned above, the four elements of Charles Ferguson and William Potter's WMD proliferation "chain of causation" represent systemic revisionism in the post-Cold War. These must be identified in order to first verify alignment participation and later to determine state identities in response to proliferation. According to Charles Ferguson and William Potter, the proliferation chain must consist of the "principal elements that would have to coalesce" to create and detonate a WMD.²⁷ While Ferguson and Potter established this "chain of causation" to determine the means by which a terrorist organization might acquire a WMD, it can also apply to a state actor.

A close look at the chain of causation shows four components of WMD proliferation: Supplier, Transporter, Financer, and End User.²⁸ The analysis of each state's antiproliferation policies helps determine if these elements have been recognized, and responded to, as part of Western alignment antiproliferation strategies. This determines the level of revisionism. The response of each state, and the alignment, to the different components establishes the acceptance of the WMD proliferation chain as systemic revisionism and is the first step in determining of followership.

The study of follower identity then uses relational comparison to examine the social construct established by group norms and whether these norms led to mutual purpose between the follower and leader to the proliferation chain. It does so by incorporating Cooper's three antiproliferation strategies – capability/denial, non-

possession/norm-building, and consequence/management – into the analysis of each states follower identity.

Thus, by establishing how each state acknowledged and responded to the different proliferation elements, I am able to determine changes in the level of systemic revisionism, how and why those changes affected the follower's identity within the group and consequently the level of cohesion.

The United Kingdom, Australia and Israel

The three states under investigation were all part of the Western Cold War alignment, and as a result it is assumed they have similar systemic perceptions regarding proliferation in the post-Cold War. While I am not examining strategic culture, or “civilization,” as motivations for alignment formation, I cannot ignore their potential influence on alignment cohesion.

I have included Israel as one of the three case studies in order to counter the influence of culture on research validity. While Britain's influence on Israeli political culture, and the United States' on its strategic culture, clearly places Israel within the Cold War Western bloc, Israeli culture is not Anglo-Saxon thus providing a different cultural basis in the research. At the same time, the shared Anglo-Saxon culture of the United Kingdom and Australia, as well as the close relations these states share with the US in fields like strategy, diplomacy, religion, culture, and commerce, lessen the effects of domestic political or strategic cultures on research validity by providing a cultural basis for comparison in the examination of followership.

Furthermore, the fact that each state represents a different geopolitical location helps to show the regional impact on alignment cohesion. Thus, geographic location and an acknowledged role in antiproliferation during the Cold War were the

primary factors for determining the states examined in the case studies. Additionally, while these three states are different in terms of power distribution in the system, they are all regional powers. Thus, by choosing Britain, Australia and Israel as the case studies here I am limiting, though not eliminating, the weight of the “power” factor in the examination of followership presented here.

Australia's role in the formation of the Australia Group and its participation in many of the antiproliferation norms established during the Cold War, suggest that it is an ideal candidate in the study of Western alignment cohesion in response to WMD proliferation in the post-Cold War. Australia's role in brokering the final resolution of the CWC in the early 1990s and its attempts to bolster the BWC in the late 1990s further suggests that the WMD proliferation was perceived as systemic revisionism. Its location near South East Asia is also important, as its perception of systemic revisionism is uniquely influenced by its geographical addition. Some researchers have gone so far as argue that in the field of antiproliferation Australia is one of the more influential players.²⁹

The United Kingdom is slightly more problematic for this study. Its participation in the European Union makes it difficult to differentiate between pure British policy and the greater European Union foreign and security policy. Nonetheless, the Britain's special relationship with the US, its geographic location in Europe, its status as a Nuclear Weapon State member of the NPT, and its clear participation in antiproliferation norms throughout the Cold War suggest that issues of antiproliferation are inherently part of its own foreign policy.

Israel's inclusion as the third case study is based on its geographic location in the Middle East, its special relationship with the US, its actions during the Cold War

in response to Iraqi proliferation (the military attack on the Osirak reactor) and the direct WMD threat it faces from both state and non-state actors.³⁰ The secretive nature of Israel's work in the field of antiproliferation makes it difficult, but not impossible, to establish its follower identity in response to this type of systemic revisionism. Furthermore, including Israel as a case study limits the potential influence of culture on research validity. In addition, the United States' increasing influence on Israel's strategic culture means that Israel helps to determine if there is variance among similar strategic cultures.

Despite its status as a WMD proliferation state, as a non-signatory of the NPT and BWC, Israel has taken upon itself to act in accordance with several of the more prominent antiproliferation regimes, including the Australia Group's export controls. Thus, Israel acts as a counterbalance in the determination if formal acceptance of some alignment norms influences antiproliferation policies in our examination of its follower identity, and gives some inclination as to how much cultural similarities and participation in non-proliferation norms influenced the other state's follower identities. At the same time, it provides a unit of critique for similar strategic cultures and participation within the alignment.

Chapter 2: Followership

This research revolves around the juncture between two important aspects of international relations: alignment cohesion and systemic change. This chapter identifies and delineates the three variables of the followership paradigm, thus presenting a method to examine the correlation between these cohesion and change. It begins with a discussion of previous followership research, determines its effectiveness in the examining alignment cohesion and presents the followership model that is eventually used in this analysis of unity of purpose.

The chapter continues with a debate over the research model best suited for the independent variable in the study of followership. This debate examines the three predominant theoretic paradigms – neo-realism, neo-liberalism and constructivism – and concludes that the best framework for the systemic analysis is the neo-classical realist balance-of-interest model.

The chapter concludes by demonstrating the necessity of an intervening variable, follower identity, in the determination of alignment cohesion in response to systemic change. It shows that analyzing the connection between cohesion and change requires the examination of identity resulting from the relational comparison between the follower and leader in response to systemic change.

Thus, this chapter presents a theoretical model that combines an independent variable that examines power distribution with a social construct intermediate variable that establishes each state's identity within the group. It then shows how this intervening variable is used to demonstrate alignment cohesion.

Since the predominant methods for examining of alignment cohesion in international relations have most often been leader-centric, with top-down

processes dependent on either power or an institutional structure, they tend to ignore the role of followers in examining cooperative action. Instead of applying a top-down perspective, this research examines international cohesion without an independent and in-depth focus on the leader. By concentrating on the follower's group identities in response to systemic revisionism, the follower acts as the primary unit for examining the similarities between the follower and leader in a bilateral relationship. This analysis establishes the group norms and purposes as well as provides the point of reference for examining the relational comparisons needed in determining the level of followership or alignment cohesion.

Followership

Richard Stubbs was the first to use the concept of followership in international relations research, arguing that a misunderstanding of the leader-follower relationship developed when the focus was exclusively on the leader.³¹ He suggested analyzing leader-follower relations from the bottom up instead of using top-down models.

Accepting this perspective, Andrew Fenton Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal used a similar method, applying social psychology's "followership" model in their examination of the "coalition of the willing" during the 1991 Gulf War. They concluded that motivation was the key to determining whether a state is a "true followers" or not a follower, since a state can participate in an alignment without being a "true follower."³² The investigators argued that motivation was "the degree to which the follower regards the leader and the leader's 'vision' (the goals that the leader seeks for the collective or the group) as worthy of active and concrete support."³³

While concentrating on the follower, these researchers also note that two types of leaders exist in social psychology's followership framework: dominant or benevolent. While the benevolent leader entices followers to act towards a goal, the dominant leader does not have followers but subordinates or minions who collaborate with the leader because of coercion.³⁴ This is important in the examination of alignment cohesion because "[i]f leadership consists of getting things accomplished through others, then those 'others' are critical to the leader's effectiveness."³⁵

Thus, if leadership is embodied in an actor exerting influence to accomplish a goal then followership is not a single actor's response to that influence but rather signifies a commonality of purpose – alignment cohesion – with true "followers want[ing] to feel as if they are partners with their leaders in accomplishing goals and defining a path to the future."³⁶ This is true even if the contributions made by the leaders and followers are unequal.³⁷

In their research on the 1991 Gulf War, Cooper, Higgot, and Nossal concluded that that Britain was the only coalition member that acted in a manner consistent with social psychology's followership model. The researchers also argued that the USSR and China participated because of possible financial or political quid pro quos, France participated because of possible post-war profit, and Japan and Germany freeloaded. In addition, they found that, while the rhetoric of many states supported the coalition, actions did not match rhetoric.³⁸ As such, the follower is a key element in determining alignment cohesion.

Rethinking Followership in International Relations

While the bottom-up model used by Stubbs, Cooper, Higgot, and Nossal provides an interesting perspective of follower–leader relations, several problems arise with applying social psychology’s followership framework to international relations. The first is that it still seeks to address the type of *leader* and if that typology influences the type of followership. Second, it produces a dichotomic, follower/not follower, perspective. Thus, there is only one “true” follower whose identity is established by examining one unit, motivation, for the analysis of each state’s identity within the coalition. The third problem is that it does not compare the different states’ follower identities to determine whether the states acted cohesively within the alignment. Thus, it does not permit the full spectrum of possible followers nor the possibility of different levels of alignment cohesion.

Barbara Kellerman, in her research on followership, presents an organizational psychology framework that argues that the level of engagement provides five different types of followers: *Isolates, Bystanders, Participants, Activists, and Diehards*.³⁹ While her argument for multiple levels based on a single unit can be applied to international relations, it is useful to break down this variable into subparts to examine the dynamic between states.

Robert Kelley’s organizational psychology followership paradigm, which includes two units of examination – active/passive action and independent/dependent thinking – can be adapted to the examination of interstate relations. Kelley’s paradigm presents five basic types of followers *Exemplary, Conformist, Passive, Alienated, and Pragmatic*.⁴⁰ By making a minor adjustment to this paradigm, using goals acceptance instead of independent/dependent thinking, it

is possible to apply this framework to the examination of state followers in an alignment and determine the level of follower identity. A state that cannot be associated with one of Kelley's follower identities is not subordinate to the alignment leader and, therefore, is not part of the alignment.

Comparing the follower identities, and determining the predominant identity in the alignment, the level of cohesion or "followership" is ascertained. Each level of followership is associated with the predominating follower type. Thus, five levels of followership correlate with Kelley's five follower identities.

Followership Levels

While each of the follower identities is based on the follower – leader relationship, the followership levels represent the level of identity similarity among the followers in the group. As such the five followership levels – exemplary, conformist, scared, alienated and pragmatic – correspond to the predominance of the follower identity associated with it. Thus an alignment that has an exemplary followership level will have a preponderance of exemplary followers and a scared followership level will consist primarily of scared followers.

Exemplary Followership

Made up predominately of states whose follower identity is exemplary, this level of followership represents highest level of alignment cohesion. This level of cohesion is similar to Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett's security community. As I will show later, the characteristic described by Adler and Barnett are exhibited by exemplary followers in their alignment identities, leading to a security community in response to change in the international system.

An alignment with this followership level has a leader that successfully established goals and actions accepted by a prevailing number of alignment followers. As such, the leader has created unity of purpose by establishing goals and determining the complementary or cooperative actions acceptable to the alignment followers. This unity of purpose is the highest alignment followership level and represents cohesion and effective leadership.

Conformist Followership

An alignment predominated by conformist followers is less cohesive than one made up of exemplary followers. This is because conformists do not actively participate in attaining the leader's goals. While the contributions made by the leaders and followers can be unequal without seriously harming the bilateral relationship, actions by followers that are unequal or equally insufficient directly affect the alignment's cohesiveness. This level of followership is closely related to Randall Schweller's "Jackal" and "Pile-on" types of bandwagoning . Both are based on participation in the group for profit with minimal output.⁴¹ While pile-on bandwagoning is more likely in a status-quo alignment, jackal bandwagoning – which suggests participation with the expressed goal of gaining power – is prone to appear in an analysis of a revisionist alignment. In either case, however, the leader bears the cost of any action needed in attaining the group's goals because of the lack of active participation by conformist followers.

The redeeming character of this followership level is support for the alignment goals. This support lends credence to actions taken by the leader or other followers in support of the those goals. While the conformist follower's failure to take action is

problematic, its support of the goals maintains alignment cohesion and suggests some effective leadership.

Scared Followership

Unlike the conformist followership alignment level, the scared followership level does not provide the leader (or other followers) with a mandate to act in accordance with the alignment's norms. This is because the scared follower neither accepts the leader's goals nor takes action to meet those goals. Thus, the alignment does not gain from their inclusion. A scared followership alignment is less cohesive because the brunt of maintaining the systemic status-quo falls on the leader and the higher level followers. It is also less cohesive because the leader has essentially failed to garner support from most of the alignment members. While identity similarity forms among the followers, the followership level is lower because the follower states fail to approve alignment norms by supporting the actions or goals that result from those norms.

By failing to accept the alignment's goals, or take any action, these followers create a neutral body within the alignment that is neither supportive nor antagonistic of the alignment norms. The dissonance between the leader and the followers directly affects alignment cohesion as the leader does not have a authorization to act based on alignment norms and is not receiving active support for alignment goals and actions.

Alienated Followership

The lack of cohesion represented by alienated followership derives from strain between the leader and followers regarding alignment norms and how those translate into goals and actions. By working together alienated followers may seek to

redefine the goals and actions for systemic victory, failure to work in unison will lead to greater anarchy within the alignment sub-system and significantly affect cohesion.

Since the alienated followers do not accept the leader's vision for systemic victory, this followership level represents the leadership's inability to create unity of purpose among its followers. One of these three changes must occur to change this level of cohesion – leadership usurpation, changes in alignment norms or systemic change that leads to a new follower identity by a predominant number of followers. Thus, the leader can adjust the alignment's norms to better match the alienated follower's perspective on the level of revisionism in the hopes of raising the followership level. If this does not occur then the alienated followers may shift their support to a new leader who is a powerful member of the alignment with a similar perspective on the level of revisionism, thus changing the alignment hierarchy. Both changes to the alignment goals and actions or usurping leadership can change the preponderance of follower identities in the alignment. In addition to these changes within the group, changes in the international milieu may also lead followers to rethink their perceived level of revisionism and to change their follower identity, thus influencing the followership level.

Despite all this, the alienated followership level is not the lowest. While the leadership may be ineffective in influencing the goals and actions of the followers, the followers are united through their disregard for the alignment norms. Even if each alienated follower determines different goals and actions, their common *dislike* of the leader's goals and actions represents some level of cohesion, in essence negative cohesion based in ineffective leadership. This level of followership does not,

however, mean that the followers are not part of the alignment. Instead it points to significant discord within the sub-system.

Pragmatic Followership

Pragmatic followership can occur in two different occasions. The first is if a predominant number of states have follower identities that continually change. In this case, the lack of consistency in each state's follower identity detracts from the overall level of followership. The other occurrence is when a lack of uniformity exists between the states – when examining the states in the alignment shows that each state has a different follower identity. In either case, whether pragmatic follower identities or different follower identities, this is the lowest level of alignment cohesion, suggesting incapable leadership (or no leadership). In essence the leader has established an anarchical alignment instead of creating unity among the followers, which raises the question whether the “leader” is leading or if there is leadership from a different actor in the system.

Followership in the International System

The followership model presented above allows for the study of interstate cooperation within a specific sphere of international interaction. That examination, however, is first dependent on an attempt by states or non-state actors to change the distribution of power in the broader international arena.

As noted, this theoretical framework postulates, that during transitional periods, alignments in support of revisionism and the status quo form. If a state or group of states seeks systemic revisionism, then a counter alignment, supporting the status quo, should respond.

Since this framework argues that the post-Cold War was a transitional period in which the level of systemic revisionism influences follower identities and consequently alignment cohesion, it is incumbent upon us to determine the means of determining the level of revisionism. If no actor wishes to change the status quo then preexisting alignments may remain or dissolve but the system should maintain its basic power distribution.

The following subsection 1. Defines alignments as the unit of study, 2. Evaluates their formation in different types of systemic power distribution, and 3. Determines the theoretical framework best suited for studying change on the systemic level and, consequently, the examination of follower identities and followership during a transitional period. This lays the groundwork for the application of the followership paradigm to determining alignment cohesiveness in response to WMD proliferation.

Alignments

While neo-realists argue that states should either balance or bandwagon in response to the most powerful or threatening states in the system, neo-liberal and constructivist analysts argue that the lack of balancing and bandwagoning in the post-Cold War is inconsistent with neo-realist theories.⁴² Regardless of these theoretical models, states constantly compete for authority because of the anarchic nature of the system.

Defining Alignments

This competition for authority can lead states to work together forming groups, alignments, that seek to advance their interests in the system. In order to examine this, it is essential to define this unit of study. George Modelski notes that “‘alignments’ can be regarded as a blanket term referring to all types of international political cooperation.”⁴³ While alliances and coalitions are subsets of Modelski’s alignments, researchers suggest four criteria to differentiate between these two types of groups: the period in which cooperation is to take place, the scope of the cooperation, the formality of the relationship, and the number of actors involved in the relationship.⁴⁴

Avi Kober, in his research on coalition defection, notes that states are motivated to participate in coalitions in response to a wide scope of activities, while Modelski and others posit that security matters are the motivation behind alliances.⁴⁵ Both Kober and Modelski present neo-realist definitions when they argue that coalitions, like alignments, are oriented around ad-hoc short-term interests, while alliances are grounded in long-term interests.

Furthermore, relationship formality and number of participants are both problematic criterion for differentiating between alliances and coalitions. First, states can have significant, but not formal, alliances.⁴⁶ Second, while coalitions are often broader based and alliances are smaller, there are exceptions. Using these two criteria in studying alignments can distort research because they fail to provide for informal interactions or numeric disparity.⁴⁷

Alliances and coalitions are deeply intertwined as subsets of alignments, making it possible to examine alignments by expanding the alliance definition to include informal relations, short-term interests, and broader participation.⁴⁸ Thus, alignments can be formal, or informal, cooperation between two or more states based on long or short-term interests. It is important to note that this does not preclude the inclusion of non-state actors in an alignment, but requires that at least two states participate in the alignment in addition to any non-state actors involved. The final aspect of the definition, long or short-term interests, opens the door to the examination of *why* alignments form.

Why Alignments Form

While the definition suggests that interests are the motivation for alignment formation, it does not determine the reason an alignment might manifest at any given point in time. Researchers have used many different models to suggest why an alignment might form. These models have addressed this issue from geopolitical, economic, security, religious, cultural and power distribution, as well as many other perspectives. Concentrating on the three major theoretical models, Neo-Realism, Neo-Liberalism and Constructivism, provides a starting point in determining the independent variable needed in order to examine alignment cohesion.

During the first half of the 20th century, as well as in several centuries before that, powerful states competed to expand their control over limited resources and fought to maintain control of the resources that they had. Strong states intervened all over the world and expanded their independent power bases by building extensive empires.⁴⁹

In order to explain this phenomenon neo-realists, like Kenneth Waltz, present a balance-of-power theory that suggests that a state's absolute power is threatening, leading weaker states to form alliances to balance against a more powerful state. According to neo-realists, this is true as long as the weaker state cannot increase its power unilaterally.

Thus, the ability to gain or maintain independent power was the primary mechanism that controlled alignment formation before WWII. In this multipolar system, states allied to counter more powerful states. During this time, states were dependent on each other for balancing perceived changes of power in the system. Alternatively, weaker states could bandwagon, or join, with a powerful one if they were unable to acquire enough power to balance.⁵⁰ In this system, great powers like Britain used alliances to avoid or go to war, to increase their ability to control the outcome of a war and to deny hegemony to any other power in the system.⁵¹

After World War II, the international system changed, as two states rose to superpower status. In this system, the alignments sought not only to balance perceived power differences but also to counter perceived threats. The Cold War bipolar system consisted of bandwagoning and balancing states seeking security. In this bipolar system, the two alignments perceived each other's offensive capabilities and intentions as threatening. As such, systemic leaders tried to increase their

relative capabilities.⁵² Furthermore, in this two-bloc system, superpowers were not reliant on other states to balance against the perceived threat.

In order to explain this, Stephen Walt,⁵³ another neo-realist, refines Waltz's theory by suggesting that the absolute power of the state is not the what state's perceive as threatening. He argues instead that states are motivated to form alignments to balance threats resulting from another state's geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions. This leads states to either balance against a threat, or bandwagon with it.⁵⁴

While Walt describes the neo-realist perspective for alignment formation during the Cold War, Ted Hopf, presenting a constructivist perspectives, argues that the Cold War was two *ideological* blocs in competition for hegemony.⁵⁵ This, however, does not seem to explain the motivation for alignment formation during this time – maintaining the integrity of each states' political system and independence, both issues of security.

According to Walt, leadership in a bipolar system is dependent on the perception of security by the weaker states. While states that bandwagon with the threatening state accept its leadership to guarantee their security, states that balance against the threat seek security in numbers and concede leadership to the state most likely to guarantee that security. Since individual security is the motivation for alignment formation in this system, bloc members support the leader even on issues where their short-term interests do not coincide.⁵⁶ This model explains homogeneous groups of security followers under the leadership of the most powerful states in the system.

While the theories described can be used to examine alignments in multipolar and bipolar systems, they do not explain the continuation of such alignments in the post-Cold War period, from 1989–2005. The end of the Cold War presents an interesting dilemma regarding intra-alignment relations.

First, models for Patron-Client relations, which were used to describe relationships between, and within, alignments in the Cold War international system, are less relevant.⁵⁷ Second, while the collapse of the USSR left the US as the sole remaining superpower, creating the perception that the system was leaning towards unipolarity and possibly hegemony, state and non-state actors have sought to limit US systemic preponderance.

In addition, constructivists argue that the lack of balancing and bandwagoning in practice is inconsistent with neo-realist theories, pointing out that NATO, and other Cold War alliances, should have disbanded. Furthermore, constructivists and neo-liberals point to states' failure to balance or bandwagon in response to the US, as the most powerful state in the system as further proof that neo-realists cannot explain post-Cold War state interaction. Their basic argument is that the neo-realist ideas, which may have explained the motivation behind alignment formations *prior to* and *during* the Cold War, are not supported by the *continued* existence of Cold War alignments once the threat, namely the Soviet Union, disappears.⁵⁸

The constructivists' attempt to include social/ideological motivations to explain the continuation of alignments in the post-Cold War period is also problematic for understanding alignment formation or continuity. On the one hand, they argue that anarchy is not an inherent part of state interaction, but that the structure of the system is anarchic because states choose to make it so.⁵⁹ Alternatively they suggest

that change in states' relations is dependent on an external force because their interactions lead to mutually *reinforcing* roles in the relationship.⁶⁰ Thus, the anarchy chosen by the states is a constraint on their systemic choices and requires an external source for change to occur. This leads to a contradiction: states choose anarchy but relational dependency creates role reinforcement (limits anarchy) within the system.

Alternatively, neo-liberals, like Galia Press Bar-Natan, suggest that geographic variation, perception of intentions, various domestic factors, and ideology are the motivating forces behind cooperation; ignoring most systemic variables as possible motivations for alignment formation.⁶¹ As such, the neo-liberal argument that domestic pressures establish a national strategic culture cannot explain systemic motivations for cohesive international strategic structures.⁶² While some neo-liberals suggest that the continued existence of NATO demonstrates the role of institutions in international politics, they do not address informal alignments based on systemic perspectives as in the case of antiproliferation.⁶³

Furthermore, some neo-liberal arguments assume a structure in which no state, or states, can balance against the systemic leader. As a result, Chong Ja Ian suggests that, in the post-Cold War world, balancing and bandwagoning no longer apply.⁶⁴ According to Ja Ian, second-tier and weaker states do not have the capabilities to change the distribution of power in the post-Cold War system. As such, they can only try to take actions or create spheres of influence independent of the powerful state. He proposes four second-tier state responses in this system: Buffering, Bonding, Binding, and Beleaguering.

While Ja Ian addresses the ability of states to take independent action, he does not examine the possibility that these states might choose to work with the predominant state because of shared, or complementary, systemic interests. Essentially, his strategies all represent opposition to, or minimizing of, predominant state authority and influence. Thus Ja Ian and other neo-liberals' theories fail to consider the possibility that weaker states may choose to align with the predominant state, as in the post-Cold War system and are insufficient to explain alignment formation or state interaction and cooperation at the systemic and sub-systemic levels.

In contrast, neo-classical realism argues that the post-Cold War balancing/bandwagoning dichotomy is not due to the search for security, but rather systemic stability versus systemic change.⁶⁵ Rather than concentrate on one state's power preponderance – as in the balance-of-power theory – or threat perception – like the balance-of threat model – Randall Schweller explains alignment formation as a status quo/revisionist dichotomy in which similar systemic interests motivate states to align with each other.⁶⁶

In this framework, the post-Cold War period system is best described as a transitional era in which states align either to maintain the status quo or to revise the international balance (or perceived imbalance). Thus, bandwagoning does not necessarily reflect the capitulation of one state to another's power, intentions, or threat, but rather represents mutual interests at the systemic level.⁶⁷ On this basis, Schweller's balance-of-interest theory seems to best explain alignment formation during this time.

Rethinking Alignment Formation

In describing the post-Cold War period, neo-classical realism's balance-of-interest theory offsets many of the critiques by neo-liberals and constructivists of neo-realist theories. First, institutions consist of states and continue to exist because the state members have redefined, constricted, or expanded the interests that motivate the alignment.⁶⁸ In the post-Cold War system, many of these institutions continue to exist as a way for the US to exert influence and control.⁶⁹ As such, Cold War institutions continue to exist because: 1. The influential states in the institutions have redefined their systemic interests, and 2. Influence, as the classical realist definition of power, is the motivation for the creation, and continued existence, of alignments.

Second, in the post-Cold War system, states are motivated to align because of either status quo or revisionist interests, reflecting "sub-system dominance." While alignments in the post-Cold War period form to maintain the systemic status quo or with revisionist intent, they ultimately seek to manipulate the global system and maintain, or attain, systemic dominance.⁷⁰

According to Schweller leadership is a scarce resource in this type of system.⁷¹ While conflicts over leadership were minimal during the Cold War, in the post-Cold War period powerful alignment members many attempt to usurp leadership to determine alignment interests. Schweller argues that this conflict for leadership leads to a sub-systemic hierarchy. He suggests that this system stratification occurs because differences in power "perpetuate inequality."⁷² Schweller further argues that the systemic dichotomy is not security centric, as Waltz and Walt suggest, but rather explains alignments as a either status quo or revisionist. The formation of

these alignments is thus based on similar systemic interests. As such, states that align for stability do so to maintain the systemic status quo, while states that ally for self-extension do so to revise the systemic balance (or perceived imbalance).

In a balance-of-interest system, the bandwagoning option mentioned above is not necessarily the capitulation of a state in response to power alone or threat perception. Instead, it can be motivated by a desire to profit, which Schweller defines as “jackal bandwagoning,” or the desire to be associated with the winning side in a war, “pile-on bandwagoning.”⁷³ Schweller presents four types of bandwagoning based on the motivation of the weaker state: “jackal,” “pile-on,” “wave-of-the-future,” and “contagion.” “Jackal” and “pile-on” are both profit-based. “Wave-of-the-future” is security-based and “contagion” is based on proximity (essentially threat perception).⁷⁴ In all of these types of bandwagoning, the weaker state’s identity within the subsystem is directly associated with its motivation for alignment participation.

Leadership and Followership in the post-Cold War International System

While the balance-of-interest theory provides the motivation for alignment formation in the post-Cold War, the types of bandwagoning Schweller suggests do not provide criteria for examining alignment cohesion. Thus, while the followership paradigm can use this theory to explain the formation of alignments in the post-Cold War, and it provides the first step for determining the existence of a sub-systemic hierarchy, it cannot stand alone in the determination of cohesion.

In order to analyze alignment cohesion it is important to understand the motivation for the follower’s acceptance of another state’s leadership. Waltz argues that fear determines participation in the alignment and power determines

leadership,⁷⁵ Walt suggests that states accept leadership to guarantee their security and concede leadership to the state most likely to guarantee that security.⁷⁶ Security is the motivation for alignment formation and leadership, and members support the leader even on issues where their short-term interests do not coincide.⁷⁷ Both these models assume undifferentiated and homogeneous groups of security followers under the leadership of the most powerful states in the system, making these models problematic, as they do not include follower influence on the leader or changes in followership.

Despite US power and dominance, leadership in the post-Cold War period was not guaranteed, as described in a balance-of-interest system.⁷⁸ Unlike the neo-liberal hegemonic stability theory, different members of the alignment attempted to sway or gain leadership to determine goals and actions.⁷⁹ This conflict formed a hierarchic sub-system as the anarchic nature of the system lead to stratification.⁸⁰

Thus, Schweller's model, unlike those of neo-realists and neo-liberals, allows for the determination of alignment cohesion by establishing the systemic dynamic necessary for the examination of followership in the post-Cold War system. As such, the level of systemic revisionism is the best independent variable for examining followership in the post-Cold War period. Unlike the neo-realist "homogeneous followers," or the neo-liberal "unimportant followers," a balance-of-interest system presents the base which supports the potential for different types of followers that determine and change alignment cohesion.

Follower Identity

While Schweller's model can act as the determinant for alignment formation and the existence of a sub-systemic hierarchy it is also important to determine how change in the systemic dichotomy influences alignment cohesion. Unfortunately, Schweller argues that power alone determines each state's role and influence in the sub-system. While this allows us to examine which states are influential in the alignment it does not show *how* that influence might affect alignment cohesion. Thus, the balance-of-interest theory – while an important part of the followership paradigm used here – does not, on its own, provide the necessary framework to analyze followership.

While Stubbs, Cooper, Higgot, and Nossal suggest that motivation is the best variable for determining followership, they do not discuss different types of followers. In contrast, the paradigm developed and applied in this dissertation presents 5 follower identities that help determine the followership level. By comparing the similarities and differences of the states' follower identities, the level of followership can be determined. Having established that the status quo/revisionist dichotomy determines alignment formation, it is now important to understand the influence of this dichotomy on the follower identities.

Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott present four elements that help to determine identity within a group: 1. Constitutive Norms – norms that define the group, 2. Social Purposes – goals shared by the group, 3. Relational Comparisons – views about other identities or groups, 4. Cognitive Models – “worldviews or understandings of political and material

conditions.”⁸¹ They also point out that contestation, or conflict, among group members helps to define the group’s relations.⁸²

All these elements are essential for the determination of the follower identity. According to Schweller, states align because they either want to maintain or change the systemic status-quo. Thus, alignments are made up of states that have specific relational comparisons and cognitive models. These states have aligned because they recognize that they have similar systemic worldviews. They also recognize a similar “other” in the system while acknowledging each state’s uniqueness within the alignment. This social construct has been explained by Ted Hopf who suggests that the constructivist’s perspective on identity is a relational comparison with another actor or actors in the system.⁸³ This alone is insufficient to determine the follower identity. Instead, it helps reinforce Schweller’s arguments about alignment formation at the systemic level while providing the first step in examining each state’s follower identity – as a relational comparison between the follower states and the leader.

Analysis of this relational comparison concentrates on the follower’s perspective of the leader’s “vision” for systemic dominance and examined each state’s acceptance of the group’s constitutive norms and social purposes. Constitutive norms are essentially the acceptable and intentional actions for systemic victory as determined by the leader. They represent what is, or is not, the expected response by members of the group. Abdelal et al.’s social purposes, on the other hand, represent the goals that the leader has established for the group in its response to systemic change.

Thus, follower identity reflects the strategic choices that each state makes. Strategy is the relationship between “ends, ways, and means. Ends are the objectives or goals sought. Means are the resources available to pursue the objectives. And ways or methods are how one organizes and applies the resources.”⁸⁴ Thus, strategy is a combination of each state’s the goals, or Abdelal et al.’s social purposes, and actions (methods), or constitutive norms, used to reach those goals. These choices are a function of the possible options that are available to a follower based on the relational comparison with the leader.

The model presented by Robert Kelley for suggests that it is possible to identify five unique follower identities within a group: *Exemplary, Conformist, Passive, Alienated, and Pragmatic*.⁸⁵

Follower Identities

Exemplary Follower

The *exemplary* follower is active in pursuit of the alignment’s goals and acts within the constraints of those goals. Actions taken are not attempts to present an alternative to the leader, but rather to support the leader’s goals. As such, the examination of this follower’s relational comparison with the leader shows acceptance of the leader’s cognitive models, as well as the constitutive norms and social purposes established for alignment victory. Kalevi J. Holsti describes this as a “faithful ally”.⁸⁶

As previously mentioned , Adler and Barnett point to three characteristics define a community: shared identities, values, and meanings; many sided and direct relations; some degree of long term interest and perhaps even altruism.”⁸⁷ This follower exhibits all these characteristics, including altruism, in its participation in the

alignment. An alignment predominated by these followers is the highest form of followership.

Conformist Follower

The *conformist* does not work against the leader but takes no action in response to systemic revision. Thus, while sharing similar worldviews and social purposes, this follower does not accept the constitutive norms determined by the leader.

While the conformist agrees with the leader's goals to maintain or change the systemic status quo, it does not actively participate to attain these goals. This alignment member is a freeloader and "passes the buck" in the hopes of gaining without incurring costs.⁸⁸ As a result, it acknowledges the cognitive model of the leader and the goals that develop as a result. Nonetheless, it is part of the alignment either because it has determined that revision of the international status quo is harmful to its interests or because it recognizes participation may lead to profit. Among these alignment members can be profiteers, similar to Randall Schweller's jackals.⁸⁹ While Schweller argues that jackals are part of a revisionist alignment, they can be members of the status quo alignment. Since they do not actively participate in achieving goals, they join the alignment because they can gain from it. While they do not seek significant revision in the sub-system, the profiteer tries to revise the alignment goals or manipulate the leader so to generate the greatest self-benefit. As such, this follower's contribution to the alignment ends with vocal support of the leader's goals, possibly including voting in favor of them, but does not include any significant actions to help meet them.

Scared Follower

The *scared* follower does not accept goals nor does it take action. While the rhetoric of the passive follower acknowledges the attempt at revisionism, its identity ends there. It does not suggest that it supports the alignment's social purposes. In essence, the scared follower is a cheerleader. While on the field, and associated with one side, it does not play the game.

For the most part, a state that takes this position cannot hide, most often because of its proximity to the threat. Similar to Randall Schweller's lambs (Robert Kelley even calls them sheep), this follower seeks the protection that an alignment can give.⁹⁰

Alienated Follower

While examination of the leader – follower relational comparison does not concentrate on the follower's power to determine its follower identity, power nonetheless plays a role in the influence that the follower may have on the leader. Thus it is far more likely that a powerful state will be an alienate follower, acting independently against perceived change in the system without accepting the constitutive norms or social purposes of the alignment. This member is part of the alignment because of it accepts the cognitive model that motivates alignment formation.

This state may employ "alliance restraint" – using its follower identity to change the alignment's goals and actions.⁹¹ In addition to seeking changes in the alignment goals and actions, it may hope to gain authority to the point that it determines the constitutive norms and social purposes of the alignment. Either way, its actions represent an attempt to act as an internal balancer, to the point where it

may be a possible replacement leader. This state is similar to Chong Ja Ian's beleaguering state, which attempts to "undermine the influence and authority of the more powerful [state] as well as [its] ability to exercise power through disruption for the purposes of gaining specific concessions."⁹²

Pragmatic Follower

The *pragmatic* follower is different from the other four follower identities. This follower is, in reality, a combination of all the different followers, changing its status based on interests. It perceives each action and goal differently. Consequently, sometimes it takes action to fulfill alignment goals while other times goals garner no action or even lead to attempts to change the alignment goals. As such, it responds to revisionism based on its analysis of the different elements of the problem, leading to a conformist or passive follower identity regarding one goal or desired action, and exemplary regarding another. This state is recognized as an alignment member because of its declared systemic motivation only.

Power in Follower Identity

Having established these five follower identities based on a social construct of relational comparisons between the leader and followers that determines acceptance of social purposes and active participation in constitutive norms, the next question is how power plays a role within that same dynamic. Kenneth F. Janda notes that, while not all power relations are leader-follower relationships, leader-follower relations are inherently characterized by power-wielder–power-recipient links.⁹³ Thus, the relational comparison is also a function of the position of the state within the sub-systemic hierarchy. Power helps to determine which states can vie for

leadership or use its follower identity (like that described in the discussion about alienated followers) to influence the alignment's goals and actions.

Combining this social construct with Schweller's arguments about power in the sub-system suggests that weaker states in an alignment will probably have greater influence if they maintain a higher level follower identity. Since weaker states' influence as alienated followers is limited by their lack of power, they may try to manipulate the leader through an exemplary follower identity, though not all weaker states will utilize this option. With power determining a state's weight in the alignment hierarchy, stronger states are more likely to wield their *power* to manipulate the alignment goals and actions while weak states are more likely to use their similarity to the leader to influence the goals and actions. Unlike the situation during the Cold War, membership in a post-Cold War alignment does not require weaker states to surrender their identity.⁹⁴ As such, some states in the alignment can seek leadership positions, resulting in competition as each tries to control the social purposes and constitutive norms of the alignment by broadening their power base.

Examining Followership in Response to WMD proliferation

This dissertation uses a comparative analysis of the follower identities to determine the level of followership in response to the WMD proliferation. In order to do this it incorporates a social construct to identify changes in follower identity levels for each follower state throughout the post-Cold War period. Comparing the different alignment member's follower identities over time establishes changes in the level of followership, representing alignment cohesion.

This paradigm may be difficult for neo-realists, neo-liberals or constructivists to accept. Since follower identity is dependent upon the comparative relationship with the leader, change in either the leader's or follower's responses to proliferation may lead to dynamic changes in the follower's group identity. It is important, however, to recognize that this group identity is specific to the cognitive model and systemic dichotomy examined. It is clear that, if the examination were to focus on a different form of systemic revisionism, each state's overall identity within the international milieu is less likely to change or will change more slowly. For example: since Israel is considered by many to be a WMD proliferator – having not signed the NPT or other WMD non-proliferation norms – it should, if we were examining it through the status-quo/revisionist dichotomy, also be considered a revisionist state. It is the combination of its perception of proliferation as revisionism on the systemic level *and* its acceptance of the Western cognitive model in the sub-system that allows it to be a member of the status-quo alignment.

Furthermore, while it is possible, and likely, that changes at the systemic level will appear to directly influence alignment cohesion, that influence is dependent upon the relational comparison that determines follower identity. Thus, the

followership paradigm *must*: 1. Establish the recognition of an “other,” in this case elements in the WMD proliferation chain, within the international system that leads to alignment formation and the creation of a sub-system; 2. Determine the level of each alignment member’s follower identity in response to WMD proliferation through a relational comparison with the alignment leader and how the level of follower identity changed over time; and 3. Compare the different states’ levels of follower identities over time to find the level of alignment followership in the post-Cold War period.

While each state’s response to WMD proliferation can stand alone as a case study in follower–leader antiproliferation relations, and a comparative analysis that foregoes the determination of follower identity might demonstrate similarity in the states’ strategic responses to WMD proliferation, neither of these provides the parameters for establishing cohesion within the alignment. Thus, when the follower identities documented through the case studies are compared in the followership paradigm they help determine if the West responded collectively to WMD proliferation in the post-Cold War period. As such the followership paradigm presented here provides a model for examining followership in other areas of international relations as well.

Chapter 3: WMD Proliferation and Antiproliferation

The previous chapter describes the followership paradigm and argues that the first stage in this framework requires the recognition of revisionism within the international system. While the post-Cold War period contains many status quo and revisionist interests, this chapter investigates WMD proliferation as systemic revisionism and presents the different elements that must combine for successful proliferation to occur.

In response to WMD proliferation as systemic revisionism, the followership paradigm examines state identities in the Western status quo alignment. As such, this chapter also presents antiproliferation strategies, which are used to determine the level of follower identity. This examination of the WMD proliferation chain and the antiproliferation strategies lays the groundwork for the application of the followership paradigm in the study of Western alignment cohesion in response to WMD proliferation in the post-Cold War period.

The WMD Proliferation Chain of Causation

As previously mentioned, elements from Ferguson and Potter's proliferation "chain of causation" represent systemic revisionism in the post-Cold War period. A close look at the chain of causation shows four components of WMD proliferation: *End User, Supplier, Transporter and Financer*.⁹⁵ Anthony Cordesman,⁹⁶ as well as Richard Falkenrath, Robert Newman, and Bradley Thayer,⁹⁷ argue that links between states, between state and non-state actors, and between non-state actors allow proliferation to occur. The response of each state, and the group of states (or alignment), to the different components allows the determination of followership.

For the purpose of this dissertation, the *supplier* takes on Glenn E. Schweitzer and Carole C. Dorsch's⁹⁸ physical aspects as well as Nadine Gurr and Benjamine Cole's⁹⁹ human aspects. As such, the supplier is a state, group, or person who can provide an intact weapon or provide material, technology, or knowledge to create a WMD or bypass an intact weapon's security system.

The *transporter* aspect has the ability to provide national and transnational shipping of material and personnel. As Rensselaer Lee notes, it can use front companies, officials with access to government transport, quasi-governmental organizations, and organized crime to move supplies for the end-user.¹⁰⁰ This component can also move a weapon to a target.

The *financer* component incorporates any actor that provides or transfers funds for proliferation activities. The systems can be legal or illegal, but some connection to proliferation must exist. According to David Cooper, this component of proliferation is a key element in understanding state responses to proliferation.¹⁰¹

The *end-user* can be an organization or a state. An organization attempting to attain WMDs for the illegitimate use of force against civilian populations is trying to change the systemic status quo, thus meeting two of Martha Crenshaw's factors for defining a terrorist organization: an illegitimate target (civilian population) and the act itself is not a legitimate one (the use of WMD).¹⁰² A state attempting to gain WMDs is, by its very nature, attempting to change the systemic status quo. Either can be the end-user in the proliferation chain.

By establishing if each state has recognized the different proliferation elements, I am able to determine how systemic revisionism has changed. Changes in

perception regarding the elements of proliferation determine whether there was a rise in the level of WMD proliferation as systemic revisionism.

Antiproliferation

While Western state acknowledgment of and responses to the components of WMD proliferation establish the status quo/revisionist dichotomy in the international system, these national responses also determine whether states have allied in response to WMD proliferation. These antiproliferation responses also determine each state's follower identity within the alignment subsystem.

Instead of examining antiproliferation based on Cold War strategies, including arms control, trade controls, and deterrence, David Cooper divides antiproliferation into three generally accepted strategies: 1. Capability/Denial, 2. Non-possession/Norm-Building, and 3. Consequence/Management.¹⁰³ Cooper's antiproliferation division builds on the bipolar rooted concepts, like arms and trade controls, by examining the interplay between these strategies and providing states with a spectrum of intertwining strategies in response to proliferation. In addition, this division recognizes the elements inherent in WMD proliferation and provides an in-depth response to those elements.

Capability/Denial

Capability/Denial is, for the most part, supply-side antiproliferation. It includes export controls, compliance mechanisms, and military force to deny the acquisition of WMDs. This form of antiproliferation uses the approach of preventative nonproliferation, which seeks to deny NBC capabilities to end-users that do not yet have proscribed weapons. In addition to targeting ready-made

weapons, capability/denial targets equipment, technology, services, and information that may help an end-user to acquire a WMD.

As such, this strategy does not take into account end-user intentions.

Nonetheless, while supply-side antiproliferation targets “have not” states and all NSAs (since their acquisition of such a weapon would change the international status quo), this strategy does not mark every “have not” for antiproliferation. For that reason, capability/denial antiproliferation specifically responds to the supplier, financier, and transporter components of the proliferation chain.

The success of this strategy depends on the cooperation of supplier and transporter countries, as well as national and multinational corporations. Lack of cooperation can lead to inconsistent rules and regulations that allow for the eventual acquisition by end-users. As such, it specifically excludes possible recipients and “have nots” from the antiproliferation process, regardless of the reason they seek to acquire NBC components. Thus, the success of the capability/denial strategy does not require, nor ask for, the consent or participation of proliferation end-users.

Indeed, the success and effectiveness of this antiproliferation strategy depends predominantly on an end-user’s need for material, technology, and experience from external suppliers. While less effective against state end-users that can rely on internal sources for most of their WMD research, this strategy can still affect the success of a WMD program, especially if military force is used against the end-user.

Overall, this form of antiproliferation acts as a means of preventing both qualitative and quantitative proliferation. This form of antiproliferation cannot undo previously established NBC capabilities, though it does seek to influence such programs so that end-users find continued proliferation unprofitable. Nonetheless

this strategy may target end-users militarily or through other means in an attempt to either dissuade them from continuing to develop WMD capabilities or to deny the development of capabilities that have begun development.

While much of the capability/denial strategy requires cooperation, each state must choose which parts of this strategy to incorporate into its antiproliferation strategies. Thus, some states may decide to use unilateral military means as their primary form of capability/denial, while others may seek to use multilateral supply-side regimes and export controls to halt WMD proliferation. The predominance of one form of capability/denial does not preclude the use of another form in response to WMD proliferation.

States that lean towards this strategy, especially states that rely heavily on military capability/denial, tend to target specific end-users regarding the denial of an NBC item. While capability/denial may also target the financier component of the proliferation chain, the difficulty of identifying proliferation-specific financial transactions makes this far less likely. As such, while capability/denial may include the financier component, non-possession/norm-building strategies tend to be more effective against this aspect of proliferation.

As expected, capability/denial has both strengths and weaknesses. Researchers have argued that technology diffusion makes this approach to antiproliferation superfluous and ineffective. The effectiveness of this strategy is limited by NBC dual-use technologies, especially chemical and biological, that support natural growth and expansion in both industrialized and Third World states.¹⁰⁴ While technology diffusion does not nullify the capability/denial strategy, especially against nuclear proliferation, the argument has been made that it weakens this strategy's usefulness

in response to chemical and biological proliferation, since legitimate businesses and researchers use biological and chemical precursors far more than similar nuclear technology and precursors.¹⁰⁵

In addition, rogue suppliers and transporters make it difficult to apply the capability/denial strategy effectively.¹⁰⁶ As long as they do not participate or cooperate, supply-side antiproliferation needs to use coercion as a part of capability/denial. This coercion, however, can come at a price, as it may drive end-users towards further proliferation to deny, or counter, external pressures.¹⁰⁷

In response to these arguments against capability/denial, there are those who argue that supply-side antiproliferation's effectiveness far outweighs the threat that technology diffusion represents. Researchers who support this strategy point to several underlying tactics inherent in capability/denial. First, while technology diffusion may suggest that states can acquire NBC capabilities through the process of natural industrial growth, that growth is dependent on foreign aid. As such, capability/denial has the best chance at forestalling proliferation while, at the same time, allowing continued industrial growth.

Furthermore, supply-side antiproliferation creates chokepoints, which limit an end-user's efforts to obtain NBC precursors, expertise, and technologies. While these chokepoints also affect legitimate acquisition of these items, capability/denial antiproliferation's influence in this realm is limited.¹⁰⁸ These chokepoints do, however, directly influence the costs of acquisition, thus decreasing the possibility of end-users obtaining source material. While supply-side antiproliferation may not succeed in denying an end-user NBC capabilities, it can halt further qualitative development.¹⁰⁹

Interestingly, those who claim that capability/denial is ineffective, as well as those arguing the positive influence of supply-side antiproliferation, accept the strategy as a way to meet the greater antiproliferation goal.¹¹⁰ As such, they accept that the capability/denial strategy plays a critical role in responding to WMD proliferation.

Non-possession/Norm-Building

While the capability/denial strategies primarily target the supplier, transporter, and, indirectly, financier components, non-possession/norm-building seeks to establish universally accepted norms that lead to non-possession, as well as regulations regarding the funding of NBC proliferation. Among the forms of non-possession/norm-building are strategies geared towards global non-possession treaties, non-possession mechanisms, and changes in the international system that lead to indirect reductions in the number of WMDs. In addition, this form of antiproliferation seeks to create norms that can target end-users and the financier component of proliferation.

Unlike capability/denial strategies, this form of antiproliferation explicitly seeks the inclusion of proliferation end-users, in essence using peer pressure and international agreements to help control proliferation. This form of nonproliferation is a preventative antiproliferation strategy based on legal norms, using non-possession, non-transference, and non-assistance pledges, irrespective of participants' latent capabilities.¹¹¹ These agreements generally include the elimination of any WMDs or NBC precursors acquired "in contravention to the nonproliferation status quo."¹¹² This form of antiproliferation may use military force

against end-users, but does so reluctantly and as the last option in response to end-user proliferation after all other options have been exhausted.

This form of antiproliferation, though useful against state end-users, is extremely limited in response to NSAs. While countries may agree to forswear a specific weapon, NSA end-users are far less likely to accept international guidelines and treaties. Thus, states must enforce these mutually binding treaties on non-state actors within their borders.

States that take the non-possession/norm-building strategy as their predominant form of antiproliferation work to build, broaden, and strengthen multilateral agreements that ban the possession of NBCs, as well as guarantee non-assistance to potential end-users. As such, these states attempt to form all-inclusive, consensual, nonproliferation regimes in an effort to eliminate the need for nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. In so doing, states seeking non-possession/norm-building as the predominant form of antiproliferation also include countries that do not have NBC capabilities, as well as states that are unable to obtain such capabilities.

Interestingly, in the nonproliferation realm, norm building does not take on generally accepted characteristics. Generally, a norm is described as a consensus based on a previously accepted idea that evolved around a specific issue. In the case of nonproliferation, however, norms are crafted from carefully designed legal frameworks that require states' acknowledged participation, and are only binding to those participating parties.¹¹³ This does not preclude, however, the attempt by member states to universalize the norm, as has been done in the Non-Proliferation

Treaty. Nonetheless, while the state members try to universalize the norm, the non-members are not bound by the legal framework set up by the participants.

In response to this, states that seek to put into practice strategies of non-possession/norm-building may use coercion to bring non-participatory states into multilateral regimes and treaties. Thus, government consent is not necessarily based on a state's goodwill, but on the possibility for retribution or punishment. Coercion may also stimulate acceptance of norms through penalties automatically incurred by non-participation, like the economic penalties imposed on non-members of the CWC.

Unlike capability/denial strategies, these non-possession/norm-building strategies are formulated from a demand-side perspective. As such, this form of antiproliferation must focus on states seeking NBC weapons, and not on facilities or precursors that *may* be used for weaponization.¹¹⁴ Thus, the focus of norm-building/non-possession is not the supply of technology or other elements that lead to WMD capabilities, but rather capabilities alone.¹¹⁵ Non-possession/norm-building “[d]isarmament practices seek to reduce or eliminate the weapons which pose military threats, not to constrain the movement of technologies underlying those capabilities.”¹¹⁶

In addition, states seeking to use non-possession/norm-building try to influence the international status quo to limit the perceived necessity for non-NBC states to acquire WMDs. Thus, a state determined to incorporate non-possession/norm-building as its predominant strategy attempts to persuade states that possess nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons to forgo their armament, or at least reduce it. While these states are trying to change the international status quo,

they are not attempting to do so through a conflict of interest, but rather through the mutually perceived interests of antiproliferation. As such, they work within an alignment to influence their members to participate in the various nonproliferation non-possession/norm-building regimes.

Nonetheless, there are significant downsides to the non-possession/norm-building strategy. Researchers who argue against non-possession/norm-building note that participation in this framework lays the groundwork for breakout to occur. It does so by legitimizing and encouraging the expansion and enhancement of nuclear, biological, or chemical research, as long as such research is subject to safeguards and other treaty-based inspections.¹¹⁷ Thus, participants are not acting illegally, since research into defense against NBC capabilities is not dissimilar to WMD weaponization.¹¹⁸ Instead, they are acting within the framework created by the non-possession norm.

Another possibility is that participants may bypass the norm, possibly leading to a breakout. In addition to regular breakout (when states use the framework norms to expand their NBC research and thus reach a point of no return), states can cheat in an attempt to circumvent the norm. The possibility of cheating, as a means of bypassing non-possession obligations, is dependent on the effectiveness of the verification regimes and the capabilities of the cheater. As such, cheating is associated with the capability of applying dual-use technologies as a camouflage for “breakout in place.”¹¹⁹ Thus, cheating is different from regular breakout because it circumvents the norms established by the non-possession framework rather than reaching a point of breakout possibility within the guidelines set forth.

While negative perceptions of the non-possession/norm-building strategies argue that the dependency on universality and effectiveness of verification are important for the success of nonproliferation/norm building, those who support these strategies argue that these norms should not be judged based on their short-term effect, but rather their influence over time. In essence, those who support non-possession/norm-building argue that the treaty framework not only expresses the existing consensus among the participating states but also influences and changes state interests, strategies, and even identities over time.¹²⁰ Thus, the lack of universality as an argument against non-possession/norm-building is irrelevant, since nonparticipants may be influenced to join (through coercion, peer pressure, or even changes in perception). Also, those who support this strategy note that this approach is not threatened by the spread of dual-use capabilities, unlike capability/denial.¹²¹

In addition, while some researchers point to the lack of short-term results from this form of antiproliferation, others have argued that non-possession/norm-building does provide significant short-term gains. The most significant gain is that the existence of a legal prohibition establishes an inherent disincentive, regardless of the likelihood of detection, for covert possession by participants, since suspected violation of the norm effects the perceived trustworthiness of the state in question.¹²² Nonetheless, even those who argue against non-possession/norm-building as the predominant antiproliferation strategy accept the need for international norms as a means of separating the “good guys” from the “bad guys” as well as making sure that those states participating remain in good standing.¹²³

Consequence/Management

Consequence/Management incorporates counterproliferation, defense against the use of WMDs, deterrence, and threatened reprisal for the use of WMDs as responses to end-user WMD proliferation.¹²⁴ This form of antiproliferation is predicated on two principles: 1) That WMD proliferation can be stopped through the use of countermeasures should weaponization occur, and 2) That management of end-user acquisition of NBCs is possible through deterrence, and the threat of military action against an end-user. Both of these principles argue that end-users recognize the futility in proliferation and either stop before achieving NBC capabilities or achieve WMD weapons but can be denied the potential to use them.¹²⁵

While deterrence is part of the consequence/management antiproliferation strategy, in-kind retaliation has been rendered a non-option in response to CBW since the early 1990s. As such, nuclear or conventional weapons have been used as the main deterrent against a CBW attack. Critics have argued that of these forms of deterrence are inefficient because of the unlikelihood of a state responding with nuclear weapons and the inability of conventional capabilities to deter chemical and biological weapons use.¹²⁶ These arguments are irrelevant, however, except when discussing those states that perceive the international imbalance as a direct threat to their regimes, since this can lead to misperceptions and miscalculations. For states that proliferate in order to overcome their sense of powerlessness and insecurity, deterrence may have no effect since the motivation for proliferation is deterrence.

Furthermore, counterproliferation, which seeks to deny end-users the possibility of using an NBC, is respected as one of the primary pillars of

antiproliferation. Interestingly, the only aspect of *counterproliferation* that has faced recent controversy is missile defense, specifically US-supported missile defense systems, with run counter to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an established nonproliferation norm.

Those who argue for consequence/management to be the predominant antiproliferation strategy do so from the perspective of unsuccessful non-possession/norm-building and capabilities/denial. This does not mean that they do not perceive non-possession/norm-building, as well as capability/denial, as complementary responses, but rather that these responses are secondary to consequence/management's counterproliferation protection and countermeasures, as well as deterrence.¹²⁷

Connecting the Proliferation Chain and Antiproliferation

While states may decide to apply one strategy as the predominant means of antiproliferation, these strategies are generally combined in response to the proliferation chain. As noted, emphasis on one strategy over another can affect each state's responses to different components of the WMD proliferation chain. Thus, while states respond to WMD proliferation by weighing their options along the spectrum of capability/denial, non-possession/norm-building, and consequence/management, these inevitably intertwine to form their antiproliferation policy.

These policies reflect the states' recognition of WMD proliferation as an attempt to revise the systemic status quo. Furthermore, the decision to emphasize one form of antiproliferation over another often depends on the identification of different actors in the proliferation chain. As states acknowledge the different components of proliferation, and the actors that take part in each component, their antiproliferation policies tend to incorporate all three strategies. Nonetheless, each state's perception of the level of systemic revisionism by the different components may lead to the predominance of one form of antiproliferation over another.

The determination of followership in response to the WMD proliferation chain of causation starts by examining the follower state responses to systemic revisionism and the leader's proposed WMD antiproliferation strategies. After determining the strategies chosen by the follower states, a comparison of the strategies establishes the follower identity level. Comparing the identity levels in response to WMD proliferation establishes the level of followership.

State Follower Identities

This section focuses on is the first two steps in determining the level of alignment followership in response to WMD proliferation. It is divided into three chapters, with each chapter examining one follower state's identity in response to WMD proliferation and US policies to counter that proliferation.

As noted previously, the examination of followership in response to WMD proliferation requires the assessment of follower states' identities to the rise of proliferation revisionists. Each chapter in this section first takes a chronological look at changes in each state's overall antiproliferation policies as a result of changes in the level of WMD proliferation and US responses to these changes. This reinforces the assumptions made in the previous section by demonstrating the acceptance of the Western cognitive model and the perception of WMD proliferation as systemic revisionism. After each chapter's chronological examination of the relational comparisons between the follower and leader over time, each concludes with an examination of the state's follower level for the different antiproliferation strategies presented above and demonstrates the shifting follower identity in relation to systemic revisionism and the leader's vision for systemic victory.

The following chapters begin with a history of each state's participation in Cold War antiproliferation. This lays the groundwork for the examination of post-Cold War Western antiproliferation goals and actions in response to elements of the proliferation chain. In each chapter the 1989–2005 timeframe is divided into three parts, 1989–1995, 1995–2001, 2001–2005. Delimitating the time into 3 parts allows for points in the examination of follower identity change and later to changes in the level of alignment followership. While the level of followership will be determined in

a later chapter, utilizing a year by year comparison of follower identities, the 3 periods provide a slightly longer framework that helps to judge adjustments in antiproliferation responses over time.

Each of these chapters can stand alone as an examination of the state's post-Cold War antiproliferation policies, cooperation with the US in antiproliferation and follower identity in the Western alignment. The first chapter examines Britain's antiproliferation policies. This chapter is slightly longer and more descriptive than those that come after it. This is because it explains US policy changes in depth. In the chapters on Australia and Israel that come after Britain these policies may be mentioned with less explanation or description. Changes in US antiproliferation strategies that were irrelevant or ignored by Britain are, of course, explained comprehensively in the chapters where they are relevant.

Follower Identities in the post-Cold War

The application of the followership paradigm in response to WMD proliferation requires the analysis of each state's antiproliferation policy in the context of the three umbrella strategies discussed above: capability/denial, non-possession/norm-building, and consequence/management. As discussed in the chapter on WMD proliferation, these three strategies are responses to elements of the proliferation chain of causation. When examining each state's antiproliferation follower identity, it is essential to determine how the changes in strategy were a result of changes in systemic revisionism, and whether the strategies coincided with the policies of the nominal alignment leader. Thus, the determination of each state's level of follower identity revolves around the relational comparison between the follower and leader during the period researched.

While this dissertation does not use quantitative analysis for the examination of followership, it is useful to use a graphical representation to see the change in follower identity and compare the different identities over time. In each examination of follower identity below graphs are used to track the changes in strategic follower level which are compared to determine each state's mode follower identity over time. Since follower identity levels are absolute in this research (there is no intermediary step between exemplary follower and conformist for example) no "average" is expressed in the graphs shown. Instead the follower identity level is expressed as the mode follower identity through the comparison of the different strategic follower levels.

The determination of follower identity revolves around the analysis of the relational comparisons that can be identified. In order to determine the level of follower identities for each state in response to changes in the level of WMD proliferation, as well as changes in US-defined Western antiproliferation purposes and norms, the analysis of follower identity examines changes in each state's antiproliferation strategies. The analysis of each state is divided into two parts: the first examines the change the follower identity level for each strategy and the second determines the changes in overall follower identity level over time.

Thus, the strategies function as the first tier in the determination of each state's follower identity, and how that identity changed. They represent the full spectrum of possible social purposes and constitutive norms a follower state could acknowledge or participate in as part of the Western alignment. While state's policymakers may lean towards one or another of these strategies, all three are generally incorporated into each state's overall proliferation identity. While the

capability/denial strategy is directed at all the elements of the proliferation chain and utilizes unilateral military force or other coercive means (such as sanctions, export controls, and national legislation) to target the proliferation elements, non-possession/norm-building is a preventative antiproliferation strategy based on international norms, using non-possession, non-transference, and non-assistance pledges, irrespective of participants' latent capabilities, to target suppliers and end-user states (and where possible NSAs).¹²⁸ In addition to these two strategies, consequence/management incorporates counterproliferation limit the effectiveness of NBC weapons (for civilians and the military) and deterrence to reinforce the futility of proliferation to potential end-users.

After establishing the follower levels for each strategy the analysis of follower identity then determines the predominant follower level of the strategies implemented. This is done through an analysis of each state's recognition and response to WMD proliferation elements and their acceptance of the alignment's social purposes and constitutive norms (as strategic goals and actions) in response to proliferation.

Once I have determined that all three states recognized WMD proliferation as systemic revisionism, that the follower states acknowledged the overall cognitive model determined by the alignment leader and, consequently, that changes occurred in each state's follower identity, it will then be possible to examine how and why alignment cohesion changed in the post-Cold War.

Chapter 4: British responses to WMD Proliferation

History: Cold War Antiproliferation

Four systemic factors motivated British security policy after World War II: the desire to remain an international power, fear of Germany's possible rearmament, the need for immediate economic recovery, and the goal of becoming a nuclear weapon state (NWS). The UK goal of becoming a NWS directly contradicted America's goals for the post-WWII system. Between 1946 and 1957, US policies regarding nuclear sharing developed under the framework of the McMahon Act, which prohibited the US from assisting in Britain's nuclear research and development programs.¹²⁹ At the same time, the US proposed a formal alliance with Britain, though it maintained its nonproliferation goal of denying Britain nuclear technology. Since this alliance would give the UK a nuclear patron, it further forestalled Britain's attempts to gain or test a nuclear device.¹³⁰ By 1948, the US and the UK agreed to some information exchanges, contingent on the denial of information to third parties, including Australia.¹³¹

During this transitional period, the US perceived the Soviet Union as the predominant revisionist and, as such, geared its policies to respond to USSR nuclear ambitions. US policymakers pushed for an embargo as the best strategy for preventing the USSR and its satellites from attaining strategic, and specifically WMD, technology. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 used coercive tactics to push Britain, and other Western states, to join the US in establishing the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM).¹³² This was an attempt at both economic warfare against the USSR and its proxies, and was also the first multilateral

“Western” antiproliferation mechanism, using export controls as way of countering the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical supplies to these states.¹³³

The 1948 Mundt Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act also forbade European countries from exporting any US-supplied commodities, or products that contained such a commodity, to a European country that could not receive a US export license by direct application. These export controls ran counter to Britain’s national interests, since they limited the UK’s goal of expanding its influence through trade.¹³⁴

After the USSR detonated its first nuclear weapon in 1949, the system changed from unipolar to bi-polar, leaving Britain with three options: balance against the USSR rise in power, bandwagon with the USSR, or try and remain neutral. Britain’s alliance with the US, and the cooperation that was already taking place, led to Britain’s acceptance of US leadership in response to Soviet nuclear capabilities.

Nevertheless, in 1952, Britain tested its first nuclear bomb, counter to US antiproliferation goals. This led to further US pressure on Britain to halt its nuclear cooperation with Australia. Britain realized that the costs of nuclear development were prohibitive and that the immediate threat of a Soviet attack meant it had to coordinate its responses to proliferation with the US.¹³⁵ Thus, the primary threat was the proliferation of nuclear technology and supplies to the Soviet Union and its satellite states, as possible end-users, and not a nuclear West Germany. This did not, however, reduce the US goal of denying its allies nuclear technology and know-how.

By the late 1950s, Britain’s desire to maintain its Great Power status, and to garner greater political authority, influenced its position on nuclear arms control.

Preservation of the special relationship with the United States, and security, motivated British interests in disarmament/arms control discussions.¹³⁶

In parallel, US – Soviet talks discussing a ban on nuclear testing started in 1957. On the one hand the British responded it as a useful way of furthering the East–West détente and halting further proliferation (both horizontal and vertical). Alternatively, this mitigated Britain’s ability to improve its nuclear arsenal, which British policymakers believed was vital to British security and stature.¹³⁷

To counter this, Britain persuaded the US to amend the McMahon Act and in 1958 the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was changed to permit Britain exclusive nuclear cooperation with the US. During this time, the USSR, US and UK were holding talks that eventually led to the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963. As a quid-pro-quo to the changes in US nuclear policy, British Prime Minister (PM) Harold Macmillan agreed to support the US proposal suspending nuclear weapons testing, as long as the US provided information regarding nuclear weapons manufacture, especially small warhead production.¹³⁸

During this process, another non-proliferation treaty was under discussion. Irish Minister for External Affairs Frank Aiken launched the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) debate in 1958.¹³⁹ The proposed treaty enhanced Britain’s status as a nuclear power, its political benefits, and its stature by limiting the recognized nuclear weapon states to those countries with acknowledged nuclear capabilities. This was because the NPT was not based on the East-West Cold War division that had guided nuclear antiproliferation, but rather on a division between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). Indeed, “Britain, the third nuclear power and junior partner of America, was placed in an intermediate position between the

two superpowers and non-nuclear weapon states because France and China strongly denounced the treaty and abstained from negotiations.”¹⁴⁰

While Britain accepted US goals for a viable nonproliferation treaty, it also perceived the NPT as a way to mitigate its fear of West Germany attaining nuclear weapons, since West Germany was not a nuclear weapons state at the time. Thus, it was able to assist the US in meeting its goals while at the same time maintaining its own antiproliferation interests.

Because of this, Britain strongly opposed the proposal for a collective Western nuclear force, since that would have given West Germany access to a nuclear armament. Fearing British influence on the NPT negotiations, US President Lyndon B. Johnson decided to hold direct talks with the Soviet Union. This also lessened the likelihood of West Germany not participating because of the have/have not divide that Britain supported.

While these talks were taking place, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) informed British Foreign Secretary George Brown that the Soviets and Americans were considering a dissemination agreement, thus circumventing the issue of collective nuclear forces by denying the transfer of nuclear weapons, or nuclear explosive devices, to “any recipient whatsoever.”¹⁴¹ Britain feared that this would limit the cooperation between the US and UK as agreed upon in 1958.

While this was unacceptable to British PM Harold Wilson, the worry caused by this proposal subsided once the British realized that dissemination only referred to nuclear warheads, which Britain could not attain because of a US law forbidding their export, and not delivery systems. This was important because the delivery systems were essential for Britain to maintain its deterrent capabilities.¹⁴²

In response to the NPT, Britain enacted legislation designed to “make provision for giving effect to an International Agreement for the application of Safeguards in the United Kingdom in connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”¹⁴³ The act gave legal backing to the September 6, 1976 agreement between the UK, the European Atomic Energy Community, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the application of safeguards in the United Kingdom. These safeguards would help maintain antiproliferation and disallow proliferation from UK sources.

These events show that Britain was unwilling to accept non-dissemination at any cost, even though its goals were similar to those of the US. Britain took action based on the role defined for it within the framework of the Cold War bipolar system, acting as supporter to the US during the PTBT and taking a background role in the NPT negotiations.

By the mid-1970s, representatives from the Soviet Union, Britain, France, Germany, Canada, and Japan, led by representatives of the United States, met in London with the goal of reaching an understanding to halt the export of “special nuclear materials, technology, and key equipment relating to plutonium reprocessing, uranium enrichment, and heavy water production.”¹⁴⁴ Two years later the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was created, and with it a set of nuclear export control rules. The NSG went beyond both the IAEA’s statute and the NPT. Unlike the NPT, the NSG’s rules were secretive and discriminatory against destinations that presented a proliferation threat. Britain was an active partner in the NSG antiproliferation framework.

Britain displayed two distinct nuclear antiproliferation goals throughout the Cold War:

1. Deny the USSR and its allies' access to nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) material, and
2. Deny West Germany access to NBC weapons.

By accepting the East-West antiproliferation goal, sponsored by the US in the form of COCOM, Britain fulfilled the first goal. It fulfilled the second goal by accepting the "have/have nots" antiproliferation goal advanced by both the superpowers for the NPT, as well as by participating in the NSG.

Britain took a similar stance regarding chemical and biological weapons. In the early 1960s, Britain expressed strong support for US goals regarding the disarmament and non-proliferation of biological weapons.¹⁴⁵ In the late 1960s, Britain tabled a proposal that strengthened the ban on biological weapons in the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In 1968, the Rt. Honorable F. Mulley argued at the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD) that:

The problems involved in seeking to go beyond the Geneva Protocol seem greater, and international opinion less clear, in the field of chemical weapons than in that of biological weapons...It seems, therefore, that one answer may be to make a distinction between chemical and biological weapons in our approach to the problems involved. I would like to suggest that we should try to go beyond the Geneva Protocol for both chemical and biological warfare, but I think it may be easier first to tackle agents of biological warfare and seek to conclude an instrument on biological warfare which would go beyond the Geneva Protocol and ban the production and possession of agents of biological warfare.¹⁴⁶

This statement did two things. First, it distinguished between biological and chemical weapons. Second, it opened a discussion about reinforcing the Geneva

Protocols, or, as Mulley argued, going beyond the Protocols to establish a ban on the production and possession of biological warfare agents. In its original proposal, Britain did not target weapons as the significant feature of the convention. Instead, it aimed to disallow the use of such weapons.

This was not, however, the proposal Britain tabled at the ENCD in 1969. That proposal prohibited the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons. It also included an inspection clause in response to alleged violations. The US supported Britain's proposal as complementary to its goals. The Soviet Union offered a counterproposal that did not include provisions for inspections.

These proposals led to direct superpower negotiations regarding biological weapons in the summer of 1971. These negotiations severely diluted the original proposal and sidelined Britain. The result was a convention that lacked the entire first article, as proposed by Britain, which banned the use of biological and toxic weapons.

The Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC) was approved in September 1971. Britain formally supported this proposal because it "respected [the] spirit of compromise to the maximum extent," though it did not meet the level of disarmament and antiproliferation expected.¹⁴⁷

Britain enacted legislation in the winter of 1973–1974 in response to the BTWC, and the Biological Weapon's Act went into effect in February 1974. This was an "Act to prohibit the development, production, acquisition, and possession of certain biological agents and toxins and of biological weapons."¹⁴⁸ This act singled out end-users as the proliferation element to be countered.

Britain's acquiescence to the US policy, vis-à-vis biological weapons antiproliferation, represented the sacrificing of its goals for those of the leader. This was the basis of Cold War leader–follower relations. By enacting legislation, Britain took action to attain the goals set forth in the BTWC.

In the early 1960s, the ENCD also began discussing the possibility of a comprehensive prohibition on chemical weapons (CW).¹⁴⁹ These talks made little progress throughout the 1960s.¹⁵⁰ In 1976, Britain attempted to breathe new life into the negotiation by tabling a draft Chemical Weapons Convention. By this time, the superpowers had established bilateral negotiations to reach a realistic ban on chemical weapons. This led to a lull in multilateral discussions on this topic until the early 1980s.¹⁵¹

In March 1980, the Ad Hoc Working group on Chemical Weapons was established in the Committee on Disarmament (CD). The United States presented a paper describing the process for verifying stockpile destruction in 1983. The US strategy combined on-site instruments with continuous monitoring by international inspectors. That same year, British Minister of State to the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) Douglas Hurd proposed a verification process that monitored “precursors” (chemicals that were essential for producing chemical weapons). In 1984, Richard Luce, Hurd's successor, further proposed on-site inspection verification at the Conference on Disarmament (the new name of the Committee on Disarmament). These proposals were unacceptable to the USSR because of the intrusive inspections and monitoring of civil chemical industries.¹⁵²

Iraq's use of chemical weapons, in the mid-1980s, led to greater motivation for the establishment of a CW regime. In 1984, Vice President George H.W. Bush Sr.

presented a draft treaty for a ban on “the development, acquisition, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons.”¹⁵³ This plan included systematic on-site inspection of chemical weapon facilities to ensure compliance.

Another response to the use of CW in the Iran-Iraq War was the establishment of the Australia Group (AG) by the US, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, and the 10 European Committee (EC) members. This group met in June 1985 and sought to establish a system of export controls on precursor chemicals, especially those chemicals used in the war.¹⁵⁴ The Soviet Union did not accept the US draft treaty as the basis for a CW ban until 1987, after Britain presented a paper to the CD supporting the US proposal and explaining the steps required to achieve the ban.¹⁵⁵

Regarding CW, Britain’s role vacillated between active supporter and passive supporter of the US. It took a backseat role in the late 1970s at the express wishes of the US. It more actively pursued a CW ban in the 1980s in response to US goals.

Post-Cold War Antiproliferation

1989–1995

Theoretically the end of the Cold War should have brought an end to the East-West antiproliferation dynamic. This change should have led to a switch in Britain’s perception of antiproliferation removing a major factor encouraging Anglo-American cohesion during the Cold War. Instead, the propagation of WMDs by scientists, technicians, and others, arose as proliferation threats to the status quo.

In 1989, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher warned that the West had to address “the spread of the capability to manufacture nuclear and chemical weapons” as a future danger.¹⁵⁶ This perception of proliferation was dependent on the end-user. Thatcher noted that Britain worried “about the proliferation and use of

those (chemical) weapons in the Middle East.”¹⁵⁷ In particular, she highlighted Libya and other Arab countries as end-users in this regard.¹⁵⁸

In parallel, Thatcher clearly maintained an East-West attitude throughout her tenure. She discussed responses to proliferation in terms of deterrence, and mixed nuclear with conventional reactions in response to the Soviet threat. In 1990, Thatcher defined Britain’s perspective on antiproliferation as nuclear deterrence to combat WMD proliferation.¹⁵⁹

This led to Britain transferring its Cold War antiproliferation policies to Iraq, which was perceived as a proliferation end-user by both the US and the UK.¹⁶⁰ Thatcher did not suggest that the goal should be to stop Iraq from acquiring the weapon, though this was the underlying goal. Instead, she argued that the threat of retaliation by the West would mitigate Iraq’s use of WMDs even if Iraq were to acquire nuclear or further chemical capabilities. This did not allay the need for Britain to uphold its international obligations regarding the NPT and other regimes. Instead, it represented Britain’s antiproliferation goals as deterring the end-users, since they represented the status quo threats.¹⁶¹

During this time, the supplier element of the WMD proliferation chain gained recognition, as Iraq sought to attain NBC capabilities. Britain revamped its export controls, because of the greater recognition of this proliferation element, with The Export of Goods (Control) Order 1989.¹⁶² This Order came into effect in early 1990 and was essential for the seizure of nuclear triggers destined for Iraq during this time. The seizure of nuclear triggers “was an effective demonstration of our [British] commitment...to stop proliferation and of co-operation between the British and United States authorities.”¹⁶³ This change in policy led to greater coordination

between the US and Britain. It also led to similar changes in the antiproliferation goals by British and American policymakers. In a joint press conference, US President George H.W. Bush and Thatcher identified Iraq as a WMD end-user and recognized the need to act together to counter this proliferation element.¹⁶⁴

While they recognized Iraq as a potential end-user, both the US and Britain maintained the supplier/end-user antiproliferation strategies from the Cold War. These were based on COCOM, economic sanctions, and deterrence. Britain and the US both perceived diplomatic measures as the way to halt proliferation and attempted to use these measures to roll back Iraq's WMD capabilities and to force its withdrawal from Kuwait.¹⁶⁵

This changed, however, as President Bush prepared to announce the beginning of Operation Desert Storm in Iraq. British PM John Major declared that Britain accepted the destruction of NBC facilities as a main goal and acknowledged that Iraq was a proliferation end-user.¹⁶⁶ Bush's announcement established the destruction of Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological research, development, and production facilities through military means as a key goal of the war for the US-led coalition, and thus for Britain. This was the third time in history that force was openly used to stop or rollback proliferation. The first was the Cuban Missile Crisis and the second was Israel's bombing of Osirak in 1981.

The actions taken in Iraq did not, however, signify a significant change in American or British antiproliferation policy. Instead, this reinforced their stance that the use of force against WMD capabilities was designed to protect coalition troops, and Israel – in essence counterproliferation – and not a way to roll back an end-user's WMD capabilities.¹⁶⁷

After Operation Desert Storm, British and American policymakers began to realize the extent to which WMD proliferation threatened the systemic status quo.¹⁶⁸ In response to this, the US and Britain started to coalesce a response to WMD proliferation. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. Douglas Hurd, noted that Britain was working closely with the US to strengthen the existing regimes, as well as to reinforce its own export controls. This included securing “a commitment to the early negotiation of a chemical weapons convention and the strengthening of the biological weapons convention.”¹⁶⁹

Both American and British policy towards antiproliferation changed after the USSR disbanded in 1991. This transformation in the international system led to new states with NBC armament from the former Soviet Union, which meant that they might enter the international arena as WMD armed states and change the systemic status quo. Britain’s worry was somewhat alleviated after Hurd’s visit to the Newly Independent States (NIS).¹⁷⁰ Nonetheless there was a fear that the new states would maintain their WMD capabilities or that the weapons in these states would be lost/diverted to other states or non-state actors.¹⁷¹

In response to this threat, the US initiated the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. This program was originally designed to assist the former USSR in meeting its Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) obligations.¹⁷² This quickly changed as the lack of security, as well as the high number of unemployed WMD specialists in the former USSR, represented an immediate supplier proliferation threat. Britain supported this program and helped the US meet the goals that this initiative set forth, namely “to facilitate the safeguarding and

elimination of nuclear and other weapons in the former Soviet Union, and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).”

During this time, the US, UK, Australia, and Japan proposed a draft challenge inspection for the Chemical Weapons Convention at the Conference on Disarmament. The US then tabled a proposal on handling inspection of declared facilities.¹⁷³ As a result of these proposals, the CWC was completed and opened for signature in February 1993. During this time, Britain was also determined to work through the NSG, the AG, and other regimes to choke off the supply of the materials, components, and technology for manufacturing WMDs.¹⁷⁴

The rise in British-American cooperation vis-à-vis the supplier threat from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was accompanied by a decline in absolute support for US antiproliferation policies. In 1993, under US President William (Bill) Clinton, US Secretary of Defense Les Aspen declared the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI). This initiative supplemented the Department of Defense’s nonproliferation mission. This included active and passive defenses, post-NBC attack decontamination, better regional deterrence against NBC armed adversaries, and improved counterforce capabilities to destroy WMD capabilities when all other antiproliferation options failed.¹⁷⁵

British antiproliferation policy did not follow the US lead to adopt the CPI standard in the years following its announcement. Britain maintained a strict nonproliferation policy. While WMD proliferation was a major security concern, the basis of Britain’s antiproliferation policy was to maintain, and strengthen, verifiable international treaties, traditional arms control, and disarmament, and ensure that anyone breaching the treaties could be held accountable.

While Britain did not participate in the US counterproliferation initiative – especially the destruction of capabilities and regional deterrence – it did take steps to safeguard its armed forces. Part of this took place under the auspices of the Chemical and Biological Defense Establishment (CBDE). This department of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) was tasked with establishing criteria and vaccination for effective counterproliferation on the battlefield.¹⁷⁶

Britain also played an active role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) proliferation risk assessment, implication analysis, and capability improvement determination. Britain was resolute, however, that these studies not accept the US CPI as the basis for analyses and decisions.¹⁷⁷ Britain supported NATO's policy of proliferation prevention, or reversal, through diplomatic means.

Nonetheless, British policymakers sought to ensure that Britain and NATO were capable of meeting the challenge of WMD proliferation.¹⁷⁸ To that end, Britain strongly supported rigorous export controls as an essential element of nonproliferation and integrated export controls from COCOM, the NSG, and the AG in its Export of Goods (Control) Order 1994.¹⁷⁹

This contradicted the US perspective, supported by William Perry after he took over the post of US Secretary of Defense in 1994, which did not put much faith in export controls to counter WMD proliferation. Perry changed US antiproliferation policies, based on a study he wrote at the Brookings Institute in 1992 with Ashton Carter and John Steinbruner, which argued that cooperative security and not of export controls was the best strategy to counter WMD proliferation.¹⁸⁰ These changes were most evident in President Clinton's speech to the UN on in late 1994, where he announced the liberalization of US export policies.¹⁸¹

1995-2001

While there was a divergence in US and UK export policies, Britain expressed support for the US goal of an indefinite extension of the NPT in early 1995. Britain worked towards this goal both bilaterally and multilaterally.¹⁸² While they disagreed regarding the policy of Israel's NPT exceptionality (Britain favored Israel's ascension to the NPT as a NNWS), this did not detract from their mutual goal of indefinite extension.¹⁸³

By mid-1995, the negotiations for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) were well underway in the CD. In March of that year, the US declared a moratorium on production of plutonium for use in nuclear explosive devices. In April, Britain announced that it had halted all production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. This presented the US and Britain with another opportunity to show unity of purpose and action. In March 1995, Australia presented a simple, clear-cut, article on the scope of the CTBT. This revised proposal garnered support from first the US and then Britain.¹⁸⁴

Nonetheless, while Britain strongly supported nonproliferation through a multilateral forum, the US was also prepared to take unilateral actions.¹⁸⁵ This did not mean, however, that their actions were not complementary. While Britain did not participate in the US CPI, it did take part in several joint working groups, including the Nuclear Forces and Counter Proliferation Studies group, where they exchanged information with the US.¹⁸⁶

During this time both Britain and the US further recognized the potential for NSA WMD proliferation. This recognition was a result of the Sarin gas attacks in

Tokyo, Japan in early 1995.¹⁸⁷ This led to greater cooperation and actions in response to NSA proliferators.

In addition to the bilateral cooperation taking place during this time in nonproliferation forums and in response to NSAs, Britain tried to influence US policy regarding WMD proliferation during this year. By the end of 1995 the British government took steps to ratify the CWC, something that America had yet to do. British policymakers hoped that this would lead to the US (and Russia) also ratifying the convention.¹⁸⁸ By mid-1996, Britain not only ratified the convention, but also put into place the necessary legislation to halt CW sources, transport, or end-user proliferation.

While Britain tried to influence US policy regarding the CWC, it also began to accept the US position regarding export controls. While Britain worked with the EC to introduce end-use controls and implement new regulations on the export of dual-use goods, many of its export controls were becoming more lenient.¹⁸⁹

In early 1996, British policymakers contended with the publication of the Scott report, which examined military and dual-use exports to Iraq under the Conservative Government in the 1980s. This report suggested that, during this time, the Government failed to inform the Parliament of its more liberal stance on military and dual-use exports to Iraq. These exports, which included precursors and technical equipment, could have been used to create WMDs.

This, combined with the move to ratify the CWC, led British policymakers to respond to proliferation elements, in particular those who would seek to steal or illegally attain material, as a destabilizing the status quo.¹⁹⁰ This was accompanied by the possibility of WMD proliferation resulting from the breakup of the former Soviet

Union. According to British policymakers, this led to a revisionist threat to the systemic status quo.¹⁹¹ Policymakers argued that this threat required like-minded countries to cooperate to counter this threat.¹⁹² To that end, British and American intelligence services began more intense collaboration.¹⁹³

Nonetheless, British policymakers chose to depart company from the US regarding the CTBT. The US did not perceive any need for the threshold states, states that were capable of attaining nuclear capabilities but had not yet done so, to sign or ratify the CTBT. Britain, however, refused to ratify it unless the nuclear threshold state's signed it.¹⁹⁴

At the same time, Britain shared US concerns that Libya had a chemical weapons program, and it supported the US stance that diplomatic and economic methods were the first step in preventing the chemical plant at Tarhuna being built.¹⁹⁵ This went hand in hand with Britain's perspective of the AG's contribution to preventing the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, especially the use of export controls.¹⁹⁶

This is interesting because, while British policymakers perceived the systemic threat as rising, they perceived the direct threat to Britain of WMD proliferation and use as low.¹⁹⁷ This was most evident in their acceptance of NATO's changing role in antiproliferation.¹⁹⁸ The adaptation of the NATO alliance to the post-Cold period was an important issue for both Britain and the US. One fear of the British Opposition was that the alliance was turning into "an adjunct of US foreign policy."¹⁹⁹ To allay this fear, British policymakers argued that the primary aim of NATO remained the prevention of proliferation through diplomatic methods, which ran counter to some of the basic precepts of US antiproliferation policies.

The policymakers understood, however, the need to include the risk such weapons posed to operational missions by the alliance. This meant that they had to address the risks posed by WMD proliferation and their means of delivery. This consisted of appropriate military responses to the problem posed by proliferation, with an emphasis placed on the protection of alliance forces, in essence counterproliferation, deployed where proliferation posed the greatest military risks.²⁰⁰

This was, on the one hand, a drastic change from Britain's previous stance on antiproliferation, leaning closer to the US CPI's goals. Alternatively, it represented a continuation of Britain's policy of multilateral antiproliferation efforts instead of the US unilateral antiproliferation policy.

President Clinton was re-elected for a second term at the end of 1995. In early 1997, Anthony (Tony) Blair led the Labour party to power in Britain. This internal change in leadership did not redefine Britain's recognition of proliferation as a threat to the systemic status quo. While this could have influenced the American–British antiproliferation dynamic, early comments by Blair's Government suggested a continuation of the basic stance as presented by the Conservatives since the late 1980s, including a commitment to further the CWC and promote arms control to maintain international stability.²⁰¹ By and large, this complimented the US' goal of antiproliferation to maintain systemic stability even though it did not include greater use of force in antiproliferation.²⁰²

While Blair made it clear that Britain was strongly committed to preventing WMD proliferation, the strategies he proposed were no different from those of the previous government. These included maintaining and strengthening non-

proliferation treaties and international export control regimes. The only real policy change his government offered was the goal of the global elimination of nuclear weapons, a goal that the US did not express.²⁰³ Towards this end, Blair's government moved to quickly ratify the CTBT.²⁰⁴

While this was taking place, Britain also began to take on a greater role in response to NBC smuggling and source material. By April 1998, the British Department of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs started to focus on programs for preventing and combating WMD trafficking. This was a result of intelligence suggesting that non-state actors, specifically people with access to technical information and material, were operating a WMD black market.²⁰⁵ This led to Britain's participation in the 1996 G8 Program Preventing and Combating the Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material. Britain also "led a successful exercise to test a Points of Contact system which provides for the immediate exchange of information on those few cases where nuclear material of proliferation concern is smuggled."²⁰⁶

At the same time, Britain began to take a greater role in support of some US antiproliferation policies designed to deny end-users access to source material. This was evident in the British response to research that pointed to a Georgian reactor site, housing highly enriched uranium, which was inadequately protected. Given that the material at the location was ideally suited for use in a nuclear weapon, British policymakers declared that, as part of their obligations to enhance security and safety, moving the material to a secure location was essential.²⁰⁷ This action coincided with similar actions by the US, which took 600 kg of highly enriched uranium from Kazakhstan. The British Government perceived their actions as a demonstration that they were committed to solving the problems of proliferation.²⁰⁸

The British also coordinated military action with the US against Iraq after the UN inspectors faced persistent non-compliance by Saddam Hussein's government. This action was designed to destroy some of the infrastructure for Iraq's WMD capabilities.²⁰⁹

This was accompanied by other moves by British policymakers to include a spectrum of military, scientific, and other capabilities to their antiproliferation policies. This was especially true in response to any WMD threat to the UK homeland. These actions were seen as complementary to diplomatic and non-proliferation efforts, with the intended goal of raising the political and economic costs of acquisition of WMDs and to deter their use.²¹⁰ Nonetheless, the 1998 Strategic Defense Review White Paper suggested that Britain had not considerably changed nor refined its policies vis-à-vis action against elements of the proliferation network.²¹¹

The US and Britain also differed on their response to the Indian nuclear test in May 1998. The US response included strong condemnation, recalling their ambassador for consultation, and economic sanction.²¹² Britain's response was milder. While Britain sought to coordinate its response with its international partners, policymakers were unwilling to withdraw aid as a way of expressing dissatisfaction with India's actions. Nonetheless, Britain was determined to coordinate closely with the United States on how both reacted and to ensure that their actions reinforced each other.²¹³

The responses by the US and Britain to Pakistan's detonation of several nuclear devices later that month were similar to those in response to India's actions. The US

responded with sanctions and heavy condemnation. Britain's response was more lenient, seeking diplomatic pressure without taking serious actions.²¹⁴

In July 1998, the British Government published its response to the recommendations on strategic export controls contained in Sir Richard Scott's report of 1996. In their response British policymakers pushed to "take action against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in part by bringing controls on biological and nuclear weapons into line with those already covering chemical weapons."²¹⁵ This included the introduction of additional controls on trafficking in, or brokering of deals in, goods between overseas countries, as well as the ability to impose controls on the involvement of UK citizens, companies, or people in the UK in supplying WMDs. This strongly contradicted the US policy of liberalization of export controls.²¹⁶

In August 1998, the US bombed the Al Shifa Chemical factory in Sudan. They took this action in response to intelligence suggesting that the factory was being used by Osama Bin-Laden to create chemical weapons. British PM Blair stated that the Government strongly supported the US actions and noted that the Americans had compelling evidence of attempts to manufacture chemical weapons for use by terrorists. The British intelligence community also presented evidence that Osama Bin-Laden was interested in the potential terrorist use of WMDs, especially toxic materials.²¹⁷ Under these circumstances, the British Government perceived the US missile strike as an acceptable tactic for countering CW proliferation.²¹⁸ Britain expressed the need to work closely with the US to influence Sudan to sign and ratify the CWC.²¹⁹

In September 1998, the British Government signed the Additional Protocol with the IAEA. This protocol required states to provide full access to civil nuclear sites or any location where nuclear materials were, or may have been.²²⁰ The obligations in the Additional Protocol did not, however, extend to defense-related activities and these remained outside the scope of IAEA oversight on the basis of national security interests. The US took similar action by signing the Additional Protocol in late 1998. Both Britain and the US did not pass the legislation required by the Protocols, however, until much later. This, as well as the creation of a US–UK Joint Venture Oversight Group in late 1998 in response to CBW, pointed to greater coordination between the US and UK in response to proliferation.

As 1999 began, the US and UK were working more closely together in their response to WMD proliferation. By mid-1999, British intelligence sources were suggesting that Osama Bin-Laden planned conventional terrorist attacks but still sought chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear material to develop WMD capability. In mid-July 1999, the view hardened further with the British assessment noting important changes in Islamist extremist terrorism, with Bin-Laden seeking NBC materials with the expressed goal of targeting US and British interests worldwide.²²¹ Thus, US unilateral action in Sudan garnered further support from British policymakers, based on evidence they had been provided, even though the British Opposition questioned the legality and necessity of the use of military force.²²²

Nonetheless, while the early 1990s showed that Britain was prepared to act against source and transport elements, and they were prepared to act militarily against the end-user element of the proliferation network (especially Iraq), the late

1990s showed little military action taken by Britain (beside Iraq), besides vocal support, to meet the goal of stopping WMD proliferation. Unlike the US, Britain was more inclined to base its antiproliferation actions in diplomatic measures.²²³ While Britain maintained strong export controls and sought bilateral or multilateral discussions to stop the flow of WMDs, the US had moved towards more liberal export controls and the use of unilateral military action to deny end-users access to WMDs and, when deemed necessary, to halt WMD proliferation.

Britain was, however, supportive of actions that the US was taking in the realm of counterproliferation. The British Government argued for the NATO Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative (WMDI), sponsored by the US. This initiative was the result of five years of research by the NATO Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP) and the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP). These constituted the Joint Committee on Proliferation (JCP), which reported directly to the North Atlantic Council. The WMDI sought to raise the level of NATO Member States' counterproliferation capabilities, especially their ability to field a military force in the face of WMD use by an adversary.²²⁴

While Britain supported the US-led WMDI, its policymakers were less enthusiastic about the anti-ballistic missile test by the US in late 1999. This test was perceived as counter to the both the goals of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) signed in the early 1970s, and Britain's declared goal of global nuclear disarmament.

In early 2000, Britain expressed regret that the US was testing anti-ballistic missile systems. For Britain, these tests represented a conflict of interests between two important facets of antiproliferation. On the one hand was the desire to limit defensive measures since this would lead to further weapons reductions, on the

other hand was the fear of WMD acquisition by rogue states that were not part of established deterrent relationships. This led Britain's Government to express fears that "the dangers of unilateral responses to rogue states [were] becoming a universal risk to humankind."²²⁵ At that time, the Government did not openly support the establishment of forward bases on British soil for the US goal of a National Missile Defense system.²²⁶

In December 1999, in a push for stronger sanctions against Iraq, Britain proposed, and the US supported, UN Security Council resolution 1284. This resolution sought harsher sanctions and established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) in response to Iraqi proliferation attempts.

As a result of Britain's move towards greater leadership, the US began to emulate some of Britain's non-proliferation actions, especially towards Iran. While the US intelligence community believed that Iran was seeking nuclear weapons, the US policymakers took similar actions to those Britain had maintained, in particular the use of diplomacy and engagement as the strategy to bolster nonproliferation.²²⁷ By March 2000, US policymakers had eased sanctions on Iran for many non-military items with the goal of diplomatic persuasion to halt proliferation and the support for terrorism.²²⁸ This was similar to actions taken by Britain in this regard.²²⁹

Britain also took an important role in the NPT review conference in April–May 2000. At the conference, Britain played an important role in bringing about a final consensus between nuclear and non-nuclear parties. It not only acted as a mediator, but it also supported and worked with the US to oppose proposals that ran counter to their positions.²³⁰

During that time, British policymakers solidified their antiproliferation policy. This policy included four elements: arms control, preventing supply, deterring use, and defending against use.²³¹

British arms control policies sought diplomatic measures to halt proliferation, which, interestingly, influenced and led to changes in US actions in the realm of arms control. While supply prevention, based on export controls, ran counter to US policies of export control liberalization, cooperation in the AG and NSG lessened the policy differences.

Deterrence acted as a continuation of the policies set forth during the Cold War in response to proliferation. The US, however, had moved beyond deterrence into unilateral military action as the way to counter proliferation.

In defense, however, there was noteworthy progress and mutual aid. Both the US and Britain sought to enhance the defense of their military and civilians in the face of proliferation. They differed, however, regarding the application of missile defense as part of that system.

In June 2000, a motion defining Britain's strategic interest passed in the House of Commons. It stated that "collective action through the United Nations, NATO, the Commonwealth, the European Security and Defense Identity, and similar political, economic and military institutions and initiatives, and with allies" was the best way to attain its goals.²³² This, as well as other policy statements regarding WMD proliferation, suggested that Britain sought to maintain close cooperation with the US through multilateral regimes.

While Britain did not seek open confrontation with proliferators, it did support the US in stemming proliferation through its security and intelligence agencies.

These agencies “scored real successes.”²³³ These included actions to stop the regimes that sought NBC material or technology. According to The Secretary of State for the Home Department, Jack Straw, all these actions were “significant and effective, as well as crucial to saving lives.”²³⁴

2001–2005

The change in US administration in 2001 once again raised the possibility that internal influences would alter alignment norms. This was not, however, the case in 2001. In a press conference in February 2001, newly elected US President George W. Bush and British PM Blair acknowledged the common threat from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The statement noted that further consultation would include a review of their common strategic assumptions to reflect the post-Cold War systemic changes, especially the threat of WMD adversaries. Interestingly, they noted that their antiproliferation policies needed to both obstruct and deter new threats with “a strategy that encompasses both offensive and defensive systems, continues nuclear arms reductions where possible, and strengthens WMD and missile proliferation controls and counter-proliferation measures.”²³⁵

Unlike previous British statements regarding WMD proliferation, which did not suggest offensive action as an acceptable strategy for antiproliferation, this statement included offensive systems as integral to antiproliferation. This represented a drastic change of UK policy, bringing it closer to US antiproliferation policy. Soon thereafter both states agreed on the importance of combating WMD proliferation and that the two countries should work closely to counter such proliferation.²³⁶ During this meeting, the two sides agreed to establish a task force to help attain that goal.²³⁷

By late March, UK Minister of State Keith Vaz argued that the threat of WMD proliferation and use was real because the US believed it to be so.²³⁸ This statement pointed to considerable change in Britain's acceptance of US leadership. While Britain had always perceived proliferation as a threat, this statement's absolute acceptance of US threat perception enhanced the dynamic of their relationship.

While there was greater coordination, British export controls were not adjusted to match US policies. Soon after the statement by Vaz, British policymakers proposed a new Export Control and Non-Proliferation Bill. This bill sought to provide improved accountability and transparency in export controls. It also established the reasons for the imposition of future export controls. In so doing, it provided the Government with new powers to impose controls on the transfer of military and dual-use technology. This included control over intangible means of proliferation (e.g., conferences, first source contacts) and the provision of related technical aid, as well as activities connected to international trade (both trafficking and brokering) of dual-use equipment.²³⁹

In addition to this divergence, the US and UK did not see eye to eye on the creation of a verification protocol for the BWC.²⁴⁰ While Britain played a role throughout the negotiations for the protocol, and was responsible for the section of the text on compliance measures, the US was the Protocol's chief opponent.²⁴¹ The US felt that the Protocol would be ineffective in preventing the proliferation of biological weapons.²⁴²

Although they disagreed about some of the ways to counter WMD proliferation, the US and Britain both perceived antiproliferation as a mutual goal and sought to work towards that goal. In response to the threat of proliferation, the

US held intensive consultations with Britain and other NATO members on the best course of action for antiproliferation. At that meeting, Blair reiterated the British Government's need for a strategy that was both offensive and defensive, included rigorous implementation of both national and multinational proliferation controls, and incorporated further reductions in nuclear arms as the necessary elements for antiproliferation.²⁴³

As part of this move towards a well-developed strategy, Britain expressed an understanding, and acceptance, of the US desire for an anti-ballistic missile system as a part of antiproliferation. British policymakers were not prepared, however, to announce their participation in such a system without a clear proposal from the US. Furthermore, the lack of a perceived threat to the British Isles meant that they were wary of giving guarantees to the US regarding the use of British resources towards such a system.²⁴⁴

The World Trade Center terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 changed the entire dynamic of the US–UK leader–follower relationship. This attack led British policymakers to understand the need to strengthen British defenses against future attacks. They understood that this attack represented the tip of an iceberg that could include scenarios in which terrorists or rogue states used weapons of mass destruction.

After September 11, 2001, UK Minister for Trade Elizabeth Symons stated that “efforts to tackle proliferation will be at the top of the international agenda and we shall continue to promote them vigorously.”²⁴⁵ According to Symons, terrorists would stop at nothing, including the use of NBC capabilities, and the UK required new tools, including offensive, defensive, and preventive measures, to defeat this

new threat. British policymakers understood that they would have to “redouble [their] efforts to stop the proliferation and the availability of WMDs.”²⁴⁶ This understanding led to greater cooperation and coordination between the US and the UK.

While there was greater solidarity, this did not lead to Britain blindly following the US lead. Even after September 11, 2001, British policymakers insisted that arms control and counter-proliferation, diplomacy, deterrence, and defensive measures were necessary parts of a comprehensive strategy. They sought to maintain working relations with the US in all these areas.²⁴⁷

On October 7, 2001, US and UK military forces attacked Afghanistan. This action was based on US policy, which did not differentiate between terrorist organizations and the states that harbored them. A major concern at the time was that al-Qaeda might have acquired, or was close to acquiring, chemical, biological, or even nuclear capabilities. On November 10, 2001, Osama Bin-Laden stated “we have chemical and nuclear weapons as a deterrent and if America used them against us we reserve the right to use them.”²⁴⁸ In response to this threat, Blair identified antiproliferation, and the removal of the WMD threat, as a central objective of military action against al-Qaeda.²⁴⁹

The September 11, 2001 attacks brought the possibility of WMD attacks by terrorist organizations into the realm of reality. For British policymakers, this led to an understanding that the proliferation of WMDs to, and by, terrorists would lead to greater systemic instability and a greater threat to their national security.²⁵⁰ In response to this threat, British policymakers pushed for legislation that would stem

the flow of WMDs to non-state actors, including, but not exclusively, terrorist organizations.²⁵¹

While actions in Afghanistan suggested a greater similarity in their approach to antiproliferation, the US and the UK did not share the same approach regarding international conventions and agreements.²⁵² In early 2002, the US faced a threat from NBC anthrax-filled envelopes. This, as well as the US Nuclear Posture Review, led to important changes in US antiproliferation policy.

The withdrawal from the ABM represented one policy change introduced by the Bush Administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). These policy changes seemed to signify greater differences between the UK and US antiproliferation strategies.²⁵³

Nonetheless, Britain perceived its strategic partnership with the United States as fundamental to its national security. According to British policymakers, September 11, 2001 enhanced and reinforced the value of the US–UK relationship. After this attack, Britain also accepted the US policy of regime change as a tactic for antiproliferation.²⁵⁴ Britain acknowledged that the attack on the World Trade Center highlighted the threat from terrorist organizations developing chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. In response to this, Britain sought to encourage other countries, especially countries like India and Pakistan, to take the necessary steps to ensure the protection of their NBC assets.

While the US maintained its export controls, based on the Wassenaar Arrangement, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), NSG, and AG, Britain revised their export policies to reject all export license applications for items listed

on the NSG Dual-Use List to nuclear and nuclear-related end-users in India and Pakistan.²⁵⁵

In mid-2002, the British Government sought to add even stricter export controls to those that already existed. Actions were also taken against terrorist organizations, especially those that represented a WMD threat. This included seizing funds and freezing bank accounts of terrorist organizations. Like their counterparts in the US, British policymakers did not distinguish between terrorist funding and WMD funding. Instead, they were included in the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act of 2001.²⁵⁶

Later in 2002, North Korea announced that it had been researching and developing a nuclear weapons program. This was seen by both the US and the UK as a gross violation of the NPT that required immediate rectification. UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and US Secretary of State Colin Powell were in contact about the implications of North Korea's announcement. In a statement soon thereafter, Straw noted that "world opinion is united in calling for North Korea to comply with its international obligations and to eliminate its nuclear weapons program."²⁵⁷

During this same time, the Biological Weapons Convention Fifth Review Conference was taking place in Geneva. This conference was supposed to take place at the end of 2001, after the World Trade Center attacks and the anthrax envelope attacks in the US. In response to these attacks, the Bush administration started a biological weapons review and decided that a verification protocol for the BWC was not in the national interests of the United States. Since a unanimous vote was considered crucial for passing the Protocol, the Conference was suspended and reconvened a year later, at the end of 2002. At that meeting, an accord was reached

that provided a set of practical measures for active consideration by the international community.²⁵⁸

Later in 2002, the US made noteworthy changes to its foreign policy on proliferation. The US perspective was that hostile states and terrorists possessing WMDs were the greatest security challenges threatening the world. As such, policymakers decided to pursue a comprehensive strategy to counter this threat. The US approach to combating WMD proliferation represented a change from previous strategies. It defined its new antiproliferation strategy based on three pillars, *counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence management*. While these strategies of antiproliferation were not new, the US added to each, including interdiction, strengthened export controls, strengthened international cooperation, and targeted strategies against proliferators.²⁵⁹ The decision by the US to strengthen its export controls led to greater similarity between US and UK policies. While interdiction, as a tactic of antiproliferation, had not yet been accepted by Britain, policymakers strongly supported targeted strategies to address each proliferation element individually.

While these changes were taking place in US policy, Iraqi WMD proliferation was once again becoming an important issue. Both the US and UK perceived Iraq as a serious end-user threat. Their intelligence communities, working in conjunction, argued that a WMD-armed Iraq, under Hussein, represented an eventual threat to world stability. In early September 2002, US President Bush called on the United Nations to move quickly to enforce the resolutions demanding Iraqi disarmament. Failure to do so, according to Bush, would lead to the US acting unilaterally.²⁶⁰ British

PM Tony Blair argued that Britain had to cooperate with the US to attain its stated goals in Iraq. He noted that if,

the international community, having made the call for disarmament, now, at this moment, at the point of decision, shrugs its shoulders and walks away, he [Saddam Hussein] will draw the conclusion...that the international community will talk but not act, will use diplomacy but not force. We know, again from our history, that diplomacy not backed by the threat of force has never worked with dictators and never will....if we do not deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their retention by highly unstable states, often with dictatorial regimes, then perhaps not this year or next year, but in the not too distant future, that problem will explode on to the consciousness of the world.²⁶¹

Beyond the threat posed by Hussein, British policymakers saw the rise of potential WMD terrorism as reason for worry. While the Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attacks in Japan in 1995 showed that a non-state actor could acquire, and use, a non-conventional weapon, the attacks on September 11, 2001 pushed British policymakers to further understand, and respond to, the threat represented by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups.²⁶² Members of the Parliament perceived the linkage between terrorist organizations and WMD proliferation as holding considerable sway on US policymakers' goals and actions, and because of this on the British antiproliferation goals and actions.²⁶³

In response to these threats, the UK and the US worked to negotiate a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) offering Iraq under Saddam Hussein one last opportunity to comply with the disarmament obligations of previous resolutions. On November 8, 2002, after several weeks of intense negotiations with the other UNSC permanent members, the UK and the US were able to pass UNSCR 1441 unanimously. As the "last chance" resolution, UNSCR 1441 included the possible use of force, should Iraq be found in material breach of previous resolutions.

US policymakers suggested that Resolution 1441 did not constrain any UN member from using force to defend against the threat posed by Iraq, or to enforce UN resolutions and protect world peace and security.²⁶⁴ The UK UNSC representative noted that, should Iraq fail to comply with demands of UNSCR 1441, the United Kingdom, with other members of the Council, would seek to ensure that the disarmament required by other UNSC resolutions was completed.²⁶⁵

Even before the passage of UNSCR 1441, the US Congress passed the Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq. This resolution provided the Bush administration with a legal basis for the use of force in Iraq. While the resolution “supported” and “encouraged” diplomatic efforts, it also authorized the use of the US Armed Forces to “defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq.”²⁶⁶

In response to this, and the UNSCR, British policymakers debated the use of military force and the sequence of events that might lead to military action. Unlike the US, they did not perceive Resolution 1441 as a pretext for military action, even thought it did not require further Security Council Resolutions. Britain was more inclined than the US to seek a second UNSCR authorizing force if there was a material breach.²⁶⁷

This did not mean, however, that British policymakers were not planning for the contingency of Iraq’s material breach of UNSCR 1441’s demands. Similar to actions taken by the US in response to the possibility that force would be required, the British Defense Secretary set out the preparatory steps that British Armed Forces would have to take to be ready for such action. This included an examination of

reserve contributions in support of any military action against Iraq, and other planning activity.²⁶⁸

By early 2003, British Secretary of State for Defense Mr. Geoffrey Hoon ordered the call-out of reservists for possible operations against Iraq. Since the reserves required advanced notice, so they could set their affairs in order and go through the mobilization process, this step was seen as precautionary, should military action be needed in Iraq. This did not mean, as far as Britain was concerned, that any decisions had been made to use force in Iraq, or to commit British forces to such an operation.²⁶⁹

The possibility of action in Iraq did not, however, take away from the belief that the fight against terrorism had to be linked to international action against WMD proliferation. In a meeting on January 20, 2003, both the US and the UK supported UNSCR 1456 on terrorism. Its key elements included the adoption of new measures to assist the work of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and acknowledgment of the link between WMD proliferation and terrorism. Through this resolution, both Britain and the US sought to counter the possible connections between terrorists that sought to attain WMDs and rogue states with illegal programs that could develop NBC weapons and provide them to terrorists.²⁷⁰

British policymakers perceived the role of their armed forces in confronting threats to global stability as essential. They acknowledged, and sought to take action against, three threats to the systemic status quo: rogue states, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction proliferation. They thus changed British antiproliferation policy to coincide more with that of the US.²⁷¹

Among the changes was, initially, the acceptance of a missile defense system as part of counterproliferation. Ballistic missile defense was only part of the response to the threat posed by WMD proliferation. Britain also sought to control technology proliferation because Iraq was not the only actor perceived as attempting to revise the systemic status quo.

For Britain, the possibility that terrorists might gain WMDs remained a danger.

As Secretary of State for Defense, Geoffrey Hoon, noted:

the determination of groups such as al-Qaeda to obtain chemical and other weapons of mass destruction is well known. We know that terrorists will use such weapons. The House will recall that Aum Shinrikyo attacked the Tokyo subway with sarin nerve gas in March 1995...The recent arrests and discovery of attempts to produce ricin here in the United Kingdom have shown that we cannot afford to be complacent.²⁷²

Nonetheless, British policymakers, acknowledging the complexity of the WMD proliferation network, believed that a military response alone was not enough, and did not address the root causes of WMD proliferation.²⁷³ While Britain still maintained a less militaristic stance than the US, the rise in intelligence cooperation and the ability that that provided to for proliferation preemption were significant. UK PM Blair argued that, in light of the antiproliferation successes and the possibility for further proliferation, the international community had to act decisively, lest the different actors seeking to attain, or proliferate, WMDs combine their efforts and destabilize the systemic status quo.²⁷⁴

By late February 2003, the issue of Iraqi non-compliance was reaching a head. British policymakers were faced with the decision whether proliferation by Iraq warranted the use of force as a tactic for antiproliferation. There was much tension within the UK Parliament regarding the possible use of UK forces in Iraq. The British

policymakers, however, were firm in their belief that a failure to address the issue of Iraqi proliferation would lead to greater WMD proliferation both abroad and to the home front.²⁷⁵

While much of the international attention was turned towards Iraq, the issue of North Korean proliferation was also of great importance to Britain. The Government did not believe that the issue of North Korean nuclear proliferation was a bilateral one, between the US and North Korea, as North Korea claimed. Instead, like Iraq, this issue was one it felt should concern the entire international community.

While the rhetoric for military action in Iraq was growing, Britain sought to address North Korea's nuclear program through multilateral dialogue, which is interesting since North Korea, unlike Iraq, openly announced its military nuclear program. It seems that, while both were perceived as seeking WMD capabilities, North Korea's openness about their program meant that the UK was more inclined to maintain its previous policy of engagement instead of implementing its newer policy of preemption.²⁷⁶ While Britain pushed for multilateral discussions regarding North Korea's nuclear program, they were not direct participants in the talks that resulted from this push. Nonetheless, Britain sought to fortify the multilateral talks, since they had a vested interest and diplomatic connections with all states involved.²⁷⁷

While the US was willing to take the bilateral/multilateral diplomatic route regarding North Korea's program, the US was more inclined towards unilateral action in Iraq. American policymakers were willing, however, to accede to the UK's desire to seek a UNSCR that represented a unity of purpose among UN Security

Council members for military action in Iraq. Even though Britain was moving closer to the US policy of military action in response to WMD proliferation, the country's Government still sought a UNSC resolution, as a representation of communal action, to enable the use of force in Iraq.²⁷⁸

In the end, the invasion of Iraq began without another UNSCR because France's stance was that further dialogue and patience, and not military force, was required. As such, France threatened to veto any resolution that would include the use of force to counter Iraq's WMD proliferation.

After the invasion began, the UK Government was faced with several issues, including reports that strategic WMD exports were sent from Britain to Iraq during the sanctions, and questions about the lack of WMDs.²⁷⁹ The ability to verify Iraq's disarmament was limited by what Dr. Hans Blix described as an insecure location where "civilian international inspection can hardly operate."²⁸⁰

While coalition members were eager for UNMOVIC to once again begin verification of Iraq's WMD disarmament, the lack of security for civilian operations meant that coalition forces were left the task of pursuing leads to sites, documentation, and people connected with Iraq's programs. Both the UK and the US deployed specialists for this task.²⁸¹

For Britain, the invasion of Iraq represented collective security in action, bringing its antiproliferation policies more even more in line with those originally proposed in the mid-1990s by the US. Terrorism and WMD proliferation, as well as rogue and failing states and massive human rights abuses, required new responses from international bodies. To enhance international security, the UK perceived antiproliferation changes as crucial. In order to attain the necessary changes, the UK

began to accept more of the US antiproliferation policies and moved away from territorial-specific defense into collective security to address these threats.²⁸²

According to British policymakers, the problem for the international community was that, while the institutions reflected the will of the nations, they did not have the ability to enforce that will. As such, policymakers believed that it must be enforced diplomatically and, should it be necessary, militarily.²⁸³

By this time, there was a clear division of labor vis-à-vis antiproliferation within the British government. While the demarcation of departmental responsibilities was clear, departmental compartmentalization did not occur. Action against proliferation was a joint effort between the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices, which lead bilateral and multilateral diplomatic activity, the Ministry of Defense, which headed the military operations, and the Department of Trade and Industry, which was responsible for national export controls.²⁸⁴

This collaboration was similar to, and coincided with, the US response to WMD proliferation and led to strengthened cooperation between the US and the UK. Part of this response was the \$20 billion program launched in 2002 with the goal of preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear, biological or chemical materials from the former Soviet Union, to which Britain made a \$750 million commitment. Britain also accepted the US stance in the 2003 G8 meeting for tightened security controls on radioactive sources and on measures to cut off financing.²⁸⁵

In addition to this recognition of the financial element of the proliferation chain, Britain also began more intense concentration on the transport element under the leadership of the US. In June 2003, the US, the UK, Australia, Japan, Italy, France, Germany, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands met in Madrid and

began to establish the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The PSI aimed to reinforce the international effort against WMD trafficking. During the first meetings, no decision was made regarding the involvement of the British Armed Forces.²⁸⁶

Nonetheless, the UK Government strongly supported the goals of the PSI. Representatives from Britain were intimately involved in discussions with the US, concentrating on how to move the PSI forward, especially to define actions necessary for effective interdiction at sea and how to share information. Part of the motivation for this was a fear of North Korea's role in further proliferation.²⁸⁷

By late 2003, the PSI participants had agreed on a statement of interdiction principles that outlined the goals and scope of the initiative. This initiative sought to encourage the recognition of the transport element of proliferation as a global threat and to establish an inclusive action for successful interdiction of WMD trafficking. Thus, any state that accepted the goals and actions set forth in the PSI could participate as long as they made an effective contribution to meet the PSI's antiproliferation goals.²⁸⁸

By the end of 2003, the British Foreign Office had determined eight international strategic policy priorities. The first of these was "a world safer from global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction."²⁸⁹ This led British policymakers to conclude that strong international institutions and a wide network of partnerships were required to achieve effective collective action. Because of the US position as the world's only superpower, British policymakers believed that the US would set much of the international agenda and that a close relationship with the US would strengthen UK security and the international status quo.²⁹⁰

While a strong partnership with the US was considered essential for the UK's, and the world's, security and prosperity, this partnership was perceived as strained because of different approaches to antiproliferation that led to an "erosion of a clearly understood sense of common purpose."²⁹¹ A main British goal in response to this perceived erosion, based on an FCO strategy review, was to seek policy changes designed to build a commitment to partnership between Europe and the US, something that the US also perceived as essential in response to WMD proliferation.

Part of these changes came as a result of the war in Iraq. The pattern of military operations after the September 11, 2001 al-Qaeda attack demonstrated that UK military involvement in anti-terror and antiproliferation operations would increase. This meant that British planners had to consider the need for multiple, concurrent, small to medium-sized operations in response to terrorism and proliferation. This led to more changes in British force structure, loosely based on the 1998 Strategic Defense Review.²⁹²

Interestingly, the British analysis also determined that, in many cases, effective operations would only be possible if US forces were engaged. Because of this, British policymakers wanted the UK to be in a position to influence US political and military decision making. In order for that to occur, Britain would have to share the military risks and be able to fight effectively alongside US forces through NATO, with the EU, and bilaterally.²⁹³

Libya's renouncing of its WMD program in late 2003, however, showed that dialogue still played a part in antiproliferation. This announcement came as a direct result of British engagement with the Libyans about other topics, including the fight against terrorism. This process of engagement opened the door for British officials to

approach Libya in March 2003 about their WMD programs. Officials and experts from the US and the UK met secretly with Libyan officials over a nine-month period, leading to Libya acknowledging it had attempted to develop a nuclear fuel cycle intended to support nuclear weapons development.²⁹⁴ The US and UK sent a joint team to Libya where they were provided evidence of uranium enrichment and chemical weapons research, and where they visited sites related to this evidence. They also met with scientists at research centers with dual-use potential.²⁹⁵

While the outcome of joint US–UK antiproliferation efforts were evident in Libya’s decision, both the US and the UK faced severe criticism of their actions in Iraq after no WMDs were discovered there. Both the US and the UK began intelligence review processes designed to investigate the intelligence coverage available on WMD programs and trade, especially what was known about the Iraqi programs up until March 2003. Part of this review process sought to examine any discrepancies between the intelligence gathered, evaluated, and used before the conflict, and what had been discovered thereafter.²⁹⁶ Both states worked in concert during this review process to determine where, and how, their intelligence services had failed.

In early 2004, it became apparent that Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, considered the father of the Pakistani nuclear program, had disclosed nuclear secrets and sold nuclear technology to states of concern, including Iran and North Korea. This brought to light the need to strengthen the steps for countering the elements of WMD proliferation. Interestingly, while these new proliferation threats were becoming apparent, British policymakers argued that the threat of WMD proliferation had been successfully limited by international arms control and multilateral treaties.²⁹⁷

Nonetheless, the US and the UK worked within the International Maritime Organization to secure an amendment that made it an internationally recognized offense to transport WMDs, their delivery systems, and related materials on commercial vessels. In early 2004, Britain and the US negotiated agreements with the main commercial flag states that would permit the boarding of vessels that may have been carrying WMD program cargoes. This action would help the US and the UK to counter proliferation in over 70% of maritime trade, considerably limiting the available shipping for transportation elements of the proliferation chain. Britain also supported the US push for Interpol and other organizations to help law enforcement agencies fight WMD traffickers. In the UK, work also began on the screening of traffic for the illicit movement of radioactive materials.²⁹⁸

Furthermore, in April 2004 Britain helped the US push UNSCR 1540 through the Security Council. This unanimously adopted Resolution established, for the first time, obligations to develop and enforce appropriate legal, and regulatory, measures against WMD proliferation, and, as a Chapter VII UN Resolution, was binding on all UN Member States.²⁹⁹ This resolution furthered the US goals by:

- requiring all UN Member States to refrain from supporting NSAs seeking WMDs
- prohibiting NSAs from engaging in WMD-related activities, including the acquisition and use, attempted acquisition and use, and the financing of the acquisition and use of WMD
- requiring UN Member States to accept, and enforce, measures establishing domestic controls for the prevention of WMD proliferation, including the establishment of controls over related materials.³⁰⁰

By the end of 2004, both the US and the UK had met their first obligations under UNSCR 1540; they handed in their technical reports on the implementation of UNSCR 1540.³⁰¹

This resolution, and the resulting legislation in the US and the UK, represented the recognition of, and response to, the financial element of proliferation. Not only did this resolution make it illegal to finance WMD proliferation, it also singled out NSAs as factors in all of the elements of proliferation. This led to similar actions by the US and the UK, including seizing bank accounts and changing financial laws and regulations, and greater cooperation in relation to the elements of the proliferation chain.

Revisionism

Britain clearly recognized WMD proliferation as systemic revisionism during the 1989 – 2005 period. Policymakers responded to this threat by incorporating many, but not all, of the policies put forth by the US to respond to proliferation. This recognition of WMD proliferation as systemic revisionism lays the groundwork for the determination of follower identities.

As described here, and as we will show in the analysis of follower identity, Britain was clearly part of the antiproliferation alignment established by the US but was not an exemplary follower throughout the timeframe examined, especially regarding capability/denial.

Britain's Follower Identity

The following analysis examines changes in Britain's follower identity by first establishing the follower level for each of the three antiproliferation strategies. It then graphs these levels to determine the mode follower level. Using this information, the analysis then explains why Britain's follower level changed over time.

Britain's Capability/Denial Follower Level

As shown in the case study above, Britain maintained a high capability/denial follower level at the onset of the post-Cold War. Soon after the first Gulf War, however, British and US capability/denial strategies began to digress.

While Britain strongly supported export controls as the predominant means of capability/denial, the US sought to limit export controls. In addition, Britain did not support the US push to maintain the AG as the predominant means of targeting CW suppliers after signing the CWC. These differences of opinion over the need for strong export controls continued throughout the 1990s.

While British policymakers believed that strong export controls should be the predominant means of capability/denial against Iraq and other revisionists, they accepted US leadership, and helped to support the constitutive norms and social purposes defined by the US, in response to potential proliferation from the former Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the differing goals and actions taken by the US and Britain in the field of capability/denial, both in terms of export controls and unilateral military action, suggest that Britain's follower identity was alienated in the mid-1990s.

By the late 1990s, however, Britain capability/denial follower level rose briefly in response to changes in systemic revisionism, specifically Iraqi proliferation. Despite the return of Iraqi proliferation as potential systemic revisionism, Britain did not maintain this high follower identity level until after the al-Qaeda attacks in New York. British policymakers were adamant that stronger Western export controls were necessary as part of WMD capability/denial antiproliferation policies in response to these attacks and the rise of NSA proliferation. As a result, the US accepted the need for stronger export controls while seeking British assistance in US-led military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq to minimize WMD proliferation. During this time, London also participated actively in the Proliferation Security Initiative, which targeted the transporter element of WMD proliferation as a source of systemic revisionism.

Britain's Norm-Building/Non-Possession Follower Level

Similar to Britain's capability/denial follower level, support for non-possession/norm-building led to distinct differences between US and British antiproliferation strategies, especially in the mid-1990s. While Britain was an exemplary non-possession/norm-building follower immediately after the Cold War, this level of support quickly deteriorated, as British policymakers sought expanded norm-building while the US tried to maintain the existing norms, especially in the AG and NPT. In addition to these moves away from the US, British policymakers also pushed for stronger multilateral based norms while seeking an improvement in the level of disarmament by the US and other NWS.

Despite changes in domestic leadership, British policymakers were consistent in their perception of non-possession/norm-building as integral to antiproliferation. The lack of significant arms reductions by other nuclear weapons states, as well as

US actions in the NPT, diminished support for US non-possession goals in the mid-to-late 1990s. While British policymakers acceptance of US-led non-possession/norm-building in response to Iraq's continued WMD proliferation in the late 1990s, London's participation in actions supporting UNSCOM disarmament inspectors was based on multilateral norms and not US capability/denial strategies.

Thus, British participation in US-led actions against Iraq did not translate into support for US norm-building/non-possession goals, especially in the AG, BWC, and NPT. Furthermore, Britain and the US had distinctly different goals and were taking contradictory actions vis-à-vis norm-building and non-possession throughout this time; to the point where Britain's follower identity was alienated.

Even after September 11, 2001, Britain maintained an alienated follower level in response to many of the US norm-building and non-possession policies. Despite British and US recognition of non-state actors as participants in WMD proliferation, it was only with the establishment of PSI and UNSCR 1540 as multilateral norms, near the end of 2003, that London reestablished its non-possession/norm-building follower level as exemplary.

Britain's Consequence/Management Follower Level

Britain's consequence/management follower level, like its capability/denial and non-possession/norm-building levels, was exemplary at the outset of the post-Cold War. This level of follower identity quickly changed after the first Gulf War. This was a response to the US proposal for CPI as the primary form of consequence/management to proliferation.

Since Britain did not recognize proliferation as a threat to the home front, or as an immediate problem facing its military, policymakers chose not to accept the US

position vis-à-vis counterproliferation. This, as well as the continued Cold War deterrent stance of Britain, meant that the UK's follower identity became alienated. London maintained this level of follower identity for much of the 1990s. This was most evident in response to US testing of anti-ballistic missile systems and the CPI.

At the turn of the century, however, British consequence/management policies began to coincide and support the goals defined by the US. In essence, UK policymakers started to incorporate the US vision for counterproliferation – in the form of NATO's WMDI – into their antiproliferation strategies. Furthermore, Britain began to accept the US position vis-à-vis ABM systems despite the lack of previously established deterrence relations.

After September 11, 2001, and the rise of rogue states and NSA systemic revisionists, the follower level of UK consequence/management was once again exemplary. British policymakers accepted and supported US goals for deterring Iran and Iraq (including ABM systems) and included many of the US counterproliferation concepts and goals into their national and military strategies.

Follower Levels and Follower Identity

Using these three analyses, the following graph shows changes in Britain's follower level for each of the three antiproliferation strategies. By examining the changes in each strategy's follower levels, Britain's overall follower identity can be determined over time. The analysis below uses this graph explains how and why Britain's follower identity changed throughout the time examined.




Table 1: Britain's Follower Identity
 5 - Exemplary, 4 - Conformist, 3 - Scared, 2 - Alienated, 1 - Pragmatic

British Follower Identity

Britain's Cold War identity was a function of the bipolar system. The UK's ability to take on any other role, except to bandwagon or to balance, was mitigated by the existence of two superpowers that were struggling with each other and did not consider Britain a threat to their leadership positions or to the system as a whole.

As the Cold War came to a close, and the USSR no longer posed a significant threat to the US, Britain and other world powers could have sought to balance against the US. This did not happen. Instead, the years immediately following the Cold War saw Britain maintain an exemplary follower identity, generally accepting the Western alignment constitutive norms and the social purposes in response to WMD proliferation. This was a result of immediate proliferation threats, specifically from Iraq and the former USSR.

Despite Britain's exemplary follower identity early in this timeframe, especially in response to Iraq's possible WMD proliferation, it began to show leanings towards

an alienated identity in its antiproliferation policies by the mid-1990s. While Britain supported the cognitive model of Western antiproliferation, it did not accept the social purposes presented by the leader and did not accept the proposed constitutive norms, like the Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI), export controls, and ABM systems, suggested to counter proliferation.

British policymakers clearly identified proliferation as a systemic threat, though they did not accept the US vision for antiproliferation during the mid-to-late 1990s. Britain's alienated follower identity from 1992 – 2000 was a result of lower systemic revisionism and a difference of opinion regarding Western alignment social purposes and how best to achieve them. During this time, Britain's resolve that the US CPI not act as the basis for analysis and decisions in NATO's proliferation risk assessment, as well as British support for NATO's policy of proliferation prevention through diplomatic means, demonstrate Britain's alienated identity.³⁰² Based on the available data, it also appears that British policymakers tried to use their alienated identity to influence both the constitutive norms and the social purposes of the alignment, specifically regarding chemical weapons, throughout the mid-to-late 1990s. By ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), something that the US had not done, the British government hoped to influence US (and Russian) policies and push the US to accept this as part of the social purposes for the alignment.³⁰³

Britain's alienated follower identity did not, however, point to London's defection from the Western alignment. Instead, Britain took its own counterproliferation steps, especially to safeguard its armed forces, within the greater Western alignment cognitive model of antiproliferation.

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, Britain's goals and actions appeared to coincide with those of the US, as British policymakers were provided with more intelligence that recognized the rise of not only state, but non-state, elements of proliferation. The differences regarding the CPI, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and export controls, that led to its alienated identity, did not significantly influence the level of coordination and cooperation in intelligence gathering, or Britain's support of US no-fly zone policies and sanctions in response to Iraqi WMD proliferation. Nonetheless, while Britain's consequence/management strategies moved closer to the US in response to Iraqi and NSA proliferation, this lowered its follower identity level to pragmatic, marking the nadir in Britain's follower identity level.

Thus, while Britain appears to be moving towards an exemplary follower identity at the end of the 1995–2001 timeframe with the goals and actions undertaken meeting or helping those of the US, the years 2001 – 2002 represented the point at which Britain's follower identity was at its lowest because of the incongruity between the follower level for each strategy.

In the years following the al-Qaeda attacks in New York, marked by terrorist attacks both worldwide and in the United Kingdom, Britain acknowledged the rise in systemic revisionism and the possibility that NSAs – in the form of WMD capable terrorist organizations – might attack from inside the UK. This led to greater cooperation between Britain and the US, as they were determined to deal decisively with the WMD threats posed by groups like al-Qaeda, and rogue states like Iraq.³⁰⁴

This perceived rise in proliferation led to changes in British policy between late 2002 and early 2003 and suggests that the UK was more prone to accept the

alignments antiproliferation social purposes and the constitutive norms. There was better recognition of the source, transport, and end-user elements of proliferation, and the initial steps were taken to halt the funding of WMD proliferation. By acknowledging these combined elements both the US and the UK began to cooperate more, with the UK accepting a preponderance of US goals and actions for all three strategies.

Working with the US, Britain helped initiate some momentous breakthroughs in countering WMD proliferation. London worked closely with the US in response to Libya's WMD programs and in countering A.Q. Khan's proliferation network, as well as participated actively in establishing and taking part in the US proposed PSI – including influencing other countries to do the same.

By the end of the 2001–2005 period, Britain was once again an exemplary follower in the US-led alignment. Shared intelligence led to greater cooperation and teamwork both in terms of defining the social purposes of the alignment and the constitutive norms needed to meet those goals. Britain did not hesitate, when necessary, to take action it deemed appropriate (engaging Libya in dialogue for example) to further the alignment antiproliferation goals.

Despite its alienated follower identity in the 1990s, Britain did not seek to usurp the leadership role of the US. Instead, it sought to influence or restrain US policy and military decisions as a means of changing the groups social purposes and the means of attaining them as the level of proliferation rose. The work by British policymakers on the PSI, coordinating the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, offering Iraq under Saddam Hussein “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations,” and then helping to pass UNSCR 1540,

demonstrated how changes in the level of proliferation led to changes in the UK's follower identity level.³⁰⁵ This raises the question of how Australia and Israel's follower identities changed and how this influenced the level of followership.

Chapter 5: Australian responses to WMD Proliferation

History: Cold War Antiproliferation

As noted, Britain was essentially shut out of nuclear research and development by the US between 1946 and 1957. However, UK leaders like PM Attlee recognized that Australia could play an integral role in WMD scientific and technical development, especially nuclear development.³⁰⁶ This move to incorporate Australia into British WMD development bolstered pre-established beliefs by Australian policymakers that that it was essential to look to the UK for support in defense planning. Even before the defeat of Japan, Australian Minister in Washington, Sir Frederic W. Eggleston, suggested that US goodwill was unreliable and that Australia should rely on the UK for strategic support.³⁰⁷

After WWII, the UK and Australia sought to overcome the US nuclear nonproliferation stance through commonwealth cooperation. Australian PM Ben Chifley was willing to participate in the commonwealth joint research project, as long as Australia was provided access to all the results that would eventually allow for the creation of nuclear weapons.³⁰⁸ The limits of their cooperation was finalized at the prime minister's conference in London in May 1946.

While this conference was taking place, scientists from the commonwealth met with Sir Henry Tizard, the architect of Britain's nuclear program. At that meeting, Tizard expressed the importance of joint research and told the delegates that it should lead to biological and nuclear weaponization within 10 years.³⁰⁹ Since the UK did not have the resources to develop biological or nuclear weapons on their own, they sought the expanded resources, both physical and scientific, of other commonwealth states. "The United Kingdom was, therefore, 'in favor of the fullest

co-operation with the Dominions in the field of defense Science and all that such cooperation implied.”³¹⁰

The agreement reached between the US and UK in 1948, which denied Australia information on nuclear research, slowed the Australian bid for nuclear capabilities into the 1950s. This agreement did not, however, forestall the British attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. The British recognized that Australia was an ideal site for testing, as well as a source of essential material and research.

While Britain and Australia maintained some level of joint research, the US proposed a formal alliance with Australia in an attempt to forestall the Australian move towards nuclearization. To that end, the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) was created to provide Australia a nuclear umbrella. Despite the ANZUS treaty, Australia did not give up attempts to attain nuclear weapons. PM Robert Menzies, as well as other Australian policymakers, understood that further cooperation with the US, especially through the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) of 1956, would allow Australia to acquire nuclear technology and armament. Nonetheless, While SEATO and the ANZUS states were part of the Western alignment, the level of strategic support given to Australia was less than that provided by the US to the NATO states.³¹¹

Despite the US goal to deny Australia nuclear capabilities, by 1956 Australia was close to becoming a nuclear power because of the joint UK–Australian research. In response to this, the US strengthened its relationship with the UK which lead to a weakening of the UK–Australian nuclear relationship. The US–UK relationship was further strengthened once the UK proved itself a nuclear power with the detonation of a hydrogen bomb in 1957. After the UK acquired nuclear capabilities, British

policymakers understood that their relationship with the US was more important than the relationship with Australia and began to refuse Australia's requests for research information.³¹²

This change in policy by the UK was worrisome for Australian policymakers as it represented a reorientation of British defense policy. By the late 1950s the UK stopped sending observers to SEATO conferences and stopped spending money to meet its responsibilities under SEATO, leading to greater concern about the future of Australia's defense capabilities.³¹³ The changes in Britain's Southeast Asia policy supported Australian Minister for External Affairs Richard G. Casey's stance from the early 1950s that Australia needed to look to the US in support of Australian defense.

In addition to the changes in UK defense policies, Australian policymakers were uneasy about the nonproliferation discussions taking place in the UN from the late 1950s throughout the 1960s. These were perceived as a threat to Australia's security, since any nonproliferation agreement had the possibility of leaving Australia with no deterrence against the up and coming regional threat, China.

In spite of Australia's perception of China as a regional threat, policymakers chose to halt unilateral attempts at nuclear research as a result of pressure from the UK and the US. Instead, the Australians initiated a strategy that included the possibility of making an atomic weapon quickly, should that prove necessary, by keeping abreast of technology and research.³¹⁴

As a result of this policy, Australia did not accept the goals for nuclear disarmament or nonproliferation being discussed in international forum during the 1960s and 1970s and opposed signing the NPT into the early 1970s, since all these denied them the possibility of further nuclear research.³¹⁵ Both the UK and US tried

to alleviate Australia's worries, suggesting it accept a US nuclear deterrent against China and the USSR in the hopes that Australia would sign the NPT. Australian policymakers acquiesced to this pressure and agreed to forgo the nuclear option only after US provided a clear nuclear umbrella in South East Asia.³¹⁶

As a result Australia forgoing nuclear capabilities it joined the Conference on Disarmament (CD), where policymakers from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) began participating in multilateral disarmament negotiations. These discussions led Australian policymakers to worry about the possibility of a Soviet nuclear strike on US bases on their soil and the potential for vertical nuclear proliferation in China. In addition policymakers began to focus on horizontal chemical and biological weapons (CBW) proliferation.³¹⁷ Though this was not a priority for policymakers well into the 1980s, they were worried about the possibility of regional CBW proliferation to counter China or the US presence in Australia.

The election of PM Robert Hawke in 1983 seemed to change Australia's perception of international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, raising it to the level of a national priority for Australia. As a result, policymaker's attention was focused almost entirely on nuclear disarmament by the superpowers and the denial of horizontal nuclear proliferation.³¹⁸ While Australian policymakers were worried about regional proliferation, PM Hawke also faced a strong left wing within his party (Labor) that opposed both the US nuclear umbrella and Australia's role as an exporter of nuclear material. Nonetheless, since Hawke and others were worried about China and the potential for further regional proliferation, they chose to appease the Labor left wing by specifically opposing the US stance on disarmament – maintaining a policy of international disarmament instead – while promoting a

strong bilateral security relationship that included many of the US's antiproliferation policies.³¹⁹

This could be seen in Australia's response to the use of chemical and biological weapons by Iraq in 1984. This act led Australian policymakers to change their CBW antiproliferation goals from solely regional to systemic and accept the US position that singled out Iraq and Iran by instituting restrictions, similar to those implemented in the US earlier that year, on the export of eight CW chemicals.³²⁰ Soon thereafter, Australia proposed a meeting of countries with export controls to compare national licensing measures and enhance cooperation.³²¹ Though Canberra instigated the AG, there have been credible suggestions that the idea originated in Washington. Either way, this meeting went hand in hand with the US goals for a CW regime presented by Vice President Bush in 1984, which Australian policymakers supported.³²²

The decision by Australian policymakers to push for multilateral agreements to counter CW proliferation were not based on a perceive CBW proliferation threat to Australia, but rather to the system as a whole.³²³ As such, they sought to include non-Western, Third World countries to demonstrate the inclusive nature of the AG and to limit CW proliferation as a systemic problem. This ran counter to the US position that the AG should only include states capable of supplying CW precursors and create a specific list of countries that were ineligible to receive chemical items that might lead to weaponization.

Australia's response to this position was to reject the US proposal instituting a list of target countries, thus avoiding clear discrimination against any state. Also, unlike the US, Australia perceived the AG as a stepping stone towards a multilateral

CW regime, and not as a permanent nonproliferation regime in and of itself. Foreign Minister Bill Hayden's approval of the AG in 1987 included a clear statement marking the export controls a transitional stage that would be unnecessary once the CW regime was in place.³²⁴

Despite the thawing of East–West relations in the late 1980s, and the lack of domestic pressure supporting nuclear disarmament, senior bureaucrats pushed for Australia becoming active in as many both nuclear and non-nuclear antiproliferation forum as possible. During this time, antiproliferation became an even greater priority to senior bureaucrats, resulting in Foreign Minister Bill Hayden pushing for greater DFA involvement in many disarmament forums, despite some policymaker's perception that it was not important.³²⁵

Though the thawing of East – West relations led some policymakers to strengthen their regional perspective and move away from the UK and US perspective of the international system, Australia sought tried to push non-nuclear issues like the AG as well as its goal of global nuclear disarmament. As the Cold War reached its end, Australian policymakers were adamant that the best means of countering weapon of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation was through multilateral nonproliferation regimes, and not through active antiproliferation policies.³²⁶

Post-Cold War Antiproliferation

1989–1995

By early 1989, Australia began to move out of the US shadow and change its role within the Western alignment. While this change was most prominent regarding CW proliferation, the push to ratify the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone in early

1989, supported by PM Hawke, also represented a move away from US leadership and a change in Australian regional policy.³²⁷

In general, Australia's preferred approach to nonproliferation at the start of the post-Cold War was multilateral and not aggressive. Australian policymakers sought to contain the spread of WMDs by maintaining an inclusive nature to multilateral agreements, rather than excluding "target states" or non-possession states from nonproliferation agreements. Since Australia recognized that Third World countries represented an end-user threat, policymakers were not convinced that supply side nonproliferation was enough of a means by which to stop systemic proliferation.³²⁸ For Australia, this was important because it perceived Third World countries as proliferation risks and did not want to alienate them.³²⁹ Therefore, Australia also sought to further its goal of all-inclusive multilateral regimes.

Thus, while the US decision not to renew military aid to Pakistan as a result of its nuclear research in late 1990 was seen by Australia as a bilateral matter between the US and Pakistan, the possibility of nuclear proliferation in South Asia was perceived as both a regional and international threat. In response Australia expressed its worries to both Pakistan and India and urged them to join the NPT, putting their nuclear facilities under full-scope safeguards. This did not, however, change Australia's export policies to Pakistan, since Pakistan was not an approved destination for Australian uranium.³³⁰

The invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the international reaction to this act, led to changes in US antiproliferation goals; but this was less the case for Australia. While Australian policymakers acknowledged that Iraq represented a proliferation end-user, their motivations for participating in action against Iraq seemed to be based on

international obligations.³³¹ This did not mean, however, that policymakers were unaware of, or not worried by, the possibility of Iraq maintaining chemical and possibly biological weapons capabilities while seeking a nuclear option.³³² For PM Hawke, the possibility of Iraqi regional hegemony, which would begin with the invasion of Kuwait, had to be countered. If Hussein was not stopped, this hegemony would be backed by chemical weapons and, sooner or later, nuclear weapons as well; this was unacceptable.³³³

While not explicitly stated as one of Australia's goals in participating in the war against Iraq, countering WMD proliferation was an underlying motive.³³⁴ Nonetheless, Australia's participation in the conflict was minimal. They sent several Navy ships to assist the interception force, some personnel to provide technical assistance, and some air force planes to transport personnel. "Although the ships and their crews were in danger from mines and possible air attack, Australia's war was relatively uneventful and there were no casualties."³³⁵ In essence, while numerically Australia did not take a major part in this conflict, policymakers supported the goals that the US defined, including the removal of WMD, and sought to help attain those goals within the limitations of their military capabilities.

The 1990–1991 Gulf Crisis changed Australian thinking about WMD antiproliferation, including the AG and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Policymakers wanted to "reinvigorate international efforts to prevent nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile proliferation."³³⁶ They understood that Australia, due to its international standing, could play an important role regarding arms control issues. Policymakers' goals did not, however, coincide with those of the US. While they recognized the US position calling for measures to strengthen the existing

export control regimes, they believed that the only feasible, long-term, answer to WMD proliferation was through global multilateral agreements.³³⁷

After the Gulf War, Australia strongly supported UN Resolution 687 establishing a special commission to oversee the destruction of Iraq's WMD. This support was further seen when Dr. John Gee, who was the Director of Chemical and Biological Disarmament at Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), became the chair of the working group on chemical and biological weapons. Australia also assisted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its assigned tasks under resolution 687, including having John Bardsley, who headed the international safeguards section of the Australian Safeguards Office, assigned to the team that carried out the first inspections of Iraqi nuclear facilities. For Australian policymakers, these were perceived as active contributions to the prevention of WMD weapons proliferation.³³⁸

Meanwhile, intelligence suggested that Iraq was still trying to develop several WMD programs, some of which were supported by Western suppliers. This led the US to push for changes that would strengthen the AG, which went against Australia's antiproliferation policy. Nonetheless, Australian policymakers supported these changes because they still sought the finalization of the CWC as their primary goal.³³⁹ In addition, the commitment by US President George H.W. Bush to combat CW proliferation through a multilateral treaty in the early 1990s coincided with Australia's goals.

By mid-1991, however, Australian policymakers became wary of the US stance regarding the AG. While Australia wanted to replace the AG with the CWC, which was making progress in Geneva, the US seemed to be pushing for even stronger

source element antiproliferation. This led Australian policymakers to counter the US goal of a stronger AG, even after the CWC was finalized.³⁴⁰

After the Gulf War, antiproliferation rose to the fore of the international agenda. Nonetheless, Australia's perspective remained predominantly regional.³⁴¹ While antiproliferation was a priority, the lack of a perceived regional threat kept it off the top of the Australian security agenda. Thus, for many DFAT officials international antiproliferation was secondary to regional security issues.³⁴²

Despite this, the difference of opinion between the US and Australia regarding the continuation of the AG threatened to derail the CWC talks in early 1992. While Australia was determined to confront this issue, it put Canberra on a collision course with Washington's goals. In response, US policymakers informed Australian policymakers that the elimination of the AG was unacceptable and that it would not countenance Australian support for such a goal.³⁴³

As a result of this, Australia tried to appease the US while at the same time suggesting some changes. In the end, the US and Australian ambassadors to the CD negotiated a compromise directly, and not under instruction from their respective governments. The O'Sullivan Statement was a compromise of the US goal, that the AG would continue to exist and perhaps be strengthened, and the Australian goal, that the AG should cease to exist when the CWC comes into existence. This compromise included no significant change to export controls, though AG members would review their export controls in light of the CWC, while not seeking any definite action because of the CWC. This formulation was accepted, having been sent to the capitals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, leaving no room for further compromise.

In addition to this, Australian defense export policy underwent a review in mid-1991. Before this review, defense export denial occurred if foreign policy interests outweighed the pluses of export approval. The review brought more distinct guidelines and examples where foreign policy considerations might take precedent. There were four such examples provided: first, if third-country reactions to the export would adversely impinge on Australia's foreign policy and trade interests; second, if the destination was involved in a conflict; third, if exports might lead to regional destabilization; and, fourth, if the destination country was in the process of acquiring WMD in contravention of Australia's antiproliferation interests.³⁴⁴

In 1992, after the Gulf War, Australia began to play an active role in strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime, in particular the IAEA's safeguards and controls on nuclear exports. Their motivation for this was, for the most part, regional. As such, they sought to put international pressure on North Korea to keep its nonproliferation obligations.³⁴⁵

As part of this, Australia supported the US in a 1992 NSG meeting that included a new control regime for 65 nuclear dual-use items. This action was a result of lessons learned from Iraq's use of nuclear dual-use items to develop WMD, which represented a serious gap in the antiproliferation regimes. In addition, this meeting adopted a common declaration requiring full-scope IAEA safeguards as a precondition for any new nuclear supply to non-nuclear weapons states. The declaration was of particular importance to Australia because it led the international coalition that worked persistently on this issue to reach this result.³⁴⁶

Furthermore, Australia was invited to join with the Member States of the Group of Seven (G7) in a series of visits to the states of the former Soviet Union

(FSU) to assist them in creating and implementing controls for both transfer and source elements of proliferation. This program was designed to cover controls to prevent nuclear, chemical, and biological proliferation. Australia perceived the request to act with the G7 as a tribute to the contribution it had made to the prevention of WMD proliferation and to the skill of its arms control officials. The participation by Australia in the G7 program is important because it represents the first time that both the US and Australia clearly recognized the interaction between different elements of the proliferation chain.

In addition to Australia's participation in the G7 program, its clout in the Asia-Pacific region led to it holding bilateral talks with regional actors to reinforce and support US policies.³⁴⁷ While Australia was willing to take diplomatic actions, policymakers chose not to partake in military actions, like interdiction, to stop WMD proliferation during this time. This was despite several requests for Australian intervention by the US, based on intelligence regarding the pending transfer of material, generally chemical, from nations of interest. The Australians believed that each state should undertake internal export controls without external enforcement.³⁴⁸

As an active and supportive proponent of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, Australia was also concerned by reports in 1993 and 1994 that companies in Europe had attempted to circumvent national export controls. Both US and Australian policymakers felt that the countries involved needed to ensure their national control systems were functioning effectively.³⁴⁹

Of significant concern was the possibility for source material and technology transported from the FSU. As noted, in 1992 the US set up a bilateral assistance

program and sought other, international, help through the G7 in addition to the IAEA. Australia's contribution to these international efforts was expanded throughout the mid-1990s with Australian officials attending a workshop on safeguards in the Newly Independent States (NIS) in 1993 and conducting a training course with the IAEA on national safeguards systems in 1994. While this course was perceived as a regional antiproliferation exercise by Australia, with the Australian Safeguards Office (ASO) conducting the course aimed at the East Asian region, Australia also funded the participation of 6 delegates from the NIS (3 from Kazakhstan, 2 from Uzbekistan, and 1 from Azerbaijan) in order to further the US bilateral and multilateral antiproliferation efforts from the FSU.³⁵⁰

While Australia was adamantly opposed to the proliferation of WMD, policymakers tended to avoid sweeping initiatives. This did not mean, however, that they did not act to counter such initiatives by the US. Australia's fear was that such initiatives, which were not based on multilateral non-possession norm building, would alienate states that did not have WMD.

Thus, Australian policymakers rejected US calls for catch-all controls throughout the early 1990s. This changed, however, when a series of exports put Australia's reputation as an opponent of proliferation in jeopardy. In response to this, policymakers introduced the Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act of 1995.³⁵¹

While this act brought Australian policies closer to those of the US, Australian policymakers adamantly opposed the 1993 US Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI). While the US tried garnering Australian support for, and participation in, this initiative, policymakers from both the Department of Defense and the DFAT strongly

opposed it. For both, the CPI was not a good way to respond to WMD proliferation. While DFAT officials were worried that the initiative's goal of cooperation among allies would hamper all encompassing multilateral treaties that included Third World countries, Department of Defense officials did not believe that military action was a suitable means of antiproliferation. As such, by late 1994, Australian policymakers made it clear to the US that they would not take part in this initiative.³⁵²

While Australia was unwilling to participate in the CPI, policymakers understood the basis underlying the US goals. As such, they did raise the level of counterproliferation capabilities of the Australian armed forces. Nonetheless, Australia did not support unilateral action as the means to halt WMD proliferation. Like Britain, Australia sought multilateral regimes (like the CWC) and stricter national export controls as the means to counter the proliferation chain. As such, the Australia passed the Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Bill in 1994.³⁵³ This Bill represented a further push by Australia to influence other Western states, especially the US, and encourage their participation in the CWC.

At the same time, the possibility that North Korea would attain nuclear capabilities became more realistic. For Australia, the possibility of North Korea achieving nuclear capabilities was seen through the prism of a regional proliferation threat. As such, they supported bilateral talks between North Korea and the US since the talks between the International Atomic Energy Agency and Pyongyang were progressing slowly.

Throughout 1994, the issue of North Korean nuclear proliferation was revisited many times by both US and Australian policymakers. Both Australia and the US remained committed to dialogue and negotiation to resolve this problem. However,

since North Korean nuclear proliferation heightened the possibility of other regional states seeking nuclear capabilities, Australia was also prepared to support US-suggested actions, including sanctions, if imposed by the UN Security Council.³⁵⁴

While the threat of North Korean proliferation continued, the US preparedness to start negotiations for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), as well as changes to other antiproliferation policies, suggested that some of the US policies were starting to run parallel to Australian interests and objectives. Furthermore, President Clinton's decision to maintain the US nuclear testing moratorium, and his priority to prevent WMD proliferation during this time, supported the Australian perspective, which viewed the "threats posed by the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons...as a fundamental challenge to peace and stability in the post-Cold War world."³⁵⁵

By late 1994, Australian policymakers believed that the prospects for concluding a CTBT were positive. Australia was a firm advocate of a CTBT and, with New Zealand and Mexico, sponsored that year's UN resolution calling for CTBT negotiations to the General Assembly. This was after Australia's leadership in this matter led to this same resolution passing by consensus in 1993, with over 150 co-sponsors.³⁵⁶ Nonetheless, Australia viewed US participation as extremely important in this undertaking, with the US delegation in Geneva playing a constructive role in formulating the CTBT. This did not mean, however, that the Australia took a backseat in advancing these negotiations through the mid-1990s. As with the CWC, Australia sought to influence US alignment leadership, including tabling a complete draft treaty as a starting point to further develop an agreed treaty language.³⁵⁷

While Australia supported and pushed for multilateral regimes in response to WMD proliferation, policymakers also supported the bilateral US–North Korea Agreed Framework concluded in October 1994. This framework was a response to concerns about the possible development of nuclear capabilities by North Korea. Both US and Australian policymakers felt that it was in everyone’s interest to create an environment that balanced incentives and safeguards and guaranteed, as much as possible, that there would not be any nuclear weapon producing capacity in North Korea in the future.

1995–2001

To that end, in early 1995 Australia made a contribution of \$5 million (US) to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), a multilateral international consortium formed to finance, and provide, civil-use light water nuclear reactors and conventional energy to North Korea.³⁵⁸ In return, North Korea promised to freeze operations at its plutonium-producing reactor permanently, seal its plutonium reprocessing facility, provide safe storage facilities for spent fuel rods for eventual removal from North Korea, and halt construction of two new nuclear reactors.³⁵⁹

In addition to Australian support for the US – N. Korean Agreed Framework, US and Australian antiproliferation policies looked like they might merge around the upcoming 1995 NPT review conference. The main topic of discussion at this conference was the issue of the indefinite extension of the NPT, something both the US and Australia strongly supported. Australia took many steps to help achieve this goal. As such, it was supportive of the progress to pursue negotiations in good faith

on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race made by nuclear weapons states in response to Article 6 of the NPT.³⁶⁰

For Australia, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the US and Russia that began the process deep cuts in the superpower's nuclear arsenals, as well as the decision by FIS states to forgo their inherited nuclear capabilities and join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states, represented attempts to uphold Article 6 of the NPT. For Australian policymakers, the best way to maintain this state of affairs, and push for further reductions, was the indefinite extension of the NPT. It also represented the best way to attain universality of the NPT and convince non-members, especially those with un-safeguarded nuclear programs in regions of proliferation concern, to join the NPT and support multilateral antiproliferation.³⁶¹

Australia's support of the NPT's indefinite extension did not, however, signal a change in Australia's antiproliferation policy or its ultimate goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons. As such, Australia continued to urge NWS to embrace that goal as the best means of global nonproliferation. To that end, and despite the US stance, Australian policymakers encouraged NWS to work towards the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the review conference process.³⁶²

Interestingly, the Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas terrorist attack in Tokyo in March 1995, which presented the possibility of other types of WMD proliferation end-users in the region, was not perceived by Australian policymakers as heralding a new era of terrorism characterized by the use of chemical weapons.³⁶³ Australia maintained that the best way to minimize the risk of CW, or other WMD, use by terrorists was through multilateral means, including the speedy entry into force of the CWC.³⁶⁴ This was not true for the US, where, as a result of this attack, congressional inquiry

specifically recognized the terrorist end-user of the proliferation chain.³⁶⁵ In response to these findings the US passed the Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (Nunn-Lugar–Domenici Act) to further improve national preparedness and responses to domestic and international WMD terrorist and proliferation threats.³⁶⁶

Despite the differing views on how to respond to this type of proliferation, in mid-1995 the US and Australia established a broad framework for cooperation between the Australian Defense Science and Technology Organization (DSTO) and the US Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). The goals of this cooperative framework were scientific exchange for the common objectives of preventing WMD proliferation and protection from missile attack.³⁶⁷ This cooperation was designed, among other things, so that Australia’s contribution would directly support Australia’s national defense needs and priorities. Among the proposed activities was a demonstration exercise with the US Navy to familiarize the Australian Defense Force with the BMDO’s cooperative engagement concepts relating to the detection, tracking, and targeting of theater missile attacks.

In the 1995 Annual Report of the US Secretary of Defense, it was stated that theater missile defense can “strengthen security relationships with allies, enhance the counterproliferation strategy of discouraging acquisition and use of ballistic missiles and, should that fail, protect against the threats posed by such systems.”³⁶⁸ Australian cooperation with the US in this field represented a change in policy, as it moved away from multilateral regimes and nonproliferation into counterproliferation by discouraging acquisition.

In addition to the Aum Shinrikyo attack, Australia faced another regional proliferation threat in 1995. While states in the South Pacific had signed the Treaty of Rarotonga 10 years earlier, defining the South Pacific as a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ), France decided to reinstate its nuclear testing in that region. This was perceived as a breach of faith with those countries that supported the indefinite extension of the NPT earlier that year. As such, it not only detracted from the climate of progress that had been seen in CTBT negotiations, but also represented the encroachment of nuclear proliferation into the South Pacific region.³⁶⁹

Since Australia was working through international forums to prevent both vertical and horizontal proliferation of WMD, the country's policymakers viewed France's decision to resume nuclear testing as damaging to the progress that had been made. In response to this, Australia sought regional unity to change the French decision.³⁷⁰ They also took unilateral action freezing defense cooperation, recalling their ambassador from France for consultation, and threatening cessation of uranium exports to France.³⁷¹ These actions were undertaken without the support of the US, since both the US and UK took the view that these tests were the price of France's acceptance of the CTBT. Nonetheless, Australian policymakers felt that the US could have, and should have, pushed harder in support of the Australian position.³⁷²

As if the threat of French regional tests and lack of US support to counter this threat were not enough, Australian policymakers were extremely upset with reports that the US was considering the resumption of its nuclear testing.³⁷³ These reports, however, proved to be erroneous and, in the end, Australia understood that nonproliferation by itself could only go so far. With that in mind, they perceived the

NWS as possible end-users of new generations of weapons, and saw the CTBT as a means of forestalling further proliferation and testing of these weapons. The statements that first worried Australian officials were not, in essence, for reinstating US testing, but instead were an attempt to define what the sub-threshold test level ought to be. While this ran counter to the Australian position of zero limits on testing, policymakers were willing to accept the US position of limited-level testing, especially for stockpile stewardship.³⁷⁴

As such, by late 1995 France, the US and the UK all agreed to sign the relevant protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, which was a goal Australia had worked for over a period of many years.³⁷⁵ On a positive note, these discussions led to France's support of a comprehensive zero yield test ban, which opened for signature in 1996.

This did not mean, however, that Australia had forfeited its perception of antiproliferation. Owing to its antiproliferation perspective, Australia specifically identified state end-users a possible proliferation threats, but failed to recognize non-state actors as end-users, despite Aum Shinrikyo's use of WMDs in Japan earlier that year. Thus, while Australian policymakers were willing to accept the limited testing of nuclear weapons, they still pushed for multilateral antiproliferation, like the CWC and CTBT, instead of action against the different elements of proliferation.

Interestingly, Australia responded to the rise in regional proliferation by passing the Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Bill 1995. This bill was an all-encompassing response to the threat of proliferation. It recognized all the elements of the proliferation chain, something that the US had not yet done.

Unlike Australia, the US would not recognize the financial element of proliferation until after the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center attacks.³⁷⁶

The election of the Liberal National Coalition in early 1996 had the potential to lead to drastic changes in the antiproliferation goals of Australia. Throughout 1996, however, the newly elected policymakers maintained much the same stance as those from the Labor party that preceded them.³⁷⁷ The goal of a world without WMD, including the signing and ratification of the CWC, CTBT, and movement towards a nuclear-free world were still seen as the significant means of antiproliferation by Australia. This acceptance of previously established policies was significant, especially because it meant the new policymakers were willing to accept the findings of the Labor party-initiated Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, and promote these findings in the international community.³⁷⁸

By mid-1996, Australia had made further progress on its goal of nuclear nonproliferation. The acceptance of the CTBT, as brought to the UN General Assembly by Australia, was a major push towards nonproliferation leadership by Australia. US policymakers, in response to this, acknowledged Australia's leading role.³⁷⁹ Australia's actions in this field led to both the US and Britain accepting the UN resolution and signing the CTBT.³⁸⁰

While Foreign Minister Alexander Downer's decision to preserve the AG, in spite of the CWC was moving towards ratification, suggested a change in Australian policy, it was changes in the US goals in response to transport and other elements of proliferation that led Australian policymakers to accept the US position that the AG continued to play an important, complementary, role to the CWC. This did not mean, however, that Australia accepted the US positions favoring expansion of the AG

controls into other fields, most significantly the biological weapons sphere. On the contrary, at subsequent meetings Australia maintained its stance that the AG needed to pursue the same priorities as it had previously.³⁸¹

In 1997, however, US and Australian policies regarding bilateral agreements supporting disarmament began to run parallel courses. Both the US and Australia were convinced that bilateral efforts towards arms reduction were an important approach to achieve concrete results towards non-possession. Both the US and Australia took the view that multilateral negotiations were not conducive for nuclear *disarmament*, which both considered to be an extremely intricate process of involving careful trade-offs, verification, and security procedures.³⁸² These parallel's, however, did not include the realm of multilateral regimes or military actions to stop proliferation.

While both the US and Australia accepted the broader antiproliferation goals, and Australia recognized that the US presence in the Asia Pacific region had a major influence on both regional antiproliferation efforts and stability, Australia sought a regional security environment that limited the need to resort to force, prevented WMD proliferation, and encouraged regional cooperation. This significantly influenced its relations with the US during this time.³⁸³

While, like the US, Australia perceived WMD proliferation as a significant global threat, Australia was far less prone to take action, beyond those actions required by multilateral nonproliferation regimes, to enforce WMD capability denial. Unlike the US, no actions by the Australian military in response to NBC proliferation were recorded during this time.³⁸⁴

This changed, however, in early 1998 when Iraq chose to deny UN inspectors access to information and facilities. At the time Richard Butler, an Australian diplomat, was the head of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in Iraq. Despite his role leading to military action in Iraq, this proliferation end-user did not significantly change the Australian perspective on how to respond to proliferation. Australia accepted the US position that military force was permitted under the auspices and in support of UNSCOM's mission, and that this was the only way to bring about Saddam Hussein's compliance. As such, they sent both ground troops and aircraft in support of the US-led coalition. These troops not only served for the originally planned 3 months, but many remained for an extended period to support coalition forces.³⁸⁵

Due to Australia's regional perspective, the detonation of nuclear devices by India in early May 1998 led to further convergence between in US and Australian policies. Like the US, Australia condemned India's actions and perceived them as defying the international community's support for nonproliferation, as well as international opposition to nuclear testing. In response, Australian policymakers responded similarly to the US by recalling the Australian High Commissioner from New Delhi for consultations. Australia also sought consultation with "the United States which share[d] the great concerns...about what India ha[d] just done."³⁸⁶

In the light of India's behavior, both Australia and the US undertook further action, including economic and defense-related actions. Among the actions taken were the suspension of the bilateral defense relationship with India (including the withdrawal of the Australian defense advisor), cancellation of ship and aircraft visits, officer exchanges, and defense-related visits, and the withdrawal of ADF personnel

training in India. In addition, Australia, like the US, suspended all non-humanitarian aid to India.³⁸⁷

The US and Australia also had similar responses following the Pakistani nuclear detonations in late May 1998. Just as they had with India, and similar to the US, Australia recalled its High Commissioner, recalled its Defense attaché, withdrew its defense personnel, and halted military exercises and ship visits.³⁸⁸

Furthermore, in early 1999 Australian policymakers implemented changes in their response to WMD proliferation. This change, however, was in the realm of counterproliferation and defense against WMD use on the battlefield. In essence, the steps that Australian policymakers were proposing were similar to those undertaken by NATO under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative proposed by the US.³⁸⁹ While this change brought Australian counterproliferation policies closer to those of the US, it did not represent a significant change in the Australian policy of norm-building and multilateral agreements as the means to forestall NBC proliferation elements.

The unilateral actions taken by the US in Sudan, since they did not affect the South East Asia region, did not garner notice by Australia. While the US sought to deny WMD to al-Qaeda through its actions, Australia maintained a norm-building attitude towards the source and end-user elements of proliferation. While they nominally acknowledged the transport element, Australian antiproliferation policies did not include any action in response to it. The only transport element issue of interest to Australia during this time was the shipping of nuclear waste through Australian waters.³⁹⁰ Furthermore, while Australia had recognized, and begun to act against, criminal financial networks (attached to drugs, people-smuggling, money

laundering, and organized crime) this element of the proliferation chain was all but ignored.³⁹¹

Regionally, however, the issue of North Korean proliferation, specifically the country's status as a potential end-user of nuclear proliferation, was of significant interest to Australian policymakers throughout the late 1990s. As such, they met with representatives from North Korea throughout this time seeking greater regional security while addressing issues of North Korean isolation and food deprivation.³⁹²

By late 1999 Australia also faced the reality that the US Senate was unwilling to ratify the CTBT, despite President Clinton's support for the treaty. This was a blow to the Australian push for multilateral nonproliferation as the fundamental means of antiproliferation. Despite this decision, Australia abstained in the vote for a nuclear disarmament resolution in the UN First Committee, which was presented by states from the New Agenda Coalition. Australia perceived this resolution as undermining the basis of Article 6 of the NPT, which calls on the NWS to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

Furthermore, the existence of this resolution, according to Australian policymakers, suggested that many states believed that the nonproliferation regime had failed.³⁹³ Not only did this run counter to the Australian position, but was seen as detracting from the security benefits garnered from the NPT. For Australia, further polarization of the nuclear disarmament debate was harmful to the security provided by nonproliferation norms established by the NPT.³⁹⁴

Interestingly, by late 2000 Australia supported the nuclear disarmament resolution, after having abstained the previous year. Australia supported the resolution because the New Agenda Coalition worked closely with several

governments to redraft the resolution, making it one that achieved broader support and expressed the positive outcomes of the NPT Review Conference earlier that year. In addition to Australia, this resolution received support from 145 other countries, including the US, UK, and China. Australia supported the resolution because it expressed Australian disarmament policy priorities, including multilateral antiproliferation, the early entry into force of the CTBT, the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, and universal adherence to and compliance with the NPT.³⁹⁵

Australia also garnered more support for the CTBT in late 2000 than it had the previous year. For Australian policymakers, this resolution, which passed in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, "...[sent] a clear message about the norms against nuclear testing...."³⁹⁶

Interestingly, while Australia maintained its support for multilateral antiproliferation, policymakers began to recognize terrorist organization end-users in the WMD proliferation chain and the possible need to take military action in response to them. This need was expressed in legislation that would allow for the military to take counterproliferation actions within Australia in response to WMD use. While these actions were based on the rising security needs for the then-upcoming 2000 Summer Olympics, they brought Australian counterproliferation policies closer to those of the US, where the National Guard would take on a similar role. Interestingly, while they were pushing for this legislation because they recognized terrorist organizations as possible end-users, there was no expectation that Australia would ever confront such a threat.³⁹⁷

2001-2005

Although there was a change in US administration in 2001, which raised the possibility that internal politics would alter alignment norms, this did not appear to have significant sway on the antiproliferation policies of either state. Like Britain, Australia recognized the common threat from WMD proliferation, as well as the means of their delivery, and the need to deter this threat with both offensive and defensive systems.³⁹⁸ While Australia vocally supported the United States' decision to develop a missile defense system in response to this threat, by mid-2001 the US had not made any decisions about including Australia in its development or use of Australian installations for such systems.³⁹⁹

Nonetheless, while Australia and the US were moving closer in their goals, and actions, there was still considerable disagreement regarding multilateral antiproliferation. While both sides were committed to the antiproliferation goals expressed in the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), there were significant differences between the US and Australia regarding negotiations for a protocol to strengthen the BWC. In addition, both states recognized that problems within the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) were affecting its ability to undertake its core nonproliferation activities. Both the US and Australia agreed to work to improve the nonproliferation efficiency and effectiveness of the OPCW.⁴⁰⁰

By mid-2001, Australia began to make changes to the legislation that related to the acceptable actions towards WMD antiproliferation by the Australian Security Intelligence Organization and the Australian Secret Intelligence Services. These changes included the possibility of action against Australian nationals participating in

activities related to the proliferation of WMD, or committing a serious crime by moving money to those ends.⁴⁰¹

The September 11, 2001 attack by al-Qaeda in the US led to greater unity of purpose in US and Australian antiproliferation policies. Statements made by Osama bin Laden made it clear that al-Qaeda sought to change the systemic status quo and would not hesitate to use WMD as a means of accomplishing that goal. While Australia had no evidence that the government in Iraq was linked to the attack in New York, Australian policymakers accepted the US concerns that rogue states like Iraq would have no qualms assisting al-Qaeda by passing on NBC expertise and weapons. As such, both Australia and the US were prepared to respond to terrorist networks as potential WMD threats.⁴⁰² However, while the attack led to both Australia and the US acknowledging a rise in revisionism – represented by the proliferation of WMD to terrorists – Australia did not accept US antiproliferation policies indiscriminately.

By early 2002, Australia was taking a greater role in the military aspects of antiproliferation, especially vis-à-vis Iraq. In January, 2002, Captain Peter Sinclair of the Royal Australian Navy assumed tactical command of the multinational interception force that was enforcing sanctions imposed by UN Security Council Resolution 665. Following the destruction of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, the ADF involvement in these operations was incorporated into Operation Slipper, which supported both the US response to international terrorism, especially in Afghanistan, and WMD proliferation to and from Iraq.⁴⁰³

Mid-2002 represented a watershed for change in Australian antiproliferation policy. With policymakers clearly recognizing the threat of Iraqi WMD to the

international community, and intelligence sources confirming the presence of al-Qaeda members in Iraq, Australia began extensive consultations with the US administration. Both Australian and US policymakers agreed that the threat from Iraq's WMD programs was real and could not be ignored by the international community.⁴⁰⁴

For Australian policymakers, the more time that passed, the more time Iraq had to work on its WMD programs; a view accepted by the US. Unlike the US, Australia's primary goal was to limit the threat posed by WMDs in Iraq, though it would also welcome new leadership in Baghdad.⁴⁰⁵ Australian policymakers viewed a WMD-free Iraq as in its national interests, as they wanted to maintain global stability through the system of collective security that was the UN. As such, Australia supported the US in its demands for Iraq's compliance with UN resolutions or its facing the consequences.⁴⁰⁶ They recognized that a NBC-armed Iraq would encourage WMD proliferation to other countries, which would undermine the multilateral nonproliferation and norm-building that was the central motif of their antiproliferation strategy.⁴⁰⁷

In the end, Australian policymakers believed that the determined stance, as well as the strong rhetoric, of US, British, and Australian policymakers, led to concessions by Iraq in late 2002. After several months with no movement, and continual pressure from the US, UK, and Australia, Saddam Hussein allowed the reentry of UN weapons inspectors into Iraq. Unfortunately, this change by Iraq was perceived as insufficient and met with harsh responses by the US, the UK, and Australia.⁴⁰⁸

The bombing in Bali, Indonesia, in late 2002 brought home to Australian policymakers the potential lethality of WMD terrorism. While WMDs were not used in the attack, Australian policymakers recognized that such an attack using WMDs would have been even more lethal, leading to even more Australian fatalities.⁴⁰⁹ This did not, however, lead to changes in Australian antiproliferation policies.

Nonetheless, the continued threat of Iraqi WMD proliferation did force policymakers to reconsider the actions they were willing to take to counter proliferation. In early 2003, with the issue of Iraqi proliferation once again on the table, Australian policymakers were faced with the possibility that military force would be required to stop WMD proliferation to, and from, Iraq.⁴¹⁰

Furthermore, and perhaps even more important to Australia, the issue of Iraqi proliferation was seen as having a profound effect on the UN's ability to respond to North Korea as a WMD proliferator. For Australia, the failure to stop Iraqi proliferation would not only be problematic in and of itself, but was a serious threat to the UN's authority, making responding to North Korean proliferation almost impossible. In addition, this would lead to other rogue states acknowledging the West's inability to deal with Iraqi proliferation, thus encouraging the rise of more revisionist states that would flout international conventions on arms control and develop NBC weapons.

Nonetheless, while Australian policymakers understood the possible need for military action in Iraq, they were unwilling to take such action without the consent of the UN Security Council. However, they also recognized that, while a majority of the Security Council could support such action, such a resolution could be vetoed by a permanent member. In this case, the final decision for or against military action by

the Australian government would be influenced not only by their “powerful desire to stop the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and [their] alliance with the United States,” but also the need for action in support of collective security.⁴¹¹

For Australia, any action taken in Iraq had to work towards the goal of disarmament. As such, and because Australian policymakers supported multilateral regimes as the best means of antiproliferation, policymakers wanted the conflict to be resolved without the need for military force. While Australia supported a peaceful solution to Iraqi proliferation, they were also pre-positioning Australian forces, and participating in contingency planning with the US military so that Australia could effectively contribute to any military operation against Iraq, if such action was needed.⁴¹²

Like the US, Australia perceived a direct connection between Iraq’s WMD program and the future proliferation of NBCs to terrorist organizations and viewed such the connection as a threat to global stability.⁴¹³ Australian policymakers believed the driving force behind American policy in Iraq was a response to the events of September 11, 2001 and accepted the US concern that the rogue states and terrorist organizations would work in unison with “horrific consequences.”⁴¹⁴ Furthermore, the US and Australia’s shared common values and interests, as well as Australian recognition of the US as the global leader in defending those values and interests led the US to consult with Australia in response to the Iraq issue. As a result, these consultations led to Australia exerting significant influence in Washington.⁴¹⁵ As such, Australia’s participation in military action in Iraq, as part of the US-led coalition of the willing, was a byproduct of changes to Australian antiproliferation policies.⁴¹⁶

For Australia, American leadership and power contributed not only to Iraqi disarmament, but also helped to maintain to a stable systemic environment in the region. At a time of both global and regional uncertainty, with the rising threat of international and regional WMD proliferation, Australian policymakers pushed for greater cooperation against the common threats of WMD proliferation and terrorism. This was especially true for Australia in response to the regional threat of North Korean proliferation.⁴¹⁷

By mid-2003 Australia joined the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), though it maintaining its support for multilateral nonproliferation forums. This came in response to the clear understanding that international transshipment was integral to the proliferation network. While the mainstay for stopping WMD proliferation, for Australia, were the treaties, export control regimes, and other instruments that were integral to nonproliferation, PSI represented new, *practical*, actions to counter the trafficking of WMD-related items.⁴¹⁸ Soon after the establishment of the PSI, Australia hosted the first interdiction exercise, “Operation Pacific Protector.”

Alternatively, Libya’s renouncing of its WMD program in late 2003 proved that the Australian position, supporting multilateral diplomacy as integral to antiproliferation, was still valid. While Australia did not take a role in the outcome, Australian policymakers believed that the actions taken in Iraq pushed Libya to change its status from a proliferation end-user and systemic revisionist.⁴¹⁹

While the outcome of antiproliferation actions was evident in Libya’s decision, it became clear, in early 2004, that Pakistan’s Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan had disclosed nuclear secrets and sold nuclear technology to many states, including Iran and North Korea. While this seemed to suggest that the available means of countering the

elements of WMD proliferation were insufficient, Australian policymakers argued that the multilateral regimes, as well as actions like the US-led PSI, were effective responses to the WMD black market.⁴²⁰

For Australia, the revelation of the Khan network showed that rogue states, middlemen, front companies, and transnational shipping were all part of WMD proliferation. The US response, which included strengthening global counter-proliferation controls, brought the US and Australian export controls more in line.⁴²¹

Also, the unanimous passage of UNSCR 1540, pushed for by the US, required the development and enforcement of national legal and regulatory measures against WMD proliferation, something that Australia not only supported but had already done in the mid-1990s. This resolution furthered the US goals by requiring all UN Member States to refrain from supporting NSAs seeking WMDs, as well as prohibiting NSAs from engaging in WMD-related activities, including the acquisition or use, attempted acquisition or use, and financing of the acquisition or use, of WMDs. In addition, it required UN Member States to accept, and enforce, measures establishing domestic controls for the prevention of WMD proliferation, including the establishment of controls over related materials. In so doing, it also met the Australian goal of action taken in a multilateral forum to further enhance and strengthen global antiproliferation norm-building.⁴²² In essence, this resolution brought Australia's national WMD antiproliferation legislation into the international sphere, and required UN Member States, including the US, to pass similar legislation while also meeting the US antiproliferation capability/denial goal that required action in response these aspects of the proliferation chain.

Revisionism

It is clear that Australia recognized and responded to WMD proliferation as systemic revisionism between 1989 – 2005. Australia's policymakers response to this proliferation was significantly different that those proposed by the US for much of the period examined. Nonetheless, Australia's recognition of WMD proliferation as systemic revisionism suggests that it was part of the Western antiproliferation alignment. This allows for the next step in the examination of followership – studying changes in Australia's follower identity.

As described here, and as we will show later in the analysis of followership, Australia was not an exemplary follower throughout a significant part of the time examined, especially regarding capability/denial and non-possession/norm-building. While the research into Britain and Australia suggest significant changes in the follower identities, examining Israel will help determine alignment followership by augmenting the sample group and providing the possibility for follower identity predominance within the alignment.

Australia's Follower Identity

Like the analysis of Britain's follower identity in the previous chapter, the following examination of Australia's follower identity begins as an study of changes in Canberra's antiproliferation policies in response to WMD proliferation. Like the above analysis, it examines Australia's response to changes in the level of systemic revisionism and the alignment leader's vision for systemic status quo. It then graphs the follower level for each strategy to determine a mode follower level. Using this information allows for the determination of Australia's follower identity and the influence of systemic revisionism on changes to that identity over time.

Australian Capability/Denial Follower Level

Unlike Britain, and despite participating in efforts to deny Iraq WMD capabilities, Australia did not support overall US social purposes for capability/denial after the Cold War and did not accept capability/denial as the best means of WMD antiproliferation. Despite Australian support for the coalition in response to Iraq's WMD proliferation, Australian policymaker's support of alignment capability/denial remained low, primarily based on international obligations and norms, both before and immediately after Operation Desert Storm.

While the US maintained that military force is necessary to attain Western antiproliferation social purposes, Australia refused to accept the use of force as the predominant means of responding to WMD proliferation as systemic revisionism. Furthermore, Australian policymakers did not agree with the US goals for export controls and the continuation of the AG.

The lack of clear systemic revisionism after the first Gulf War, and Canberra's lack of support for US capability/denial policies, suggests an alienated follower level

for this strategy. This level is further reinforced by Australia's attempts to present alternative capability/denial goals and constitutive norms to counter proliferation. Since Australia was not trying to exert influence on the leader so as to change the social purposes and constitutive norms of the leader, the argument can be made that Australia was presenting itself as an alternative leader to the US in the field of capability/denial. While the US supported unilateral military action as one of the primary constitutive norms in response to end-users and suppliers, Australia proposed the use of non-military measures for capability/denial.

By the late 1990s, however, Australia recognized that the only way to force Iraqi submission to UNSCOM inspection was through military means. Despite this, Canberra was adamant that any actions taken needed to be supported by multilateral regimes and norms, not unilateral military measures. While this rise in systemic revisionism led Australia to support Western alignment social purposes and constitutive norms, Canberra still expressed doubts about capability/denial as the predominant form of antiproliferation and did not take action to assist the US in response to Iraq's proliferation.

It was not until after the events of September 11, 2001, which acted as a watershed for Australia's perception of supplier, transporter, financier and end-user elements of proliferation, and the rise of non-state actors like al-Qaeda, that Australia changed its perspective on the use of military capability/denial in response to WMD proliferation. This move towards an exemplary capability/denial level was further demonstrated through Australia's participation in Proliferation Security Initiative actions, the war in Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq in 2003.

While Australia's capability/denial follower level rose to exemplary in response to Iraqi proliferation in 1990-1991 and again in 1998, its overall capability/denial follower level in the 1990s was alienated. The rise to sustained exemplary follower was a result of clear systemic revisionism after September 11, 2001 and changes made in the alignment's capability/denial social purposes and constitutive norms – including support for stricter export controls.

Australian Non-Possession/Norm-Building Follower Level

Unlike Australia's capability/denial policies at the beginning of the post-Cold War, Canberra's non-possession/norm-building follower level was high, though not exemplary. Australia, while supportive of the US goals, did not accept many of the actions for maintaining the non-possession/norm-building status quo.

Thus, while the Western alignment leadership was supportive of some multilateral regimes, Canberra pushed for all-inclusive non-proliferation and non-possession regimes. In addition, Australia's support for the South East Asia Nuclear Free Zone ran counter to US policies for the region. As a result, it seems that Australia's conformist follower identity soon changed to alienated as Australia targeted the rise of regional end-users – especially North Korea and India – by defining and acting upon regional norm-building goals regardless of, or even contradictory to, overall Western alignment social purposes.

Australia's alienated follower level was further demonstrated as policymakers sought to reinvigorate the push for the CWC and the eventual dismantling of the AG despite US objections. While Canberra supported the goals of indefinite extension for the NPT, it also sought greater non-possession on the part of the NWS. In addition, Australia did not support the accepted Western social purposes regarding

Israel, Pakistan, and India at the 1995 NPT conference. For Australia, the lack of US support for NPT universality ran counter to established non-possession norms. Additionally, policymakers held that multilateral regimes like the CTBT and CWC were the best way to counter WMD proliferation end-users and, as such, pushed for stronger and broader multilateral approaches to antiproliferation throughout the mid – 1990s. Thus, Australia, which was never a strong supporter of overall Western non-possession/norm-building goals and actions, was actively trying to present alternative options to the US leadership in this field.

The lack of progress in multilateral forum, and the rise in systemic revisionism by regional actors in the late 1990s led Australian policymakers to rethink their non-possession/norm-building policies. Thus, Canberra accepted the US position that bilateral non-possession agreements based on established norms might be more effective in countering *some* end-user proliferators like North Korean. Despite this, and while these changes could be associated with domestic Australian politics and the election of John Howard, Australia nonetheless maintained multilateral norm-building and non-possession as its predominant policy. Furthermore, Australia took little action to support the bilateral social purposes instead leaning on the US to maintain the status quo, especially regarding North Korea, suggesting a conformist non-possession/norm-building follower level by the late 1990s.

After the attacks of September 11, 2001 Australia continued to maintain the need for strong non-possession/norm-building. Canberra supported the US social purposes in the UN Security Council for Iraqi non-possession and was prepared to participate in constitutive norms to maintain non-possession standards based on established systemic norms. While Australian policymakers tried to resolve Iraqi end-

user proliferation without military force, the eventual participation of the Australian military in Iraq was a byproduct of maintaining and defending non-possession norms.

Nonetheless, Australian non-possession/norm-building policies changed as a result of the al-Qaeda attack on September 11, 2001. The potential for NSA WMD proliferation led Australian policymakers to act in support of US norm-building and non-possession goals. In addition, Australia recognized the potential for Iraqi end-user proliferation and the need to create an internationally recognized norm to counter WMD transporter proliferation. While Australian policymakers still wanted to take action through accepted multilateral regimes, and based on internationally accepted norms, Australia took a prominent role in the actions in Iraq in 2003.

These changes in Australian norm-building antiproliferation policies and the support for Western non-possession social purposes in response to the rise of systemic revisionism – though they failed to include the Australian goal of global non-possession – suggest that Australia was an exemplary non-possession/norm-building follower at the end of the time examined. This finding is reinforced by Australia's participation in establishing the PSI and UNSCR 1540 as social purposes that supported norm-building to maintain the systemic status quo.

Australian Consequence/Management Follower Level

By maintaining its Cold War deterrence and counterproliferation policies, with goals and actions complementary to those of the US, Australia began the post-Cold War as an exemplary follower. In fact, based on available data, it seems that consequence/management was not a significant factor in Australian disagreements with the US regarding antiproliferation strategies until the US proposed the CPI in

1993. In response to this proposal, Australian policymakers began to incorporate counterproliferation into Australian armed forces capabilities, though Canberra did not accept CPI as the basis for its consequence/management policies. Instead, Australian policymakers and sought to redefine the goals and actions in this proposal to fit Australia's perception of WMD proliferation.

Interestingly, this did not mean that policymakers denied the need for counterproliferation. On the contrary. Canberra accepted the need for counterproliferation but not the social purposes or constitutive norms that the leader was pushing as the means of attaining it. As such, Australia's follower identity level lowered to alienated as the US sought to establish the CPI as the standard for Western alignment counterproliferation.

Even after the Aum Shinrikyo attacks in Japan in 1995, policymakers did not take steps to accommodate Western constitutive norms for counterproliferation or deterrence. While Australian policymakers recognized the necessity of effective consequence/management policies, they were unwilling to accept the means set forth by the US and did not seem to acknowledge this attack as systemic revisionism.

Nonetheless, by the late 1990s, Australian policymakers accepted that maintaining regional status quo, and discouraging WMD proliferation, required deterrent capabilities. While Australian forces worked with the US to incorporate deterrence through anti-ballistic missile systems, Canberra relied primarily on the US to provide much of that deterrent. Thus, while the US and Australia were once again working together to formulate effective deterrence capabilities in the South East Asia region, this cooperation was limited, and primarily symbolic, with Australia supporting but not taking significant action, suggesting a conformist follower level.

Nonetheless, Australia, in order to prepare its armed forces to work in a NBC environment, began to accept the constitutive norms that the alignment established as a result of the US and Britain response to Iraqi proliferation in 1998. On the home front, Australian counterproliferation policies changed with the recognition of NSA WMD end-users as a potential threat to the Sydney Summer Olympics. As a result, Australia began to take greater action to protect the home front and accepted the social purposes and constitutive norms that Western alignment leadership had determined were essential to ensure the security of the Olympic Games. This, combined with the deterrence policies Australia was incorporating hint at exemplary consequence/management by 2000. In the aftermath of the al-Qaeda attacks in 2001, Australia became even more supportive, both vocally and in actions, of the US ABM systems as a necessary means of deterrence. These changes, and the acceptance of US goals and actions for counterproliferation and deterrence, seem to indicate that Australia's consequence/management level was exemplary from 2000 onward.

Follower Levels and Follower Identity

This graph tracks the changes in Australia's follower level for each of the three antiproliferation strategies. By determining the mode – predominant – follower level Australia's follower identity is established at different points during the post-Cold War. The analysis below uses this graph to demonstrate why Australia's follower identity changed throughout the time examined.




Table 2: Australia's Follower Identity
 5 - Exemplary, 4 - Conformist, 3 - Scared, 2 - Alienated, 1 - Pragmatic

Australia's Follower Identity

While not a perfect follower during the Cold War, Australia accepted most of the goals set by the US. It clearly functioned as a member of the Western alignment and, as neo-realists would argue, sought to balance the systemic threat of proliferation through this alignment.

Unlike Britain, Australia demonstrated a pragmatic follower identity at the very beginning of the post-Cold War. This changed as a result of Iraqi WMD proliferation, which led to Australia's participation in the first Gulf War. While Australia's involvement was limited, it was a demonstration of vested interest in helping the Western alignment attain its antiproliferation social purposes.

Soon after the Gulf War, the lack of systemic revisionism led to less participation and support for US-led antiproliferation actions. As a result the relationship between Australia and the US underwent a process of change. While defense and security ties remained strong, the importance of the Asia Pacific region

to both countries led to a shift away from the emphasis on the Western alignment interests and instead towards independent common interests.⁴²³ While the US placed nonproliferation concerns at the top of its agenda, an approach that Australia strongly supported, some of the constitutive norms, especially the CPI and continuing the AG, ran counter to what Australia's leadership believed was necessary to maintain antiproliferation. These changes led to differences of opinion regarding all three strategies. By 1993, changes in Australia's capability/denial and non-possession/norm-building strategies represented a move away from the US that suggest an alienated follower identity level. By 1994, the low level of systemic revisionism also led to a lower Australia consequence/management level, further emphasizing the alienated level of Australia's follower identity.

While the US forfeited leadership on some level to Australia, especially regarding the nonproliferation of chemical weapons, as well as in the AG, Australia was nonetheless a follower, working to maintain the status quo at the very least. Australia was, however, more inclined to apply its regional perspective of the necessary social purposes to redefine systemic goals, than participate in constitutive norms supporting US goals throughout the mid 1990s. In addition, Australia's work maintaining the status quo was, from their perspective, the starting point for international disarmament, something that the US had not defined as a Western social purpose. As such, while Australia was part of the Western alignment, working adamantly and systematically to oppose WMD proliferation, Canberra sought to redefine the Western alignment antiproliferation goals. Thus Australian policymakers sought to restrain the US by seeking bilateral or multilateral diplomatic solutions to reach goals, even if this led to it opposing the US policies as the alignment leader.

The difference of opinion between the US and Australian regarding Pakistan, India, and Israel in the 1995 NPT Review Conference further demonstrated Australia alienated follower identity. While the US accepted, and even protected Israeli ambiguity and the three state's non-signatory status, this constitutive norm was unacceptable to Australian policymakers wanted to push for their acceptance of the NPT and disarmament.⁴²⁴

Despite a change in government that could have led to significant changes in Australia's antiproliferation policies, Australia maintained multilateral nonproliferation and norm-building as its primary response to WMD proliferation. While US and Australian policies on security and antiproliferation were running parallel courses by 1997, Australia was far less prone to take action, beyond those required by multilateral nonproliferation regimes. The differences between the US and Australia were so great during the mid-1990s that available data suggests Australia's military took no action in response to NBC proliferation in 1997.⁴²⁵ Furthermore, while accepting the alignment's systemic goal of countering NBC proliferation, Canberra sought to redefine the alignment's constitutive norms to support Australian regional antiproliferation interests without accepting Western leader's social purposes.⁴²⁶

Iraqi proliferation, and the move to deny UN inspectors access to information and facilities in 1998, significantly influenced Australia's follower identity as Australia accepted and vocally supported the US position that military force was the only way to bring about Saddam Hussein's compliance. The difference was that Australia perceived these actions as supporting its non-possession/norm-building social purposes and not as capability/denial.

As a result of Iraqi, as well as Indian, Pakistani, and North Korean, proliferation Australia participation in constitutive norms changed as it began to take greater action in support of US led consequence/management policies, incorporating them into Australian antiproliferation social purposes. These included the WMDI (even though Australia was not part of NATO) and the US goal for ABM systems. The move away from alienated follower is further demonstrated in the mutual responses by Australia and the US to the Indian and Pakistani nuclear detonations in 1998. These actions were taken as both India and Pakistan sought to revise the systemic status quo and establish themselves as proven nuclear weapons states, which was unacceptable to the US and Australian antiproliferation social purposes. Thus, in 1998, the rise in systemic revisionism, especially regional state proliferators, led Australia's policymakers to accept the social purposes defined by US goals for non-possession/norm-building and consequence/management, though Australia did not take many actions in support of these goals. These changes in policy, as a result of systemic revisionism, imply that Australia's follower identity was conformist.

In 2000 there was a slight glitch in Australia's rising follower identity as it made changes in its consequence/management strategies that dropped its overall follower identity level to pragmatic. By mid-2001, however, Australian and US legislation also began to coincide, especially regarding intelligence agency responses to WMD proliferation. These changes included the possibility of action against Australian nationals participating in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or committing a serious crime by moving money to that end.⁴²⁷ These capability/denial cognitive norms accepted by Australia represented another move

closer to US goals and actions for antiproliferation and seem significant enough to argue a change in Australia's follower identity level.

Furthermore, after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Australian and US antiproliferation policies began to converge because of the rise of both state and non-state revisionist systemic actors. Changes in policy led to Australia accepting the social purposes and constitutive norms determined by the US. These changes led to a symbiosis suggesting that Australia's follower identity was exemplary.

For Australia, there was a clear understanding that the war on terror and Iraqi WMDs represented an inherent threat to systemic stability. Australian participation in constitutive norms to counter these represented a watershed that led to greater cooperation and similarity, bringing its antiproliferation policies in line to those of the Western leadership. While Australia still maintained that multilateral nonproliferation regimes were essential to counter WMD proliferation, it took greater cooperative actions with the US to attain the alignment's antiproliferation goals.

By the end of 2004, Australian and US antiproliferation social purposes were no longer running parallel, but separate, courses. Instead, it appears that the US accepted some of the goals pushed for by Australia, including the establishment of national legislation in response to WMD proliferation and the strengthening of export controls (also supported by Britain), as well as the elements of the proliferation chain, including recognition of the transport and financial elements. Australia, in the meantime, had accepted the use of military action and the need for proactive capability/denial as a necessary constitutive norms for effective antiproliferation.

Chapter 6: Israeli responses to WMD Proliferation

History: Cold War Antiproliferation

Unlike Britain and Australia, Israel was not a US client at the beginning of the Cold War and did not receive US assistance or security promises minimizing its need to develop WMD capabilities. As such, Israel began developing nuclear technology at the founding of the state in 1948 with the help of Jewish scientists, like Ernst David Bergmann (who would later become the director of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) founded in 1952).⁴²⁸ Bergmann, who was a close friend and advisor of David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first Prime Minister, noted that there was just one nuclear energy, not two, and that nuclear weapons were part of nuclear development.⁴²⁹ As such, he argued that nuclear energy could compensate for both Israel's poor natural resources as well as its lack of military manpower.⁴³⁰

The lack of US patronage in 1949, led Israeli policymakers to seek alternative resources for the development of WMD capabilities. As a result of Bergmann's personal relationship with Francis Perrin, a member of the French Atomic Energy Commission, Israeli scientists were invited to the new French nuclear research facility at Saclay. Perrin, and other French scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project and who were allowed to use what they had learned as long as the information was not shared, provided Israel data and expertise on the same basis, leading to joint French – Israel nuclear research efforts.⁴³¹

In the aftermath of the Second World War, France's nuclear research capabilities were limited, so the French – Israel joint research provided France access to Israeli scientists and Israel access to French technological breakthroughs as they both sought to develop nuclear capabilities. Throughout this period, French and

Israeli progress in nuclear science and technology was closely linked, with France named as a partner in two Israeli patents, one for heavy water production and another for low-grade uranium enrichment.⁴³² Thus, for the years immediately following Israel's independence both Israel and France were both early nuclear proliferators.

In parallel, Israel also started serious research and development into chemical and biological weapons. Since no international norm limited the research of CBW at this time, Israeli researchers supposedly examined the offensive and defensive characteristics of these weapons, despite the Geneva Convention's clause denying states the right to *use* CBW.⁴³³ Unlike Israel's nuclear program, which demonstrated a connection to the West, there are no records that Israel's CBW research received external support. Nonetheless, Israel's cooperation with France demonstrated its association with the US-led Western alignment.

Israel's connection to France as its Western patron was further reinforced as a result of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's closing of the Straits of Tiran in 1953. The ensuing crisis was, for Israel, further motivation for nuclear, chemical, and biological development, especially after the signing of the Czech-Egyptian arms agreement in 1955. As a result of Nasser's actions, Ben-Gurion reportedly ordered the manufacture of chemical and other unconventional munitions.⁴³⁴ This episode led Bergman and Shimon Peres, the Director-General of the Defense Ministry and aide to Ben-Gurion, to request French assistance in building a nuclear reactor in Israel, based on the precedent set a year earlier by Canada's aid to India.⁴³⁵

Soon thereafter, in October 1956, France and Israel cooperated with Britain in the Suez Canal-Sinai operation against Egypt, further demonstrating Israel's

relationship with the Western alignment. The failure of the Suez operation, the subsequent threats by the Soviet Union – including the possible use of nuclear weapons if Israel did not withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula – and the lack of support from the US-led alignment, led Israeli policymakers to further acknowledge the need for an independent Israeli nuclear deterrent. By late 1957, Israeli policymakers convinced the French to help with the development of Israel's nuclear deterrent.⁴³⁶

During this time, the US was making considerable effort to limit the proliferation of nuclear capabilities. As a result, while France helped Israel develop a nuclear deterrent, Israel helped France circumvent the US imposed computer technology embargo that was limiting France's ability to develop a nuclear bomb. This, as well as Israeli scientific capabilities, ensured that any difficulties France or Israel faced in attaining nuclear weapons would be overcome.⁴³⁷

In addition, French and Israeli policymakers were not forthcoming to US policymakers about the construction of the Dimona nuclear reactor in Israel.⁴³⁸ When the US discovered the existence of the reactor in late 1958, Ben-Gurion described the unfinished construction as a 24-megawatt reactor “for peaceful purposes.”⁴³⁹ The construction of the Dimona reactor quickly became a point of contention in US - Israel relations. While the US policymakers accepted the “peaceful purposes” declaration overtly, they pressured Israel on the construction privately. They also sought to limit Israeli nuclear development and research by obtaining Israeli commitments to use the facility for peaceful purposes and allow international inspection of Dimona. Israel's reluctant acquiescence to biannual US inspection of the Dimona reactor suggests that Israeli policymakers recognized the need to accommodate the US as the Western alignment leader.⁴⁴⁰

Nonetheless, and despite US efforts to stop Israeli nuclear development and research, the French nuclear test in 1960 may have led to both Israel and France becoming nuclear powers.⁴⁴¹ The presence of Israeli observers at the French nuclear tests, as well as the cooperation in research and in obtaining technology and material, suggest that Israel, like France, chose to disregard US nonproliferation goals and may have acquired nuclear capabilities as early as 1960.⁴⁴²

Even if this is not the case, the French – Israeli joint venture provided Israel with several essential ingredients for nuclear weapons including a reactor, a plutonium extraction plant in Israel, and schematics. In addition, Israel circumvented US nonproliferation goals by acquiring heavy water from Norway, France, in addition to the US during this time.⁴⁴³

While US policymakers faced the challenge of opposing Israeli nuclear proliferation, they also recognized Israel's tenuous strategic position as the regions only democratic state.⁴⁴⁴ Despite US President John F. Kennedy's strong support for nonproliferation, the lack of international nonproliferation norms limited the ability of US policymakers to influence states trying to develop NBC capabilities. For that reason, the US used coercion to influence British and Australian proliferation in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This use of coercion, which worked effectively on Britain's cooperation with Australia, was not as effective against Israel's nuclear ambitions.

Kennedy acknowledged that US nonproliferation goals would not constrain Israel from acquiring NBC capabilities, and as such recognized that the US had to address Israel's regional concerns while trying to attain US antiproliferation interests. In many ways, the US experiences dealing with the Israeli nuclear program provided

a model for US and Western antiproliferation policies. Some researchers have suggested that the US support for multilateral nonproliferation regimes, like the NPT, was a byproduct of its inability to deny Israel nuclear capabilities.⁴⁴⁵ While this may have influenced the US push for multilateral regimes, previous chapters have already noted that the US was also trying to alleviate worries that other states, like Germany, would try and acquire nuclear weapons.

These worries led US policymakers to recognize that Israeli proliferation was not only a regional problem. They feared that a successful Israeli nuclear program would push other Western states, including Germany and Japan, to seek nuclear weapons.⁴⁴⁶ This led the Kennedy administration to recognize that bilateral relations were insufficient on their own to counter WMD proliferation. In response to this, and because of fears of further regional and international proliferation, US policymakers began to rethink nonproliferation as a whole and reconsider the possibility of a multilateral nonproliferation agreement.⁴⁴⁷

The assassination of Kennedy in 1963 left newly inaugurated US President Lyndon B. Johnson the decision how best to incorporate Israeli security needs with US nonproliferation goals. Some US officials felt that Israel would probably sign the NPT, which was being negotiated at that time, 1) if the Arab countries signed as well, 2) if Israel were able to withdraw from the treaty if it necessary and 3) “if the Israel government received some assurances of aid from Western governments in the event of an overwhelming Arab attack.”⁴⁴⁸ This belief was not openly discussed with Israel until after negotiations for the NPT document were concluded in 1967. Meanwhile a special bilateral arrangement was reached between the US and Israel that included a US promise to maintain and support Israeli conventional parity and

an Israeli pledge to not be the first state to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. US policymakers expected that, if Israeli security requirements were met, Israel would become a NPT signatory.⁴⁴⁹

While the US policymakers sought to entice Israel to sign the NPT, the Six Day War in 1967, followed by the French decision to stop supplying Israel with uranium, influenced Israel's perceptions regarding WMDs, especially nuclear weapons.⁴⁵⁰ Despite the US push for international nonproliferation, and the Israeli agreement to not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, Israeli policymakers believed that the establishment of an independent nuclear capability was essential. As such, Israel undertook undercover operations to obtain uranium oxide and continue developing nuclear weapons.⁴⁵¹

Additionally, Israel turned to other states, like Norway, to acquire material for further nuclear development. While Norway sold Israel 20 tons of heavy water (though Norway demanded inspection rights for 32 years) South Africa supposedly supplied Israel with uranium in a series of deals including yellowcake and tritium.⁴⁵² It has been argued that in exchange for these material sources Israel provided South Africa with nuclear expertise.⁴⁵³

Many reports suggest that Israel managed to build several nuclear weapons by the late 1960s, though nuclear production began in earnest after the Six Day War.⁴⁵⁴ By 1971, Israel was purchasing krytrons, dual-use electronic switching tubes used as detonators in both industrial and nuclear weapons applications. Despite US export controls, these krytrons were supposedly provided by Richard Smith (or Smyth), an American charged by the US with smuggling 810 krytrons to Israel.⁴⁵⁵

In 1973 Israel apparently had a nuclear arsenal, as well as the means of delivery. Some reports suggest that Prime Minister Golda Meir decided to arm Israel's Jericho missiles and Phantom airplanes with nuclear weapons in response to the Egyptian and Syrian surprise attack on Yom Kippur.⁴⁵⁶ It has been suggested that, in response to this decision, the US opened an aerial supply pipeline to Israel, reinforcing the Israeli belief that its nuclear armament was a way of guaranteeing US conventional aid.⁴⁵⁷

Despite Israel's actions as a nuclear proliferator, it also tried to counter WMD proliferation by other states in the Middle East. In meetings that took place between US and Israeli diplomats regarding Iraq's Osirak reactor, American representatives "verified Israeli assessments that Iraq was working to reach nuclear capability and would exploit the ability to influence and destroy Israel. Despite the American concurrence, the Americans refused to act, perhaps because they did not truly grasp the danger, or because they did not want to upset Iraq, then fighting America's enemy, Iran."⁴⁵⁸ Instead, the US tried to persuade other Western alignment members, especially France, to stop supplying Iraq's nuclear program. Throughout the late 1970's diplomatic pressure was put on France to stop assisting in the construction of the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor. As US and Israel's diplomacy foundered, Israel tried other methods to stop the French shipments to Iraq. In April 1979, saboteurs tried to blow up the completed reactor's core to prevent its shipment from France to Iraq. Additionally, the head of Iraq's nuclear program was killed in his Paris hotel room. While the attempted sabotage failed, both of these acts were attributed to Israeli agents.⁴⁵⁹

The announcement by Alexander Haig, in April 1980, that attempts to stop construction through diplomatic channels had failed, may have been interpreted by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin as a “signal to go ahead” with plans to destroy the reactor.⁴⁶⁰ This, as well as the Iraqi response to the Iranian attack on Osirak in September 1980, which stated that “[t]he Iranian people should not fear the Iraqi nuclear reactor, which is not intended to be used against Iran, but against the Zionist entity,” further reinforced Israeli fears of Iraqi nuclear proliferation.⁴⁶¹

this declaration, and the failure of both the US and Israel to influence French participation in the Iraqi nuclear developments, led Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to approve plans for the destruction of the Osirak reactor. On June 7, 1981, Israeli F-16 bombers flew over Jordan and Saudi Arabia and destroyed the Osirak reactor.⁴⁶² according to Begin the reactor was designed to produce atomic bombs and that Israel was the intended target. For that reason, Israel undertook unilateral military action to deny Iraq nuclear arms.⁴⁶³ The actions by Israel marked first time military force was used against a working nuclear reactor to halt proliferation.

While some US policymakers may have been surprised by Israeli unilateral action, the argument has been made that the Israeli action was, in reality, a client acting for its patron state. David Schoenbaum has argued that the new US administration, under President Ronald Reagan, “opted for complicity by omission, leaving the initiative to the Israelis, while reserving post facto censure.”⁴⁶⁴ While Israel may not have acted in the complete interest of the US at the time, and “while Washington joined in a unanimous U.N. Security Council resolution ‘strongly’ condemning Israel, privately US officials made it known that they would veto any article that called for sanctions against Israel. As a result of this pressure, council

Resolution 487 stopped short of imposing sanctions and Israel's aggression was let go with a slap on the wrist."⁴⁶⁵

While both Israel and the US were worried about Iraqi nuclear proliferation during this time, Iraq was also among world's largest producers of chemical agents.⁴⁶⁶ Despite US and Israeli diplomatic efforts, Germany and other Western European countries provided Iraq technology and materials for the manufacture of these agents. According to some sources, these weapons were developed with a variety of delivery systems, most aimed at the ability to attack Israel.⁴⁶⁷

As such, Israeli antiproliferation policies had to come to grips with the Iraqi threat, especially after the Iraqi military used chemical weapons against Iranian troops in 1983. While the attacks did not result in high mortality rates, the possibility that these weapons might be turned on Israel forced Israeli policymakers to confront the threat of WMD use.

While Israel had used military and other means it attempts to counter WMD antiproliferation, Israeli policymakers argued that deterrence was the best way to preempt an Iraqi chemical attack. As Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin noted in mid-1988, "One of our fears is that the Arab world and its leaders might be deluded to believe that the lack of international reaction to the use of missiles and gases gives them some kind of legitimization to use them. They know they should not be deluded to believe that, because it is a whole different ball game when it comes to us. If they are, God forbid, they should know we will hit them back 100 times harder."⁴⁶⁸

While Israeli policymakers sought to deter possible chemical weapons use by Iraq, they also understood there was no guarantee that Saddam Hussein or any of

the other Arab state leaders would believe the threat of Israeli retaliation. As such, Israeli policymakers began to consider how to counter the possible use of chemical and biological weapons against Israeli civilians.

Post-Cold War Antiproliferation

1989–1995

The move from the Cold War to the post-Cold War period did not significantly change Israel's acceptance of the US as the leader for Western antiproliferation. Both Israel and the US recognized that WMD proliferation in the Middle East had the potential to destabilize the systemic status quo and by 1989 Israel was taking action to meet the goals defined by the US for regional antiproliferation.

As part of its support for the US, and because of the potential for regional destabilization, Israel sought to influence Western European states directly in an attempt to limit their participation in regional WMD programs. The role of Germany in Libya's chemical weapons program, in early 1989, was of significant importance because of the historic use by Nazi Germany of chemical and biological weapons during the Holocaust.

In response to Germany's role in regional CW proliferation, Deputy Foreign Minister Benjamin Netanyahu noted that Israel recognized and responded to three phases of proliferation.⁴⁶⁹ According to Netanyahu, the first phase required international pressure and sanctions against supplier states. As such, the Israeli policymakers tried to convince Western European states to stop supplying NBC expertise and materiel to Libya and other Middle East end-user states.⁴⁷⁰

The second phase of antiproliferation, according to Netanyahu, targeted the production of CBW and was considered a more difficult stage for antiproliferation.

While hinting that Israel was taking action to limit regional production capabilities, Netanyahu was unwilling to go into details about what those actions might be.⁴⁷¹

In order to respond to the third antiproliferation phase – the use of chemical and biological weapons – Netanyahu argued that internationally recognized sanctions and standards were needed. To that end, Israeli policymakers attended meetings with both US and European officials to further the establishment of a workable international agreement that would respond to chemical weapons proliferation.⁴⁷²

While Libya's CBW program was perceived as problematic, Saddam Hussein's WMDs were a far more immediate concern to Israeli policymakers. The potential for regional destabilization, and the possibility that Hussein might use chemical weapons against Israel, meant that policymakers had to provide sufficient counterproliferation measures to protect the civilian population and the military. By mid-1989, policymakers implemented a program to examine and refurbish public bomb shelters to limit the effects of ground to ground missiles, especially missiles with chemical or biological warheads, should Iraq or Syria attack.⁴⁷³

At the same time, Israel tried to garner support from the US and other Western states to stop regional proliferation. Among the more important points, for Israel, was to convince Germany that it must counter the illegal sale of WMD materiel to Iraq.⁴⁷⁴ Israeli policymakers argued that Iraq represented the tip of an iceberg that, if not stopped through a comprehensive US-led Western embargo of materiel, information, and weapons, would lead other Middle Eastern states to obtain WMDs.⁴⁷⁵

In this same vein, Israel raised the issue of German companies supplying nuclear and chemical equipment to Libya. In response to this, Germany acted to the extent of its power against the companies in question. While the Israelis believed that this action succeeded in stopping nuclear and biological proliferation from Germany to Libya, they maintained close surveillance to preempt any future proliferation.⁴⁷⁶

While Israeli policymakers, with the help of the US, successfully convinced Western European states to limit regional proliferation, they also wanted to hinder the effectiveness of chemical and biological weapons use. Working with the US, and other Western powers, Israel sought to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack, especially in response to potential Iraqi CBW use.⁴⁷⁷ By late 1990, with the an imminent US-led assault on Iraq, Israeli policymakers asked for US help to counteract potential WMD attacks, while making clear that Israel maintained the right to respond “as it felt necessary” to any attack by Iraq or its allies.⁴⁷⁸

The 1991 Gulf War led to greater cooperation between the US and Israel, especially in the field of counterproliferation. Israel sought US help in response to the threat that Iraq might use Scud missiles with CW. While Israel perceived Iraq as a WMD threat, policymakers accepted the US goals and actions for the coalition that required Israel maintain a low profile and not actively participate in military actions against Iraq. While it supported the US, Israel used the possibility of a military response to attain US missile defense systems, access to satellite information, target determination, and other indirect aid. Thus, Israel participated as part of the US-led antiproliferation alignment against Iraq by *not* taking action against Iraq.

While regional antiproliferation may have been paramount for Israeli policymakers, the Gulf War further emphasized that international nonproliferation was the key to maintain the systemic and regional status quo.⁴⁷⁹ This led them to support the US stance that antiproliferation could not rely solely on the UN or multilateral treaties but that bilateral agreements, as well as action by Western industrial states to embargo or halt WMD proliferation, were necessary. For Israeli policymakers, a US-led "embargo coalition," which also targeted industrialized state that chose not to participate, was imperative.⁴⁸⁰

While Israel recognized WMD proliferation as a threat to international stability after the Gulf War, policymakers were, nonetheless, more worried about their effect of on the regional status quo.⁴⁸¹ Israel's regional perspective meant that the possibility of WMD proliferation, both by states possessing ballistic missiles or possible NBC armament and those who had yet to achieve either of these, would drastically change the regional dynamic.⁴⁸² Accordingly, Israeli policymakers argued that the only way to counter this attempt to change the system was the complete elimination of WMDs.⁴⁸³

As a result, Israel and 13 Arab states inaugurated the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group in early 1992 while participating in a meeting in Moscow. The ACRS process was designed to promote regional stability by reducing the possibility of violence and war, and addressing issues of regional NBC proliferation.⁴⁸⁴ In a subsequent ACRS meeting, the US and Russia proposed a compromise that included "a joint effort to define long-term objectives ('a vision') for the process, but argued that progress towards the realization of these goals must be built 'brick by brick' through the gradual growth of mutual confidence."⁴⁸⁵

The election of Yitzhak Rabin and the Labor Party in mid-1992 did not change the perception of Israeli policymakers that NBC proliferation was a regional destabilizer or that the US was the leader of international efforts to stop WMD proliferation.⁴⁸⁶ In fact, policymakers were beginning to accept that military action to prevent WMD proliferation, like the Osirak attack in 1981, necessitated further cooperation with United States.⁴⁸⁷ In addition, while Israel had been preparing for the possibility of a WMD attack for some time, recent events had further clarified the necessity for cooperation in regional antiproliferation.⁴⁸⁸

By early 1993, Israel outlined an approach to Middle East arms control that included the creation of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East (WMDFZME) after stable and durable bilateral peace was established among the parties. This multilateral goal, reinforced by bilateral agreements, ran parallel to US antiproliferation policies. In addition, both the US and Israel demanded mutual verification measures was an essential part of this process.⁴⁸⁹ However, the lack of Iraqi and Iranian participation in the ACRS working group made any discussion of limiting WMD programs through that framework irrelevant.⁴⁹⁰

While these regional discussions took place, Israeli policymakers also recognized and accepted the US stance that participation in multilateral treaties, like the CWC, established norms that were important for global nonproliferation.⁴⁹¹ However, while Israel made the point of signing the treaty in early 1993, there was little chance of their signing the NPT, since policymakers contended that it ran counter to Israeli interests.

While Israeli policymakers recognized the global nonproliferation was of vital importance, the potential for regional destabilization led them to recognize and

respond to potential end-users and suppliers rather than the proliferation chain as a whole.⁴⁹² As such, Israeli policymakers perceived the CWC as a way to improve their position in response to regional proliferation, especially in the ACRS framework, rather than systemic CW proliferation.⁴⁹³ Despite US ratification in 1997, Israel did not ratify the CWC as a result of regional constraints, namely the lack of peace accords with many of the states in the Middle East.

While the US and Israel recognized the need to create internationally accepted norms in response to WMD proliferation, the potential for regional destabilization upsetting systemic stability led both to call for greater action in response to Middle East WMD programs. This demand for action, often directed at sources outside the Middle East region, was especially important to counter proliferation to countries like Iran, a state that Israeli policymakers believed was irrational, had dangerous intentions, and which was dependent on external support to advance its WMD programs.⁴⁹⁴

In addition to targeting suppliers in its antiproliferation strategies, Israel supported the US-led dual containment policy.⁴⁹⁵ This policy recognized both Iraq and Iran as WMD end-users that threatened regional stability and sought to limit their access to weapons grade material and resources through sanctions and isolation.⁴⁹⁶

The US dual containment policy was far more realistic than broader multilateral regimes according to Israeli policymakers, since it targeted two of the primary states threatening the destabilization of the Middle East. As such Israel worked with the US to advance this policy among other industrialized states.⁴⁹⁷ Despite the US-Israel efforts to prevent the transfer of dual use capabilities and

technology to Iran and Iraq, as well as UN Security Council resolutions against the transfer of advanced technology to Iraq, companies in Germany and other states continued to sell WMD precursors to both countries. While Israel and the US regularly pressured these supplier states to maintain a high level of vigilance regarding the export of technology and materiel to the Middle East region, Israeli policymakers also hinted at antiproliferation measures being undertaken to counter regional NBC proliferation by these states, though what these steps were was not made public.⁴⁹⁸

While working together to prevent Iran and Iraq from acquiring WMD capabilities, Israel and the US also cooperated in advanced missile defense systems research and development to deter the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the region. This cooperation included Israel's participation in the joint US - Russian Global Production System, as well as continued US - Israel joint design of the advanced "Arrow" system.⁴⁹⁹ Israel's participation in the development of active counterproliferation measures represented acceptance of the actions called for 1993 US CPI program.⁵⁰⁰

Recognizing that the US was unable to stop regional proliferation on its own, Israeli policymakers sought to take action that would bolster US antiproliferation policies.⁵⁰¹ With the US concentrating on containing Iraqi proliferation, Israel tried to hamper the Iranian NBC programs through both diplomatic and other means. While Iraq still garnered Israeli attention, Iran was seen as a far greater threat to regional status quo and led Israeli policymakers to suggest that a regime change in Iran might be the best way to stop Iranian participation in the proliferation chain. Whether this

became part of Israel's antiproliferation policy vis-à-vis Iran is unclear, as no information is available pointing to Israeli actions supporting this goal.⁵⁰²

While Israel viewed Iran as the predominant threat and both the US and Israel sought to counter the regional proliferation of Iran, Iraq, and Libya, Israeli policymakers continued to recognize the global threat of WMD proliferation. That recognition, however, was skewed by Israel's regional perspective. As such, while both the US and Israel perceived North Korea as a threat to the systemic status quo, its participation in proliferation as an end-user was of less importance to Israel than its actions as a supplier of WMD technology and capabilities to regional end-users. US policymakers made clear that Israeli attempts at discrete independent negotiations with North Korea regarding its participation in regional proliferation were unacceptable, leading Israel to support the US goals and actions to stop North Korea despite different perspectives on its role in the proliferation chain.⁵⁰³

1995–2001

With the US responding primarily to Iraqi and North Korea proliferation efforts (from the Israeli perspective), Israeli policymakers focused on Iran as the primary WMD regional revisionist.⁵⁰⁴ While Israel perceived Iraq and Iran as a WMD end-users, and acknowledged North Korea as part of the proliferation chain, one of Israel's antiproliferation challenges at the time was the US role as the predominant technology supplier to Iran.⁵⁰⁵ In response to this, Israel tried, and failed, to pressure the US and other Western states to strengthen their export controls and to stop non-state suppliers from transferring NBC technology and materials to regional end-users.⁵⁰⁶

During this time the US and Israel also perceived non-state actor end-users differently. The 1995 chemical attack by Aum-Shinrikyo, an Armageddonist cult based in Japan, which killed 12 people and shut down the Tokyo subway system led the US to take a closer look at the possibility of NSA proliferation. This attack did not change Israeli antiproliferation policies, and failed to garner attention from Israeli policymakers, even though this cult was anti-Semitic.⁵⁰⁷

Despite Israel's failure to recognize NSA end-users, Israeli policymakers established export controls similar to, though in some ways more rigorous than, those established by the NSG and other supplier groups as a result of regional proliferation and US pressure. As such, Israel enacted stringent legislation on export control to ensure it did not act as a NBC supplier.⁵⁰⁸

While Israel worked to counter proliferation in the Middle East, it faced pressure from the states in the region, including Egypt, to move forward with a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East. For the Arab states, a WMDFZME was only viable if Israel signed the NPT. For Israeli policymakers, however, Iraqi and Iranian proliferation was reason to seek bilateral peace accords in the region before signing the NPT or moving forward on the WMDFZME.⁵⁰⁹

The assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 and the changes in government over the following year, and the election of PM Benjamin Netanyahu from the Likud party, did not significantly influence Israeli antiproliferation policies. Policymakers from both sides of the political spectrum concentrated on Iran as the main threat to regional stability, and tried to persuade the US and other Western democracies to incorporate stringent antiproliferation policies regarding Iran. As a result of this regional perspective Israeli policymakers also tried to influence non-

Western, global powers like Russia and China, to participate in sanctions targeting Iran's NBC programs.⁵¹⁰ While China accepted the Israeli perspective and maintained that no cooperation with Iran was taking place in the field of NBC manufacture, Russia was less accommodating and was less willing to accept Western-led antiproliferation.⁵¹¹

In addition to these bilateral discussions, Israel also participated in the negotiation of the CTBT during this time. While Israeli policymakers were not inclined to participate in many of the multilateral norms, and were less worried about global antiproliferation than the possibility of regional proliferation, it signed the CTBT in 1996 as a result of extensive consultations with the US. Nonetheless, both the US and Israel chose not to ratify the CTBT, linking ratification to the creation of effective on-site inspections. In addition, Israel linked ratification to the signature and ratification by several regional proliferators, specifically Iran and Egypt.⁵¹²

Israel's Iran centric focus meant that many of the other participants in WMD proliferation in the region were left to US-led antiproliferation actions. As such, it was Britain and the US that responded to Libya's chemical weapons program and the construction of the Tarhuna chemical plant, while Israeli policymakers made no mention of Libyan proliferation during this time.

While Israeli policymakers recognized that Iran was not the only WMD proliferation threat to the region, by early 1997 Israeli policymakers tried convince the US leadership that the issue of Iran as a regional proliferator was of far greater significance than previously recognized. This focus led Israeli policymakers to not only try convincing the US, as well as Britain, to take greater action stopping the flow

of NBC technology and precursors to Iran, but also to clandestine Israeli actions to minimize Iran's access to suppliers.⁵¹³

While Israel maintained a constant vigilance regarding Iranian proliferation, the rise of potential Iraqi proliferation in mid-1997, after Saddam Hussein expelled UN special commission (UNSCOM) inspectors, led Israeli policymakers to vocally support US diplomatic measures as well as the US and British pressure on Iraq to abide by the UN Security Council decisions. At the same time, Israel continued tracking Iraqi activity and called on other states to acknowledge and respond to regional destabilization that Iraqi proliferation represented.⁵¹⁴

This fear, and the rising potential for conflict between the US and Iraq, led Israeli policymakers to seek greater cooperation with the US. As a result, Israel and the US formed a counterproliferation working group (CWG) in late 1997 that focused on NBC defense that met twice annually as part of the greater Joint Political Military Group, which was established to coordinate defense cooperation in the early 1980s.⁵¹⁵

By early 1998 policymakers were preparing for a worst-case scenario, including the possibility that Iraq would use chemical and biological armed missiles toward Israel in response to further pressure to reinstate the UNSCOM inspectors. In response to this, Israel once again began refreshing civilian gas masks and preparing bomb shelters to lay the groundwork for future military action by the US and other Western states.⁵¹⁶ At the same time, Israeli policymakers once again sought to deter Iraqi WMD use by stressing Israel's right to respond as they deemed fit.⁵¹⁷ Israel also sent a delegation from the Foreign and Security Committee to meet with members of the US Congress. The goal of those meetings was to raise the level of

interoperability, especially regarding the conception of antiballistic missile systems to deter WMD proliferation.⁵¹⁸

While Israel was worried about the possibility of conflict between Iraq and the US, and Israel and the US prepared to work more intimately – especially on missile defense systems – the region’s tensions were further raised by Pakistani and Indian nuclear tests in mid-1998. While the US responded to these tests by limiting defense cooperation, Israeli policymakers condemned the tests as counterproductive to systemic and regional stability and called on both Pakistan and India to sign the CTBT.⁵¹⁹ At the same time, policymakers were quick to deny claims that Israel participated in the Indian nuclear test. Furthermore, the greatest worry, for Israel, was that these tests might further pressure Iranian nuclear ambitions.

As a result, Israeli policymakers argued that deterrence, not only Israeli but international, was the best way to limit end-user proliferation. In that respect, Israel looked to the European and US deterrence example from the Cold War as the best response to NBC weapons proliferation.⁵²⁰ As such, policymakers tried to encourage the US and other Western states to raise the level of deterrence against regional end-users. In addition, Israel were closely with the US to develop the "Arrow" missile defense system and the Boost Phase Intercept program, which explored the possible use of armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to intercept theater ballistic missiles during their ascent phase.⁵²¹

While Israel sought to create a reasonable deterrent as the way to limit regional proliferation, it also supported the US and Britain decision to use force in response to end-user proliferation. Not only did policymakers support US-led actions, especially in Iraq, but they also perceived those actions as “serving Israel

directly, beyond...the global issue.”⁵²² Thus, Israel was vocal in its support of Western antiproliferation actions regarding Iraqi proliferation while maintaining a limited role based on missile defense and deterrence to protect the Israeli home front.

While Israel supported the actions taken to counter Iraqi WMD proliferation, policymakers felt that Western states, especially the US, were not responding effectively to Iran as a WMD proliferator. Many Western states were unwilling to reinforce export controls and other mechanisms, despite acting as NBC suppliers, as a result of complex economic ties with Iran. By mid-2000, the lack of Western response to Iranian WMD proliferation led Israeli policymakers to understand that, while some regional threats to the status quo would garner immediate response, the issue of Iran as a WMD proliferator required Israel to establish and maintain a high level of deterrence and counterproliferation since Israel faced this threat alone.⁵²³

2001–2005

While Israeli policymakers continued to push for Western participation in response to Iranian proliferation, they also recognized that Iraq was trying to change the regional and international status quo. Though they acknowledged Iraq's NBC ambitions, they argued that the US and Britain were taking the necessary steps to counteract Iraqi proliferation, thus limiting the need for action by Israel.⁵²⁴ By early 2001, however, the rise of terrorism was seen as far more threatening to regional stability than WMD proliferation, leading to almost no mention of WMD proliferation during this time.

In August 2001, the Palestinian weekly newspaper, Al-Manar, published an article that suggested that Palestinian terrorist organizations and the Palestinian

Authority were considering obtaining biological weapons to deter Israeli aggression.⁵²⁵ While Israel was worried about regional proliferation, and while terrorism was taking a prominent role in the Israeli national security debate, the suggestion that the Palestinians might seek to acquire WMD capabilities did not receive any overt attention by policymakers.

Despite significant changes in US antiproliferation policies, especially the acknowledgment of NSA end-users, as a result of the al-Qaeda attacks in September 2001, Israel's recognition of WMD proliferation not change. While the US took action against these organizations (as demonstrated by the US cruise missile attack on al-Qaeda sponsored Sudanese chemical plant), Israeli recognition of NSA end-users as part of the proliferation chain was unclear.

This changed in early 2002 when Israel seized the Palestinian ship "Karine A," which was transporting weapons from Iran to the Palestinian Authority. While this shipment consisted of conventional armament, Israeli policymakers recognized the potential danger of fusion between Iran's WMD aspirations and its support for the terrorist organizations fighting Israel. Despite having acknowledged the possibility that Palestinian terrorist organizations might try to acquire WMD capabilities, policymakers did not make note of any specific actions undertaken to counter this threat.⁵²⁶

While it is unclear if Israel responded directly to the potential for Iranian supplied WMD terrorist organizations, significant changes were made to Israel's policies regarding terror and proliferation financing as a result of the "Karine A." As part of these changes, Israeli policymakers reinforced money laundering laws in 2002

making it illegal to finance terror organizations, especially those participating in WMD proliferation.⁵²⁷

While Israel responded to the potential Iran – terror proliferation chain with national legislation, it did not participate in the US-led regional antiproliferation actions for fear of destabilizing the region. Thus, while the US and Israel were closely following Iran, Iraq, and Libya as the regional proliferators, Israel did not actively participate in US-led actions despite reserving the right to join the fighting, should the US expand its regional antiproliferation operations.⁵²⁸

By mid-to-late 2002, Israel was also making counterproliferation preparations in response to the US-led military buildup in the region. While there was no expectation by Israeli policymakers that Israel would participate in US-led antiproliferation efforts, the Israeli Defense Department, military, emergency personnel and others were all participating in preparation for the expected American assault on Iraq. In addition, Israeli policymakers reinforced deterrence as central to their antiproliferation policies, especially the “Arrow” missile defense system and its ability to counter ground to ground missiles. They maintained that Israeli deterrence was paramount, and that everything was being done to further enhance that capability.⁵²⁹

At the same time, Israel did not want to participate in the expected confrontation in Iraq, though policymakers were prepared to respond to any aggression by Iraq. Instead of overt involvement in antiproliferation actions against Iraq, they were vocal in their support of the US and its allies, specifically Britain, and were adamant that the US-led coalition was capable of countering Iraqi proliferation without Israeli security forces taking an active role.⁵³⁰

By early 2003, Israeli policymakers were being even more straightforward in their declarations regarding the upcoming war in Iraq. Deputy Defense Minister Gidon Ezra stated that, while the US was laying the groundwork diplomatically and militarily for the upcoming confrontation, the “American campaign in Iraq is not our war.”⁵³¹ At the same time, policymakers suggested that US actions to deny Saddam Hussein NBC capabilities were primarily designed to protect Israel. Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom claimed that this was the main reason for the upcoming US campaign in Iraq, since Iraqi WMDs were not aimed at Washington or London.⁵³² Despite this, policymakers were adamant that Israel was not involved and would not become involved unless attacked.

While Israeli policymakers were clearly worried about the conflict in Iraq and the potential for Israel to be drawn into the fighting, Iran was still seen as the greater threat. The quick conclusion of major military operations in Iraq, the subsequent fall of Hussein's regime, and the potential for greater regional stability and diminished WMD proliferation led Israeli policymakers to believe that US actions would result in other radical states rethinking their proliferation policies.⁵³³

The removal of Saddam Hussein did not, however, significantly influence Iran's role as a regional WMD proliferator. The possibility that Iran would act as a WMD supplier for terrorist organizations like Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, creating a proliferation chain that could lead to a NBC armed terrorist groups, was recognized as a long-term threat. According to Israeli policymakers, US policies did not address the possibility of Iranian supplied WMD terrorist organizations, leaving Israeli policymakers to prepare for this potentiality alone.⁵³⁴ In response to this, Israeli policymakers pushed diplomatic measures to

limit Iran's proliferation capabilities, including pressure on the US, Europe and Russia to enforce stronger sanctions against Iran.⁵³⁵

Iran's role as the primary regional proliferator was further amplified by Libya's decision to forgo its WMD programs in late 2003. This was seen by Israeli policymakers as yet another successful US-led antiproliferation action that was more beneficial to Israel than to the US or Britain, since Libyan disarmament further diminished the possibility of a regional end-user initiating a NBC attack or the transfer of WMD capabilities to non-state actors.⁵³⁶

By late 2003 and into early 2004, changes in US goals and actions led to greater Israeli participation in US-led antiproliferation efforts. In 2003 Israel joined the Proliferation Security Initiative, accepting the need to participate in this initiative to counter both regional and systemic proliferators (though there is no mention of Israeli participation in actions taken under the auspices of PSI). Israeli policymakers also accepted and supported the decision by US policymakers to push for stronger export controls. Though Israel was not an official member of any export control regime, policymakers accepted the export controls as defined by the AG, Wassenaar Agreement, and NSG. These actions represented active Israeli participating in US-led antiproliferation policies.⁵³⁷

While Israel was taking a greater role in US-led antiproliferation, Israeli policies were still directed almost entirely towards Iran in late 2004. While Israeli policymakers did not mention any actions taken in response to Iranian proliferation, they were vocal in their support of the US and other Western states decision to enforce stronger sanctions. The fall of Hussein's government in Iraq and the Libyan declaration and actions leading to disarmament meant that Israeli policymakers

could concentrate their antiproliferation strategies on Iran, which they perceived as “the most dangerous country in the world.”⁵³⁸

Revisionism

The recognition of, and response to, Iraqi, Libyan and Iranian proliferation as destabilizing to the regional and systemic status quo, signified Israeli membership in the US-led Western antiproliferation alignment. The clear recognition of WMD proliferation as a systemic and regional threat to the status quo led Israeli policymakers to respond to proliferation through a mix of strategies, many of which coincided or supported US goals.

Israel’s WMD antiproliferation strategies described here show that it was clearly part of the antiproliferation alignment established by the US. Nonetheless, it was not an exemplary follower throughout the timeframe examined. By recognizing WMD proliferation as systemic revisionism, Israel’s follower identity can now be determined.

Israel's Follower Identity

As a non-Anglo-Saxon country, Israel provides a point of reference for examining whether the similarities apparent in the previous two analyses are a result of a shared culture. Furthermore, this analysis provides a counterpoint for examining Western antiproliferation in the post-Cold War by demonstrating the influence of US leadership on states that do not have international antiproliferation obligations, since Israel is not party to most of the multilateral antiproliferation norms. Its position in the Middle East also presents another angle for examining antiproliferation, since many of the states in the Middle East have, or were attempting to acquire, WMD capabilities during the period examined. Thus, studying Israel demonstrates how a state in a region with a high level of WMD proliferation responded, and whether this had a significant effect on its follower identity.

Like the previous analyses, the examination below begins by establishing the follower level for each of the three antiproliferation strategies. It then graphs these levels to determine the mode follower level over time. This graph is then used to analyze how and why Israel's follower identity changed over time.

Israeli Capability/Denial Follower Level

In the immediate post-Cold War period, Israel maintained a relatively high level capability/denial follower identity in response to end-user revisionism. Israel's apparent lack of participation in the first Gulf War supported the US need for a broad coalition. Had Israel participated openly, many of the coalition states would not have cooperated with the US. Nonetheless, unconfirmed reports suggest that Israel did engage in clandestine actions supporting US and allied SCUD hunting operations during operation Desert Storm.⁵³⁹

After the first Gulf War, Israel sought to include stronger export controls and other forms of capability/denial strategies into Western alignment antiproliferation. While policymakers supported the use of force to counter NBC proliferation, Israel also pushed for stronger export controls in the US and Europe (especially Germany), which were seen as hosts to WMD proliferation suppliers. Thus, Israel's support for US capability/denial strategies was limited as it attempted to influence the US recognition of supplier elements. Furthermore, in contrast to the immediate post-Cold War period, Israeli policymakers were no longer suggesting that actions (clandestine or otherwise) were being taken to halt proliferation. By the mid-1990s, Israeli support for military action appeared predominantly vocal, though the possibility exists that still classified actions were taken, while it sought greater capability/denial in the form of stronger export controls. These changes in policy suggest that Israel's capability/denial follower level deteriorated to alienated. Interestingly, this drop in follower level does not appear to be a result of less systemic revisionism, but instead a perceived increase in regional revisionism that was not recognized by the US.

Unlike Britain and Australia, Israel's capability/denial follower level did not jump to exemplary in 1998 as a result of Iraqi proliferation. Iraq's position in the Middle East meant that Israeli policymakers did not see Iraqi proliferation as a change in the level of systemic (or regional) revisionism.

The al-Qaeda attacks on September 11, 2001, and the support Israeli policymakers gave to the US in response to potential NSA proliferation, led to a rise in Israel's capability/denial level. This change to conformist was further demonstrated by Israeli policymakers' statements supporting the 2003 war in Iraq as

primarily for Israel's benefit, though they maintained that Israel did not participate in military actions there. Despite this, it is unclear from the information available whether Israel took some actions in response to regional end-users during this time. Nonetheless, Israeli policymakers' suggestion that the US goal in Iraq was to remove the threat of WMD use against Israel, as well as the changes in US export control policies, suggest that Israel's capability/denial level was conformist, though this determination is subject to change as more data becomes available.

Israeli Non-Possession/Norm-Building Follower Level

Israel's non-possession/norm-building follower identity started as conformist as policymakers maintained their support for US goals but refused to accede to many of the established antiproliferation norms. Thus, while Israel was not party to any of the non-proliferation or non-possession norms of the time, it supported the idea of norm-building and accepted the US goals for non-possession, especially for states like Iraq and Iran.

After the Gulf War in 1991, Israel continued to recognize that many states, especially those in the Middle East, were potential WMD proliferators. As seen in the case study, this high level of regional revisionism influenced Israel's acceptance of norm-building and non-possession, with policymakers arguing that both were essential for effective antiproliferation. At the same time, Israel, like the US, called for bilateral agreements establishing non-possession norms with verification methods, rather than accepting multilateral treaties as the basis for such norms in the Middle East.

Despite Israeli insistence that bilateral discussions act as the basis for regional non-possession, it actively participated, and consulted extensively, with the US in the

CTBT negotiations throughout the mid-1990s – as it did regarding the CWC – suggesting an exemplary non-possession/norm-building follower identity. Evidence supporting this apparent change in follower level include Israeli helping the US negotiate the CTBT while supporting the US demand for effective on-site inspections prior to ratification. Thus, according to the available data, Israel’s non-possession/norm-building follower level rose significantly after the first Gulf War, especially in response to regional revisionists, leading to greater action in support for US goals.

As was shown in the case study, Israel worked closely with the US to maintain this dual policy of accepting non-possession/norm-building while seeking to establish bilateral agreements throughout the 1990s and after September 11, 2001. Furthermore, Israeli policymakers were active in their support of US non-possession goals in response to systemic and regional revisionism by Iraq, Iran and Libya, especially since these states were party to antiproliferation norms like the NPT. Nonetheless, the rise of Iran as a systemic revisionist in 2000 seems to have resulted in a hiatus in Israel’s non-possession/norm-building follower level – it could be argued that disagreements with the US on Iranian non-possession suggest an alienated follower level.

The al-Qaeda attacks in New York, the rise of NSA WMD proliferation and changes in US responses to Iranian proliferation as systemic revisionism returned Israel’s follower level to exemplary, with Israel accepting US non-possession/norm-building policies. Israel strongly supported US goals and took actions that supported those goals, including the establishment of new norms like the PSI, further reinforcing an exemplary follower level. Thus, the predominance of systemic

revisionists in the region, the potential for further regional proliferation, and the Israeli perspective (similar to that of the US) that non-possession/norm-building should not be the primary means of antiproliferation, led to Israel's exemplary non-possession/norm-building level from the mid-1990s through the end of the time examined.

Israeli Consequence/Management Follower Level

In many ways Israel's consequence/management policies appeared distinctly different from those of the US at the beginning of the post-Cold War. While the US maintained the need for deterrence, Israel's policies focused primarily on counterproliferation because of potential WMD use against its civilian population from Iraqi, Syrian and Iranian proliferation. This need for counterproliferation was even greater as a result of US-led coalition actions in Iraq.

Nonetheless, while Israel tried to establish a credible deterrent, stating that Israel would respond "as it felt necessary" to any attack by Iraq or its allies, policymakers relied on the US to reinforce that deterrent capability. In order to encourage US support, Israeli policymakers used the possibility of a unilateral military response to attain US missile defense systems and satellite imagery to bolster their existing consequence/management policies. Thus, Israel threatened actions suggestive of an alienated follower in order to coerce US help in protecting its home front. The decision by the US to accept the Israeli stance, bolstering Israeli deterrent and counterproliferation capabilities, allowed Israel to maintain an exemplary consequence/management follower level during, and after, the first Gulf War.

Israel maintained this high follower level after the first Gulf War, despite Israeli counterproliferation policies concentrating on the need for greater civilian counterproliferation preparedness. Israel also worked with the US on more effective deterrent capabilities as a result of the high level of regional WMD revisionism by Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya. This cooperation led to further similarity between US and Israeli consequence/management policies, including Israel's acceptance of the CPI as the basis for military counterproliferation capabilities.

Interestingly, while Israel accepted US counterproliferation goals, the US lagged in taking actions to protect civilians. Despite the decision by Israeli policymakers to institute the Home Front Command as a result of the Gulf War, the US failed to recognize the threat NSA WMD revisionism meant to the home front until the Aum Shinrikyo attack in Japan.

Regardless of these differences, Israel's exemplary follower identity continued throughout the 1990s, with the US and Israel working to develop multiple deterrents, including the Arrow ABM system. As a result of continued Iraqi WMD proliferation, and the possibility of military maneuvers against Iraq in the late 1990s, Jerusalem once again prepared for US-led action in the region. This helped sustain Israel's exemplary consequence/management level, as Israel worked with the US to reinforce its counterproliferation and deterrence policies, thus laying the groundwork for effective military action by the US with less fear of Israeli civilian casualties.

By the turn of the century, Israeli consequence/management policies seemed to be the mainstay of Israel's antiproliferation strategy. While Israel recognized Iraq and Iran as proliferation end-users, policymakers sought cooperation with the US

and its allies. As noted in the case study, this cooperation led to greater US – Israel interoperability - especially to deter regional WMD proliferation using ABM systems, and the formation of a counterproliferation working group (CWG) that met twice annually – focusing on chemical and biological defenses.

The US perception of higher systemic revisionism resulting from potential NSA WMD proliferation after September 11, 2001 did not lead to changes in Israel's consequence/management follower level. In fact, based on the available material, while this attack did not result in any changes in Israel's consequence/management policies, it helped reinforce the need for deterrence and civilian counterproliferation in US policies. Nonetheless, while Israeli policymakers prepared the home front for possible US-led military action in response to WMD proliferation in 2002, they not seeking active Israeli participation in the confrontation. In fact, policymakers expressed their trust in the US and its allies to deter Iraq while also maintaining the right to respond should Iraq attack. For Israeli policymakers, deterrence was the primary, and essential, consequence/management policy that Israel needed to reinforce in order to assist the US succeed in Iraq. To that end, policymakers noted that everything was being done to further enhance that capability, and thus maintaining Israel's exemplary consequence/management level.

Besides coordinating responses to Iraqi proliferation and potential use of WMDs, Israel strongly supported the US decision to give notice and withdraw from the ABM Treaty as essential for effective consequence/management. Israeli policymakers understood the US decision as a response to Iranian WMD proliferation as systemic revisionism and, as such, supported the US move for greater deterrence including cooperation with Israel to develop enhanced radar and other detection-

and-response systems. Thus changes in systemic revisionism reinforced Israel's high consequence/management level so that by the end of 2004, Israeli and US policies coincided and Israel's follower level remained exemplary.

Follower Levels and Follower Identity

The graph below shows changes in Israel's follower level for each of the three antiproliferation strategies. Israel's follower identity is established at different points during the post-Cold War by determining the predominant follower level at that time. The analysis below uses this graph to demonstrate how and why Israel's follower identity changed throughout the time examined.




Table 3: Israel's Follower Identity
 5 - Exemplary, 4 - Conformist, 3 - Scared, 2 - Alienated, 1 - Pragmatic

Israel's Follower Identity

Israel is unique among the states examined here. While it was clearly a client of the US by the end of the Cold War, it did not act, specifically in the field of WMD proliferation, as a bandwagoner throughout most of the Cold War period. If anything, its decision to continue its nuclear program and its supposed sharing with

South Africa suggest that Israel was acting counter to the US goal of nonproliferation.

Furthermore, while Israel faced the possibility of a Soviet nuclear umbrella for Arab states in the region, its participation in Western antiproliferation was almost nonexistent unless regionally motivated. While many have argued the issue of Israel as a US client during the Cold War, in the field of WMD *proliferation* Israel did not act as a client state.⁵⁴⁰ If anything, its actions as an end-user and supplier state, especially during the years developing their nuclear, biological, and chemical programs, raise the question if Israel was really a member of the Western alignment in response to proliferation during this time.

Despite this, it can be argued that Israel was a follower of the US, if nothing else for the support and protection it gained in the UN and other international forum. There is much literature that discusses the special relationship between Israel and the US. Part and parcel to that special relationship was the eventual acceptance, and protection, by the US of Israel's unique position as an unrecognized nuclear weapon state. This, it seems, was the essence of the Cold War Western alignment membership on the part of Israel. While it used US protection in the international arena to allow its development of NBC weapons, and coerced the US to supply conventional military aid so that the use of WMDs would not arise, it also provided a point of balance against the Soviet supported Arab states in the region.

As the Cold War came to a close, Israel was much more prone to act as a follower, supporting the US, though not always as the US would have liked. While the Osirak bombing was motivated by Israel's threat perception, the act supported the US nonproliferation goals, which diplomacy had failed to attain. The end of the

Cold War, however, represented a serious dilemma for Israeli antiproliferation. While Israel supported the greater idea of nonproliferation, it did not want that to come at the expense of its security. As such, Israel had to rethink its role within the Western antiproliferation alignment.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, Israel seemed to act as an exemplary follower. This move towards an exemplary follower identity seems to be a result of WMD revisionists in the Middle East, namely Iraq, Iran and Libya. The prevalence of WMD systemic revisionism in the region meant that Israel generally left global antiproliferation to the US, while trying to manipulate US goals and actions to support regional Israeli interests. The rise of Iraq as *the* predominant proliferator in the early 1990s, helped further establish Israel's exemplary follower identity, with Israeli policymakers seeking close cooperation with the US as the alignment leader. The lack of overt Israeli participation in the first Gulf War also solidified Israel's follower identity as exemplary.

Interestingly, while Israel began to accept Western social purposes and participate in some constitutive norms at the beginning of the 1990s, it seemed to digress by the mid-1990s. The lack of serious US response to Iran, and the continued Western supply of NBC precursors and technology to Iran, forced Israel to establish its own social purposes, and take actions, in the field of capability/denial. Thus, while Israel did not cooperate with the US, and even acted as an alienated follower, regarding capability/denial, changes in Israel's non-possession/norm-building and consequence/management in response to WMD proliferation sustained Israel's exemplary follower identity throughout the 1990s. As such, while Israel perceived a rise in the level of systemic revisionism – specifically in its region of the world –

which lead to a lower capability/denial follower level, it acknowledged the need for and accepted some of the Western non-possession/norm-building and consequence/management social purposes and participated in some of the constitutive norms in response to this same revisionism.

As such, Israel's follower identity level did not change as a result of its capability/denial level. While the US responded to proliferation on a global scale, Israel was more inclined to react specifically to the aspects of proliferation affecting the Middle East. Thus, while Israel's participation in multilateral norm-building was limited, it accepted the US social purpose that argued for bilateral peace in the Middle East as a means of removing the need for capability/denial or consequence/management as well as the goal of creating a regional norm that would put an end to future regional WMD proliferation.⁵⁴¹ Thus, Israel was willing to accommodate the alignment leader on some multilateral regimes, so as to display willingness to participate in constitutive norms established through non-possession/norm-building, as long as it did not detract from Israeli antiproliferation interests.

Consequently, Israel follower identity remained high as it participated in the constitutive norms and accepted the social purposes surrounding non-possession/norm-building and consequence/management during this time. At the same time, while Israeli actions beyond the diplomatic front are still unknown, Israel, like the US, sought to deny regional end-users access to the materials needed for WMD proliferation. Interestingly, Israel did not display any significant action to counter proliferation during the 1995-2001 period. While Israeli policymakers mentioned that actions were being taken in the 1989-1995 timeframe, though they

were unable to disclose what those actions were, little to no mention was made of actions being taken in response to WMD proliferation throughout the late 1990s. It seems, based on the available data, that the discord between the US and Israel regarding the social purposes associated with capability/denial primarily revolved around the issue of export controls and the participation of the US and Europe in constitutive norms to halt suppliers in each of these regions. It is possible that Israel participated in the constitutive norms and accepted the social purposes for Western capability/denial during this time, though that determination requires access to data not presently available.

In addition, the lack of response by the US to Iranian proliferation led Israel policymakers to formulate social purposes and constitutive norms that would maintain the regional status quo. Thus, it could be argued that by mid-2000 Israel appeared to move away from the US and had taken on an alienated follower identity because of differences in opinion about *regional* revisionism. Israel's perspective on revisionism – more regionally oriented than systemically - led to changes in Israel's capability/denial and non-possession/norm-building social purposes that ran counter to alignment leader's goals and actions.

The attacks of September 11, 2001, however, brought a quick return of Israel to the level of exemplary follower. Though Israel's capability/denial level rose to conformist, with Israel leaning on the United States and its allies while vocally supporting the Western alignment social purposes, Jerusalem's regional perspective meant that policymakers perceived Western constitutive norms as supportive of the Israeli interests and security. In addition, Israel signed as a participant in PSI and undertook to reinforce litigation that would support UNSCR 1540. Israel also

accepted the leader's social purposes for countering proliferation financing and established national constitutive norms to help attain that goal.

Even though Israel's actions on the diplomatic front suggested that Israel was unable or unwilling to take further action on its own, its support for Western consequence/management and non-possession/norm-building social purposes and actions taken to support those goals in these fields bolstered Israel's follower identity to exemplary.

Nonetheless, Israel tried to influence the US, Europe and Russia to take actions that would diminish Iran's proliferation capabilities. In response to some revisionist states, like Iraq, Israel's lack of participation was not specifically at the behest of US policymakers (though the US did not want Israel to actively participate), but instead was based on Israel's regional perception. Thus, while Israel was extremely supportive of the Western constitutive norms taken to eliminate Iraqi WMDs, they did not take action in support of capability/denial, instead relying on the US and its allies to end Iraq's position as a WMD end-user and possible supplier.

Also, while Israel faced the possibility of terror organizations acquiring NBC capabilities during this time, the only mention of non-state actors as a potential proliferation threat was made in relation to Iran as a possible supplier. Thus, Israel ignored threats made by such organizations to attain WMDs, but was quick to denounce Iran as a possible supplier.

In addition, the capability/denial constitutive norms undertaken by the US and Britain in Libya were perceived as, first and foremost, beneficial to Israel. While Israeli policymakers recognized that Libya might have acted as a WMD proliferator

beyond the region (especially regarding North Korea), they believed that the US and Britain were acting on Israel's behalf.

Interestingly, while Israel saw many of the Western capability/denial constitutive norms as supportive of Israeli security, this did not change Israel's cooperation with the US on either non-possession/norm-building or consequence/management. As such, Israel's follower identity remained exemplary, even though its level of capability/denial was conformist and dependent on the US acting on Israel's behalf in response to systemic revisionism.

Followership

The previous section's analyses showed that the three follower states participated in the status quo alignment in response to WMD revisionism and determined how and why the level of follower identity changed for each state. Having established that all three states recognized WMD proliferation as systemic revisionism, that the follower states acknowledged the overall cognitive model determined by the alignment leader, and that their follower identities changed in response to systemic revisionism, it is now time to examine how and why alignment cohesion changed in the post-Cold War.

In the examination of the development of the follower state's antiproliferation policies in relation to systemic revisionism and US antiproliferation strategies, the case studies and analysis of follower identity demonstrated that, while each state may have responded differently to WMD proliferation in their relational comparisons, they recognized proliferation as systemic revisionism and worked within the cognitive model established by the leader of the Western alignment to maintain the status quo.

Thus, this section seeks to determine whether these follower identities, established through the relational comparison, were similar. This is done through a comparative analysis of the state's follower identities over time. Similar to the analysis of follower identity, the examination of followership below uses a graphical representation to show the mode follower identity within the Western antiproliferation alignment. As such, if the predominant follower identity level is conformist, then the alignment is considered to have a conformist level of followership and if it is pragmatic then the level of followership is pragmatic.

Furthermore, if there is no mode follower identity – if every state has a different level of follower identity in response to systemic changes – then this too represents a pragmatic level of followership.

This section determines the level of followership in response to WMD proliferation in the post-Cold War. As such it examines changes in the level of followership and explains how and why these changes took place. This provides a comprehensive appraisal of Western alignment cohesiveness in response to WMD proliferation in the post-Cold War.

Chapter 7: Analyzing Followership

Having examined, in the previous section, how the level of systemic revisionism influenced change in follower identity, this chapter compares those follower identities to determine the level of followership. This study will examine how and why the level of followership changed during the post-Cold War and try to determine if the West responded cohesively to WMD proliferation during that time.

Followership in the Post-Cold War

The analysis of systemic influences on strategic change in this dissertation suggests that the states' follower identities were low because the level of systemic revisionism was perceived as low during the mid-1990s through 2000. The analysis here seeks to determine if the alignment followership level was low in response to this, and thus establish if "the West" responded cohesively to WMD proliferation during the post-Cold War. It does so by determining the mode follower identity to ascertain the followership level. If no mode exists, then the followership level is pragmatic.




Table 4: Followership

5 - Exemplary, 4 - Conformist, 3 - Scared, 2 - Alienated, 1 - Pragmatic

The individual analyses above seem to indicate dramatic changes, especially for Britain and Australia, in follower identity as a result of changes in systemic revisionism during the research period. The above graph suggests that the level of followership also changed drastically. These changes imply significant fluctuations in the cohesiveness of Western antiproliferation in the post-Cold War.

While the research period began with “the West” acting cohesively in response to WMD proliferation, that cohesiveness quickly dissipated as two of the powerful alignment states expressed significantly different antiproliferation interests from the leader. These conflicting interests led to tension in the sub-systemic structure.

While the level of alignment followership began as exemplary after the Cold War, the lack of systemic revisionism resulted in the rapid decline in the followership level. The perception of less WMD proliferation after the first Gulf War led to radical changes in both Britain and Australia’s follower identities. These changes meant that the level of followership dropped to alienated in 1992 and remained at that level through the mid-1990s.

The lack of unity between the leader and the followers expressed by this low level of followership suggests that the sub-systemic strain could have one of four outcomes: the leader would change its policies, the followers would change theirs, both would make slight changes to accommodate alignment interests, or the alignment would break apart. While the tension between the leader and some of the followers did not point to the dismantling of the Western antiproliferation alignment, it did suggest distinct differences of opinion between the leader and two of the powerful followers.

Despite the rise of proliferation elements during the mid-1990s, most significantly the Aum Shinrikyo chemical attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995, the level of followership remained low during this time. While changes in national leadership could have influenced their antiproliferation policies and follower identities, neither Britain nor Australia acknowledged or responded to these proliferation elements as systemic revisionism. Additionally, neither Britain nor Australia was inclined to acknowledge Middle East proliferation as systemic revisionism during this time. This contrasted the push by Israel for its regional perspective to garner systemic attention. Interestingly, while two of the powerful states in the alignment did not accept this, the US sided with Israel. This suggests that Israel may have been using its exemplary follower identity to gain recognition of, and changes in policy responding to, non-state actors and Middle East revisionism.

Not only did this imply a low level of followership, but also brings into question US leadership during this time. An analysis of the followership graph seems to suggest that Britain and Australia's alienated follower identities were the predominant response to the level of systemic change through the relational comparison. Furthermore, the changes in alignment unity in 1998 were due to adjustments in Australia's follower identity, resulting from its response to regional revisionism by India and Pakistan. While both Britain and Australia responded to Iraqi proliferation during this time, the UK follower identity did not change as a result. In contrast, Australia's follower identity rose as a result of revisionism by India, Pakistan, and Iraq.

Interestingly, this rise in revisionism led to an pragmatic level of followership, since Australia seemed to “pass the buck” to the US as the alignment leader in response to these systemic revisionists. The move to pragmatic followership suggests that alignment unity eroded as the follower states each responded differently to perceived revisionism. Thus, the late 1990s was the point of greatest discord in the alignment, with the US unable to instill unity among its followers in response to systemic revisionism.

The rise in alignment unity in 2000 to alienated, a result of Israel’s lower follower identity, seemed to suggest further tension between the US and its followers, especially with the decrease in Australia’s follower identity to pragmatic. While the followership level rose from pragmatic to alienated, resulting from a lack of US responses to Israel’s push for the alignment cognitive model to recognize Iranian revisionism as systemic and Britain’s continued alienated follower identity, all three follower identities were low at this point, suggesting that the Western alignment leadership was at odds with its followers.

Thus, the lack of clear systemic revisionism and the contradicting interests of Britain, Australia and Israel – which were all trying to influence the alignment cognitive model by adapting the social purposes and constitutive norms for antiproliferation by restraining US antiproliferation policies – from 1998 – 2000, represent the nadir in Western antiproliferation cohesion. The alignment restraint undertaken by Australia and Britain throughout the 1990s and Israel’s move in 2000 to influence by changing its alignment follower identity seemed to pressure the US as the alignment leader, resulting in greater similarity between US, Israeli and Australian antiproliferation social purposes. These changes in policy by the US, as

well as changes in Australian and Israeli responses to systemic revisionism in 2001 resulted in an increased level of followership, despite the lack of change in Britain's follower identity. Thus, the rise in systemic revisionism, and the judicious use of alienated follower identities to influence alignment norms, led to an exemplary followership level in 2001.

While this level of followership suggests unity of purpose, Britain's role as an alienated follower in 2001 – 2002 detracted from that level of cohesion. Nonetheless, by 2003, "the West" was once again acting as a cohesive unit in response to WMD proliferation. This change resulted from the influence of systemic revisionism on Britain's follower identity. While this change was primarily a reaction to NSA WMD proliferation as systemic revisionism, the alignment maintained that unity because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the revelations of the A.Q. Khan Network and Libyan and Iranian proliferation.

While the rise in systemic revisionism led to greater alignment cohesion, some of the changes were a result of the constant pressure to modify Western alignment goals and action from Australian and British policymakers. The low level of followership and the resulting lack of unity in the mid-1990s through the early 21st century seems to suggest that the alignment, while countering proliferation on a whole, did not have unity of purpose. Nonetheless, as the follower states were presented with a rise in systemic revisionism their level of follower identity rose – directly translating into a higher level of alignment cohesion. This led to the state's working more closely in response to the elements of WMD proliferation. As this unity of purpose solidified in response to specific revisionist states or NSAs the US was able to garner support for its antiproliferation social purposes and participation

in the constitutive norms that helped to meet those goals. At the same time the US made changes to the alignments antiproliferation social purposes and constitutive norms so as to accommodate its more powerful followers.

The Influence of Culture

As mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, there exists the possibility that strategic culture or national culture may have influenced the level of follower identity and consequently followership. The above analyses demonstrate that neither strategic culture nor similar national cultures were of significant influence.

The role of Israel in this analysis was to demonstrate that neither culture nor strategic culture were influential. Despite Israel not identifying with the Anglo-Saxon culture, its follower identity remained exemplary through most of the time examined while those of Australia and Britain dropped to alienated in the mid-1990s. While this might be interpreted to suggest that culture did play a role, it is important to remember that the United States is also culturally Anglo-Saxon. As such, the ability to express culture as an influential factor would have required Israel to take an alienated follower identity while both Britain and Australia would have had to maintain higher level follower identities within the alignment.

Regarding strategic culture, the strain between Israel and the US expressed previously suggests that, while strategic culture may have allowed for better understanding in the relational comparison, Israel did not hesitate to forego the social purposes or constitutive norms that the US established for systemic victory. Thus, strategic culture also played a limited affect in the analysis of followership.

Regional vs. Systemic

One point that did seem to influence the level of followership was perceptions regarding regional versus systemic status-quo. Both Israel and Australia were prone to apply their regional perspectives in their acceptance of alignment social purposes and, even more so, constitutive norms. The difficulty they faced transforming these regional perspectives into the Western alignments perspective of systemic revisionism did influence the overall level of followership. This is because both states perceived regional revisionism as a greater threat to the systemic status-quo (even if they did not necessarily feel threatened directly by that revisionism – as in the case of Australia and the Indian/Pakistan end-user proliferation).

As a result, both Israel and Australia's follower identities were directly influenced by this regional perspective. The changes that resulted were clearly seen in the relational comparison and had a direct impact on the alignment followership level – especially in the case of Australia.

Vying for Leadership?

One of the questions that arises from the followership analysis is whether any of the follower states were attempting to use their follower identity to usurp leadership of the Western antiproliferation alignment. While it seemed clear that neither Israel nor Britain were attempting to take over leadership during this time, the same may not have been true for Australia.

Australia's role as the devil's advocate, supporting multilateral regimes, non-proliferation/norm-building and against capability/denial, put it in the unique position of presenting significant alternative social purposes for the alignment. These led Australia to define the constitutive norms it deemed appropriate for

antiproliferation included the establishment of the CWC, stronger export controls, the desire to disband the AG, as well as non-acceptance of the CPI or unilateral military actions. Thus, it seems that changes in Australia's follower identity may have been of significant influence on alignment cohesion. While Australia was not a NWS, it was clearly powerful (and influential) enough to engage the US in competition for leadership.

While the alignment followership level followed Britain and Australia's identities from 1990 – 1997, changes in Australia's follower identity led to the pragmatic followership level in 1998. The rise to exemplary in 2001 was also a result of the shift in Australia's follower identity. While Israel also rose to exemplary at this time, the dramatic change by Australia from pragmatic to exemplary seems to have been far more significant than Israel's return to exemplary resulting from changes in US policy. If this is the case, it raises questions about Australia's role in the alignment and whether Australia was vying for alignment leadership in the 1990s.

Conclusion

The post-Cold War period was representative of significant changes in Western alignment antiproliferation cohesion. States that were staunch supporters of the US, as the alignment leader, during and immediately after the Cold War no longer accepted US goals and actions for Western antiproliferation in the post-Cold War. This, and the lack of WMD proliferation as systemic revisionism, led to a drop in alignment cohesion as state's antiproliferation actions did not help meet US goals, but rather pushed towards goals they perceived as necessary to maintain the systemic status quo.

Clearly the examination of these states as followers is not enough to make a clear cut determination of Western alignment cohesion in response to WMD proliferation in the post-Cold War, but the fact that prominent members of the Western alignment moved away from exemplary follower identities to the point of alienated or even pragmatic follower levels suggests that alignment cohesion may have been low. This raises the question of which state might have been vying for leadership during this time.

Interestingly, for much of the first 10 years examined the level of followership appears to have been influenced by Australia's follower identity. While the sample of state's here is small, this raises many questions about the possible use of followership in the determination of policy. If a wider examination shows that the level of antiproliferation followership tracks a state, or group of states, follower identity then this may have significant ramifications on the leader's policy decisions that can affect alignment unity of purpose. By responding to the interests of the representative state the leader can alleviate tensions and may be able to influence

alignment followership for the better. An additional question that arises from this finding is: was Australia trying to act as an alternative leader? While the research here seems to suggest that this was the case, this question also requires research that goes beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Another question is whether the low level of followership represented an attempt to redefine Western antiproliferation in the post-Cold War. Based on the evidence here, it seems that all three follower states were able to influence the overall cognitive model for antiproliferation and Western alignment social purposes and constitutive norms. Further research into other Western alignment states' post-Cold War antiproliferation policies is needed to determine if the level of alignment cohesion was as low as it seems here, and, if so, which states may have been seeking alignment leadership.


While the outcome here suggests that Britain, Australia and Israel influenced the alignment norms, these three states were also allies and partners with the US in other endeavors. That being the case, it is possible that the depth and extent of these relations were as influential in the follower state's follower identities. Nonetheless, this research seems suggests that by pulling away from high level follower identities, or by using their high level identity, these states were employing a form of alignment restraint to induce changes in the Western alignment antiproliferation goals or actions.

The main question this research sought to answer was how and why Western alignment followership changed in response to WMD proliferation from 1989 – 2005. In order to answer this, I examined the weaker members to determine the factors that influenced change in their follower identities.


This dissertation has shown that changes in systemic WMD revisionism by states like Iraq, Iran, and non-state actors like al-Qaeda and A.Q. Khan led to changes in the antiproliferation identities of weaker states in the Western alignment - specifically Britain, Australia and Israel. This proves the hypothesis at the beginning of this dissertation which argues that attempts to change the systemic status quo led to changes in the antiproliferation policies of the follower states in the Western alignment that matched or complemented the US antiproliferation policies. Thus, the rise in the level of systemic revisionism led to a higher level of identity similarity among the alignment members and a higher level of followership while a lower level of systemic revisionism led to identity dissimilarity and a low level of followership.

The research has also shown that top down examinations of alignment cohesion and leadership need to expand and include studies that analyze the followers relations with the leader without analyzing the leader independently. While this dissertation uses the followership paradigm to examine Western antiproliferation cohesion in the post-Cold War, this model is not exclusive to antiproliferation. This framework can help examine alignment cohesion in both status quo and revisionist alignments during transitional periods. By focusing on the follower's relations upward – rather than fixating on the leader's policies – to determine whether a leader has created unity of purpose, this framework expands the means by which effective leadership and alignment cohesion can be examined.


Appendix I: Variable Interaction



Appendix II: Follower Types



Appendix III: Hierarchy of Followership



Endnotes

¹ For further reading on transitional periods see: Paul Gordon Lauren, Gordon Alexander Craig, and Alexander L. George, *Force and Statecraft : Diplomatic Challenges of Our Time*, 4th ed. (New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 110 - 15. For readings on change in the international system see: A.F.K. Organski, "The Power Transition," in *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, ed. James N. Rosenau (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1961).

² Lauren, Craig, and George, *Force and Statecraft : Diplomatic Challenges of Our Time*, 110-15.

³ David A. Cooper, *Competing Western Strategies against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Comparing the United States to a Close Ally* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 221.

⁴ Andrew Fenton Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, "Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict," *Political Science Quarterly* 106, no. 3 (Autumn, 1991); Richard Stubbs, "Reluctant Leader, Expectant Followers: Japan and Southeast Asia," *International Journal* 46(1991).

⁵ Barbara Kellerman, *Followership: How Followers Are Creating Change and Changing Leaders* (Boston: Harvard Business Press, 2008); Robert Kelley, *The Power of Followership: How to Create Leaders People Want to Follow and Followers Who Lead Themselves* (New York: Doubleday Currency, 1992).

⁶ Bruce M. Russett, "Delineating International Regions," in *Quantitative International Politics* ed. J. David Singer (New York: Free Press, 1968); Morton Kaplan, "International Law and the International System," in *Great Issues of International Politics*, ed. Morton Kaplan (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co, 1970); Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957); Hayward R. Alker Jr. and Bruce Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly* (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1965); Steven Brams, "The Structure of Influence Relationships in the International System," in *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1969); Steven J. Brams, "Positive Coalition Theory: The Relationship between Postulated Goals and Derived Behavior," in *Political Science Annual*, ed. Cornelius Cotter (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975); Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander L. George, eds., *Change in the International System* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980).

⁷ Organski, "The Power Transition."

⁸ David Tumanyan, "The Political System and the Civil Service in Transition Period in the Republic of Armenia," in *NISPAcee 8th Annual Conference* (Budapest, Hungary: April 13-15, 2000). <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/NISPAcee/UNPAN005563.pdf>. ; Holsti, Siverson, and George, eds., *Change in the International System*; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little Brown, 1977); Charles A. Kupchan et al., eds., *Power in Transition: The Peaceful Change of International Order* (New York: United Nations University Press, 2001); Eugene R. Wittkopf, "Faces of Internationalism in a Transitional Environment," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38, no. 3 (1994).

⁹ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," *International Organization* 39, no. 4 (Autumn, 1985); William E. Rosenbach and Robert L. Taylor, eds., *Contemporary Issues in Leadership*, 4th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998); Richard Stubbs, "From Hegemony to Competitive Leadership: The Case of South East Asia," in *International Studies Association* (Vancouver, BC, Canada). ; Stubbs, "Reluctant Leader, Expectant Followers: Japan and Southeast Asia."; Mark Van Vugt, "Evolutionary Origins of Leadership and Followership," *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 10, no. 4 (2006).

¹⁰ Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, "Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict," 393-99. See also: G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," *International Organization* 44(Summer, 1990); Robert W. Cox, *Production Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Gene Dixon and Jerry Westbrook, "Followers Revealed," *Engineering Management Journal* 15, no. 2 (March, 2003); Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

¹¹ Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, "Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict."

- ¹² G. John Ikenberry, "The Future of International Leadership," *Political Science Quarterly* 111, no. 3 (Autumn, 1996): 386.
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- ¹⁴ Léon Dion, "The Concept of Political Leadership: An Analysis," *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique* 1, no. 1 (March, 1968): 3.
- ¹⁵ Richard T. Morris and Melvin Seeman, "The Problem of Leadership: An Interdisciplinary Approach," *The American Journal of Sociology* 56, no. 2 (September, 1950): 151.
- ¹⁶ Rosenbach and Taylor, eds., *Contemporary Issues in Leadership*, 86.
- ¹⁷ Stubbs, "From Hegemony to Competitive Leadership: The Case of South East Asia." ; ———, "Reluctant Leader, Expectant Followers: Japan and Southeast Asia."
- ¹⁸ Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, "Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict."
- ¹⁹ Charles D. Ferguson et al., *The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2005).
- ²⁰ Cooper, *Competing Western Strategies against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Comparing the United States to a Close Ally*.
- ²¹ Jeremy Pressman, "If Not Balancing, What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony," in *Discussion Paper 2004-02* (International Security Program: March 2004), 8-10. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resistance_to_american_hegemony.html?breadcrumb=%2Fexperts%2F355%2Fjeremy_pressman. June 30, 2008. See also: ———, *Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).
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- ²³ Ashok Kapur, "Nuclear Policies of Small States and Weaker Powers," in *The National Security of Small States in a Changing World*, ed. Efraim Inbar and Gabriel Sheffer (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 112; Stephen M. Walt, "Taming American Power," *Foreign Affairs* 84(September/October 2005): 114.
- ²⁴ Ferguson et al., *The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism*.
- ²⁵ Cooper, *Competing Western Strategies against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Comparing the United States to a Close Ally*.
- ²⁶ It is important to note at this point that I am not examining the influence of strategic culture on alliance formation, nor how strategic culture can help to define threat perceptions, goals, and actions. This dissertation examines Western state responses in order to determine if the assumption that Western states have acted collectively in response to proliferation is correct.
- ²⁷ Ferguson et al., *The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism*, 64.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, 6. See also: "Nuclear Threat Initiative," [http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/..](http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/)
- ²⁹ Cooper, *Competing Western Strategies against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Comparing the United States to a Close Ally*, 5.
- ³⁰ Cameron Brown, "Israel and the WMD Threat: Lessons for Europe," *MERIA* 8, no. 3 (September 2004), <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2004/issue3/jv8n3a4.html>.
- ³¹ Stubbs, "Reluctant Leader, Expectant Followers: Japan and Southeast Asia," 652-52; ———, "From Hegemony to Competitive Leadership: The Case of South East Asia."
- ³² Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, "Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict," 397.
- ³³ *Ibid.*: 398.
- ³⁴ *Ibid.*: 393-99. See also: Ikenberry and Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power."; Cox, *Production Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History*; Dixon and Westbrook, "Followers Revealed."; Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*.
- ³⁵ Rosenbach and Taylor, eds., *Contemporary Issues in Leadership*, 86.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*

- ³⁸ Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, "Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict," 399-407.
- ³⁹ Kellerman, *Followership: How Followers Are Creating Change and Changing Leaders*.
- ⁴⁰ Kelley, *The Power of Followership: How to Create Leaders People Want to Follow and Followers Who Lead Themselves*.
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תקציר

נושא עבודה זו הינו המידה בה מדינות מערביות פעלו כקבוצה מלוכדת אל מול הפצת נשק להשמדה המונית (נב"ק) בין השנים 1989-2005. הגדרת הלכידות, המיושמת בעבודה זו, מתבססת על מושג 'החסידות' השאול מדיסציפלינת הפסיכולוגיה הארגונית. לאור זאת, לכידות הינה מבוססת על הזהויות של שלושה המדינות – בריטניה, אוסטרליה וישראל – מתוך המערך המערבי לאי-הפצת נב"ק. מסגרת זו מעניקה את האמצעי הדרוש לקבוע האם שלושת המדינות מקבלות את ארה"ב כמנהיגה מערבית לאי-הפצה, ואם הן מגיבות באופן מגובש להפצת נב"ק. באמצעות מסגרת תיאורטית זו מנותחת בעבודה המדיניות נגד הפצת נב"ק של בריטניה, אוסטרליה וישראל במטרה להעריך האם מדינות אלו הן 'חסידות' של ארה"ב בסוגיה זו, והאם מדיניותן דומה או שונה. לצד המחקר ההשוואתי שמטרתו לבחון את מידת הלכידות במאמצי מניעת הפצת נב"ק, מנותחת מדיניותה של כל אחת ממדינות מקרי המבחן (בריטניה, אוסטרליה וישראל) כמקרה בוחן עצמאי. הניתוח נעשה במסגרת הגישה האיכותנית בהתבסס על ניתוח תוכן של מקורות ראשוניים כתובים וניתוחי אירוע.

שאלת המחקר הנוכחית הינה: כיצד ומדוע לכידות המערך המערבי השתנה בתגובה להפצה

שלאחר המלחמה הקרה?

מסקנות המחקר הנוכחי הן שאחדות המטרה בקרב אוסטרליה, בריטניה וישראל הייתה גבוהה בשנים הראשונות לאחר המלחמה הקרה. זאת מאחר והן הכירו בהפצת נב"ק כאיום וקיבלו את חזונה של המנהיגה בתחום- ארה"ב- לפעול למניעת הפצה במטרה לשמר את הסטטוס-קוו. זהותן של מדינות אלו כ'חסידות' של הנהגת ארה"ב נחלשה משמעותית במהלך השנים 1989-2001. בתקופה זו בריטניה, אוסטרליה וישראל ביקשו להגדיר מחדש את המטרות והפעולות של המחנה¹ המערבי במניעת הפצת נב"ק. אולם, תקפות הטרור של ה-11 בספטמבר 2001, מאמצי ההפצה של מדינות כעיראק, איראן וצפון-קוריאה, ומאמצי ההפצה של שחקנים לא מדינתיים כאל-קאעידה, הביאו להתחזקות זהותן כ'חסידות' של הנהגת ארה"ב בתחום. זאת כתוצאה משינויים במדיניות ארה"ב ו'חסידותיה'. ככל שזהותן כ'חסידות' התחזקה כך גברה רמת 'החסידות' במחנה המערבי וחיזקה את לכידותו.

¹ השימוש במילים מחנה ומערך באופן חליפי באה משום שאין מושג מגביל ל-"alignment" בעברית. לאור זאת החלטתי להשתמש בשתי מילים אלו, מחנה ומערך, כמילים העיקריות במקום קואליציה או ברית שהם סוגים של alignment אך לא כל ה-alignment כולו.

ממצאים אלו ממחישים את ערכה של המסגרת התיאורטית בה נעשה שימוש במחקר הנוכחי לבחינת סוגיית הלכידות במניעת הפצת נב"ק לאחר המלחמה הקרה. עם זאת, תרומתה האפשרית חורגת מסוגיה בודדת זו. מסגרת זו יכולה לבחון סטאטוס קוו וכן מערכים רביזיוניסטים והיא אינה ייחודית לאי-הפצה. בנוסף לכך, גישה זו מסבירה את המתח הקיים בין מסגרת ריאלית לבין מסגרת אנליטית קונסטרוקטיבית בבחינת המערכים.

מבוא

סופה של מלחמת העולם השנייה בשנת 1945 הביא עמו שינויים משמעותיים במערכת הבינלאומית. המעצמות המובילות ערב המלחמה מצאו עצמן תלויות במעצמות העל החדשות- ארה"ב ובריה"מ. אלו נהפכו למנהיגות המערכת הדו-קוטבית שהתפתחה. ברה"מ שחששה שהשינויים במערכת הבינ"ל יהיו מנוגדים לאינטרסיה הלאומיים, במיוחד בשל שאיפת ארה"ב לשמר את המונופול הגרעיני שלה, פעלה לשינוי הסטטוס-קוו המתפתח ולהשגת יכולות גרעיניות. סטטוס קוו זה – דיכטומיה רביזיוניסטית על עליית כוחה של ארה"ב היה קצר, כשברקע ברה"מ מבצעת פיצוץ בנשק גרעיני ב-1949.

מאבק זה על חלוקת הכוח לא היה מיוחד. במהלך המלחמה הפלופונסית, מ-431 עד 404 לפנה"ס, אתונה ניסתה לשנות את הסטטוס קוו של יוון העתיקה, רק על מנת להיבלם ע"י ספרטה במאבק שהביא לחלוקה מחדש של העוצמה ביוון העתיקה. בדומה לכך, למעלה מ-2300 שנה מאוחר יותר מלחמת העולם הראשונה הייתה מאבק על חלוקת העוצמה במערכת הבינלאומית. תוצאת מלחמה זו הייתה תקופה שנמשכה מספר שנים במהלכה הדיפלומטים הגדירו מחדש את מאזן הכוחות, מה שהוביל לעלייתן של מדינות-לאום והתפרקותן של אימפריות וותיקות. המחנה המשותף לדוגמאות אלו הוא פעילותן של מדינות לשינוי מערך הכוחות בעולם. חלק משינויים אלו לא היו מידיים, אך כולם הובילו לרביזיה בחלוקת הכוח העוצמה במערכת הבינלאומית. חלק מתוצאות המאבקים הובילו מדינות נוספות לפעול לרביזיות נוספות במטרה לשפר את מעמדן במסגרת חלוקת העוצמה. ניתן לפיכך להבחין בתקופות גאות ושפל בחלוקת העוצמה במערכת הבינ"ל כאשר ישנן תקופות מעבר בהן חלוקת העוצמה משתנה.¹

תוצאת תקופת המעבר שלאחר מלחמת העולם השנייה הייתה עלייתן של ארה"ב וברה"מ כמעצמות על אשר מכירות האחת ברעותה כמנהיגת קבוצת מדינות, או עמדות.² בעוד ששתי עמדות אלו נאבקות לשמור על חלוקת עוצמה שווה במהלך 40 השנים הבאות (תקופה הידועה בשם המלחמה הקרה), מדינות שהיה ברשותן יכולת גרעינית, ביולוגית וכימית (אב"כ) פעלו גם הן לשימור הסטטוס-קוו על ידי הגבלת הפצת נשק להשמדה המונית (נב"ק). במהלך תקופה זו, קובעי מדיניות ניסו להגדיר את תפקיד הנשק להפצה המונית במדיניות, ולקבוע אילו מדינות יורשו להחזיק נשק אטומי ביולוגי וכימי (אב"כ). הם גם דחפו להגביל את הפצת היכולות של נשק אב"כ על מנת לשמור

על חלוקת העוצמה בעולם. כתוצאה מכך, סוגיית ייצור והפצת נב"ק הפכה נקודת מאבק מרכזית בין מדינות שהחזיקו בנב"ק לאלו שלא.

סוף המלחמה הקרה הותיר את ארה"ב כמעצמת העל היחידה בעולם. כתוצאה משינוי זה, ניסו מדינות מסוימות להשיג יכולות נשק בלתי קונבנציונאלי' כאמצעי לאזן את חלוקת העוצמה החדשה, מה שהביא להיווצרותה של תקופת מעבר.³ עליה זו בפוטנציאל ההפצה, וגישה לנב"ק הובילה את ארה"ב להגדיר מחדש את האסטרטגיה שלה ואת המדיניות נגד הפצת נב"ק. זה גם הוביל את קובעי המדיניות בארה"ב לפעול לגיוס תמיכתן של מדינות נוספות כתוצאה מכך, לאחר המלחמה הקרה ארה"ב נתפסה בעיני רבים כמנהיגה המערבית במאמצי מניעת ההפצה. זה הוביל "להנחה הרווחת לפיה מדינות המערב הגיבו קולקטיבית מול ההפצה באסטרטגיה מלוכדת למעשה".⁴ תקופה של הנחה זו נבחן בעבודה הנוכחית תוך הצגת שיטה לאימות לכידות המאמצים במהלך תקופת מעבר.

מסגרת המחקר

מחקרים הבוחנים שינויים בסדר הבינלאומי מערבים, פעמים רבות, בחינה של מספר מדינות על סמך הדמיון ביניהן, תוך התחקות אחר המשכיות או שינוי בדפוסי חלוקת עוצמה, בהתבסס על סיבתיות. עם זאת, קיימים מחקרים מעטים בספרות העוסקים בדינאמיקה של הסדר העולמי במהלך תקופות מעבר.⁵ בעוד שמרבית החוקרים מודים כי שינוי הוא חלק מהמערכת הבינלאומית, חלקם, כמו א.פ.ק. אורגנסקי, טוענים כי המשתנים, כמו מספר המעצמות, אינו רלבנטי לשינוי.⁶ אם נקבל את טענת אורגנסקי שמספר המעצמות אינו משמעותי בתקופת מעבר, כיוון שתקופה זו מייצגת שינויים מתמידים בחלוקת העוצמה, עולה השאלה מהם הגורמים המשפיעים על תוצאות חלוקת העוצמה בסיום התקופה. גם מסגרת הזמן של תקופות המעבר נראית לא-רלבנטית, כיוון שחלקן יכולות להיות מהירות, כתוצאה ממלחמה, ואחרות יכולות להימשך זמן רב יותר כשמדינות מפתחות אינטראקציות לטווח ארוך המשפיעות על יציבות בחלוקת כוח. המחקר הנוכחי נוקט גישה שונה וגורס שתוצאות תקופת המעבר מתבססות על קבלת המדינות את חלוקת העוצמה החדשה בהתאם לצורכיהן. אם מדינות אינן מוכנות לקבל את התוצאות הן יפעלו לשינוי חלוקת העוצמה כך שתתאים לאינטרסי הן.

בדומה למצב לאחר מלה"ע 2, תקופת המעבר שלאחר המלחמה הקרה, נדמתה כמאופיינת בהגמוניה אמריקאית כתוצאה מקריסת, מעצמת העל המתחרה, ברה"מ. בתגובה

לכך, מדינות וארגוני טרור ניסו להשפיע על תוצאת תקופת המעבר. הפצת נב"ק היוותה את אחד האמצעים המרכזיים ששימשו לשינוי התוצאה של תקופת המעבר. כתוצאה מהניסויים גרעיניים של צפון קוריאיה, הפצת נשק להשמדה המונית ע"י איראן, לוב ועיראק, יכולת הגרעינית של הודו ופקיסטן, שימוש בנשק כימי ע"י ארגון טרור כ'אום שינריקיו' וניסויים שערכה אל-קאעידה בנשק גרעיני אתגרו את הסטטוס-קוו. התוצאה שהסתמנה הייתה מערכת חד-קוטבית חלשה.⁷

עבודה זו בוחנת את תקופת המעבר שלאחר המלחמה הקרה בתחום הפצת נב"ק כנקודת חיכוך בין מדינות המבקשות לשמור על איזון הכוחות במערכת ומדינות וארגוני טרור שמבקשות לשנות את מערך הכוחות. במטרה לקבוע האם פעולת המערב נעשתה במסגרת אסטרטגיות מלוכדות נעשה שימוש במסגרת תיאורטית שבבסיסה מושג 'החסידות' (followership) השאול מדיסציפלינת הפסיכולוגיה הארגונית. מסגרת זו מאפשרת לבחון האם לכידות המחנה המערבי נובעת מעימות על חלוקת עוצמה ודימיון בזהות, במעשים ובמטרות של חברות המחנה. יישום מסגרת זו מאפשר להשוות את תגובותיהן של בריטניה, אוסטרליה וישראל להפצת נב"ק ושינויים במדיניות המאבק בהפצתו של ארה"ב בין השנים 1989-2005. מסקנות המחקר יקבעו האם מדינות אלו פעלו במשותף להשגת רביזיה בחלוקת העוצמה ולהעריך את תוקפה של הנחת הלכידות של המחנה המערבי.

בעיית המחקר

אחת הבעיות המרכזיות במחקרים העוסקים בשיתופי פעולה בינלאומיים הינה, שפעמים רבות, נעשה שימוש במודלים המניחים מנהיגות top-down. כתוצאה מכך, קיימת הטיה להתמקד בתרומתה של ההנהגה להצלחה או לכישלון שיתוף הפעולה.⁸ מודלים אלו הם בעייתיים למחקר לכידות כיוון שהם מתעלמים לרוב מחלקו של החסיד (follower) להצלחת או כישלון שיתוף הפעולה. בניגוד לכך, מסגרת מחקר חסידית מתמקדת בתגובתו של המונהג למדיניות המנהיג, לאור השינויים בחלוקת העוצמה במערכת הבינלאומית, על מנת לקבוע האם מדינות פועלות לקראת מטרה משותפת.

למרות זאת, אנדרו פנטון קופר, ריצ'רד א. היגוט וקים ריצ'רד נוסאל הציעו כי קביעת סוג המנהיג חשובה לבחינת החסידות.⁹ הם טענו שישנם שני סוגי מנהיגים במסגרת החסידות-דומיננטיים ונדיבים. למנהיג הדומיננטי אין חסידים אלא כפופים (dominant) או מתחנפים

(benevolent) המשתפים פעולה מתוך תחושת אֵין- ברירה או כפייה.¹⁰ בשונה מכך, המנהיג הנדיב מביא את המונהגים לאמץ את השקפתו ולפעול בצוותא להשגתה.¹¹ בעצם, טוענים קופר היגוט ונוסאל שהמנהיג הנדיב משתמש ב"עוצמה רכה" - היכולת למשוך ולשכנע – על מנת להניע אחרים לקבל את מנהיגותו.¹²

ללא קשר לסוג המנהיג, אחת המטרות העיקריות של המנהיגות היא לקדם שיתוף פעולה להשגת מטרה משותפת.¹³ מאחר ו"מנהיגות מורכבת מקבלת דברים המושגים באמצעות אחרים...אותם "אחרים" הם קריטיים ליעילותו של המנהיג".¹⁴ לפיכך, בחינה מקיפה של מידת הלכידות של מחנה במערכת הבינלאומית מחייבת התמקדות לא במדינה המנהיגה כשלעצמה אלא גם במדינות המקבלות את מרותה.¹⁵ במילים אחרות, החסיד הוא גורם מרכזי בבחינת הלכידות, בלי להתחשב בסגנון ההנהגה.¹⁶ בעוד שמנהיגות היא המאמץ להשפיע ולקבוע מטרות, חסידות משמעותה אחידות בחתירה להשגת המטרה, "חסידים רוצים לחוש כאילו הם שותפים עם המנהיגים שלהם בהשגת מטרות והגדרת מסלול לקראת העתיד", אפילו אם תרומת המנהיגים והחסידים אינה שווה.¹⁷

משתנים

על מנת לבחון את המדינה החסידה, אומצה במחקר הנוכחי חלוקה לשלוש רמות ניתוח: רמת המדינה הבודדת, רמת תת- מערכת ורמת המערכת. שלוש רמות ניתוח אלו מתואמות ישירות עם שלושת המשתנים במסגרת החסידות. המשתנה התלוי, רמת החסידות, נמצא במתאם עם ניתוח רמת תת- המערכת וקובע את רמת הלכידות. הניתוח ברמת תת- המערכת- האינטראקציות המערך בקרב המחנה – מאמת את תוקף הנחת לכידות המערך באמצעות השוואת זהויות המדינות לאורך זמן. המשתנה המתערב – רמת "זהות החסיד" של כל מדינה – הוא פונקציה של מתאם בין המטרות ופעולות המדינה לבין המטרות והפעולות של מנהיגת המחנה. בחינה ברמת המדינה תאפשר לקבוע האם היא בבחינת 'חסיד' וחלק מהקבוצה ולהעריך את זהותה של כל חברה במחנה.

השתתפותה של כל מדינה במחנה, שינויים בזהותה כחסידה וכתוצאה מכך לכידות במערך, תלויים על קיום תקופת מעבר ברמה המערכתית – המליאה הבינלאומית. במהלך תקופה כזו, ניסיונות לשנות את חלוקת העוצמה במערכת הבינלאומית מביאות להיווצרות מחנה סטטוס קוו. קיום דיכוטומיה סטטוס-קוו/רביזיוניסטית היא הכרחית לניתוח לכידות המחנה ומייצגת את המשתנה הבלתי-תלוי לקביעת רמת החסידות בתקופת המעבר.

המחקר הנוכחי אימץ את טענת המחקר לפיה רמת הרביזיוניזם במערכת הבינ"ל משפיעה על הזהויות של המדינות החברות במחנה וקרבתן למדינה המנהיגה, לאור שאיפתן לפעול לשימור או לשינוי הסטטוס-קוו. לפיכך, קיימת קורלציה חיובית בין רמת הרביזיוניזם במערכת הבינ"ל ומידת הקרבה בזהויותיהן של חברות המחנה (רמת חסידותן) למנהיג ובסופו של דבר ברמת החסידיות (לכידות). ניתן לבדוק רמת החסידיות במערך סטטוס-קוו וכמו כן במערך רביזיוניסטית דרך מודל זה.

מטרות המחקר

המטרה העיקרית של עבודה זו היא ניתוח לכידות המחנה המערבי לאחר המלחמה הקרה תוך שימוש במושג החסידות השאול מתחום הפסיכולוגיה הארגונית. מסגרת זו תתרום להבנת שיתוף פעולה בינלאומי ותתרום לפיתוח תיאוריית החסידיות, שבאמצעות ניתן לשלב ניתוח חברתי לבחינת זהויותיהן של המדינות המונהגות. גישה זו מפחיתה את המתח בין התיאוריות הריאליסטיות והקונסטרוקטיביסטיות באמצעות יישום פרספקטיבות קונסטרוקטיביסטיות של זהות מדינה לבחינת רמת החסידות וחסידיות בתוך המסגרת הריאליסטית הניאו-קלאסית. גישה זו מספקת גם כלי להערכת תגובותיהן של מדינות להפצת נב"ק. לאור זאת, המחקר הנוכחי נשען על עבודותיהם של ריצ'רד סטובס,¹⁸ קופר, היגוט ונוסאל,¹⁹ צ'רלס פרגוסון וויליאם פוטר,²⁰ ודיוויד וקופר,²¹ תוך יישום תובנותיהם לתחומי מחקר חדשים.

הנחות

3 הנחות בסיסיות עומדות מאחורי עבודה זו. 1. התקיים מחנה סטטוס קוו בנוגע למניעת הפצת נב"ק בתקופה שלאחר המלחמה הקרה. 2. ארה"ב הייתה מנהיגותו של מחנה זה, כפי המערך שהנהיגה את המחנה המערבי במלחמה הקרה. 3. בריטניה, אוסטרליה וישראל היו חברות במחנה לאחר המלחמה הקרה.

שאלות מחקר

בהתבסס על הנחות אלו, שאלת המחקר המרכזית הינה: כיצד ומדוע מחנה החסידות המערבי השתנה כתגובה להפצת נשק להשמדה המונית בין השנים 1989-2005? על מנת לענות על שאלה זו, ייבחנו המדינות המונהגות בקרב המחנה במטרה לזהות אילו גורמים השפיעו על שינוי המדיניות וזהויות החסידים בקרב מדינות אלו.

השערות

שחקנים מדינתיים ושחקנים שאינם מדינתיים (Non State Actor- NSA) שהשתתפו בהפצת נשק להשמדה המונית היו רביזיוניסטים שביקשו לשנות את חלוקת הכוח במערכת בינ"ל במהלך תקופת המעבר שלאחר המלחמה הקרה. לפי ג'רמי פרסמן, הטרור ופצת הנשק הבלתי-קובנציונלי היו שני אמצעים באמצעותם מדינות ניסו לסתור את עליית ההגמוניה האמריקאית בתקופה זו.²² לא מעט קובעי מדיניות מערביים טענו כי התפרקות של ברה"מ, הניסיונות להשגת נשק להשמדה המונית של עיראק, לוב, צפון קוריאה, אירן, אום שינריקיו ואל-קעאדה, ורשת הפצת הנב"ק של עבדול קאדר חאן, הפגינו את הדיוק ההערכה שההפצה מייצגת את אחד האיומים המערכתיים הגדולים ביותר לסטאטוס קוו הבינלאומי שלאחר המלחמה הקרה.²³ הפצת נשק להשמדה המונית היה אחד האמצעים העיקריים לרביזיוניזם עבור השחקנים מדינתיים ולא-מדינתיים שמנסו להשפיע על הסטאטוס קוו המערכתי. הם הבינו שנשק זה הוא "יעיל ואפילו רצוי, למרות שהמלחמה הקרה...הסתיימה".²⁴

לכידות המערך המערבי השתנתה משמעותית בין השנים 1989-2005 כתוצאה מהפצת הנב"ק. בעוד שמייד לאחר המלחמה הקרה, בריטניה, אוסטרליה וישראל הציגו את רמת החסידות הגבוהה ביותר, או חסידי "מופת", רמת חסידותן נחלשה משמעותית לאחר מבצע 'סופה במדבר' (1991). ככל שרמת ההפצה נתפסה כנמוכה, מדינות שהשתתפו המחנה הסטטוס קוו לא קיבלו את המדיניות האמריקאית לאי-הפצת נשק להשמדה המונית. החלשות זו נבעה משינוי בתפיסתן של בריטניה, אוסטרליה וישראל שהפצת נב"ק לא היוותה רביזיה משמעותית ברמה המערכתית. אם עליה בהפצת הנב"ק, השתנתה רמת החסידות של המדינות במחנה המערבי. שינוי זה סימל התקרבות לרמה מלוכדת יותר. תפיסתן השתנתה רק לאחר מתקפות הטרור ב-11 לספטמבר 2001, וחשיפת הקשרים בין ארגוני טרור וספקי הנב"ק. כתוצאה מכך, זהות החסיד של כל מדינה נהיו דומות וגבוהות יותר. שינויים אלו העלו שוב את רמת הלכידות במחנה המערבי.

מתודולוגיה

עבודה זו בוחנת את רמת החסידות בתגובה להפצת נשק להשמדה המונית. זאת באמצעות בחינת הזהות של חלק מהמדינות במחנה המערבי. שיטת המחקר הננקטת הינה איכותנית המתבססת על ניתוח תוכן של מקורות ראשוניים וניתוחי אירוע. כל אחד ממקרי הבוחן יכול לעמוד בפני עצמו כניתוח מדיניות האי-הפצה של המדינה הנבדקת. דרך השוואת הזהויות של המדינות

נבחנות במקרי הבוחן – בריטניה, אוסטרליה וישראל – ניתן לקבוע את רמת הלכידות (חסידיות) במערך.

חסידיות במחנה

חסידיות נקבעת באמצעות השוואה בין הזהויות של המדינות החלשות במחנה בין לבין עצמן. השוואה זאת נעשתה על ידי יישום גישה חברתית שבוחנת את היעדים והפעולות של המדינות. וזאת באמצעות השוואת זהויות אלו אחת עם השנייה לאורך זמן.²⁵ המקורות הנדרשים לניתוח זה כוללים נאומים של קובעי מדיניות, הודעות לעיתונות של גופים קובעי מדיניות של כל מדינה (דוגמת משרדי חוץ) ומסמכי מדיניות.

באמצעות ניתוח תוכן ייקבע האם הפצת נשק להשמדה המונית יוכר כרביזיוניזם ברמה המערכתית והאם הייתה עליה ברביזיוניזם ברמה זו. על מנת לזהות רביזיוניזם ברמת המערכת, שולבו ארבעת המרכיבים של צ'רלס פרגוסון וויליאם פוטר, של "שרשרת הסיבתית" להפצת נשק להשמדה המונית ושלושת המענים האסטרטגיים נגד הפצה זו של דיוויד קופר. לפי פרגוסון ופוטר, אלמנטים אלו חיוניים ליצירת והפצת נשק להשמדה המונית, בעוד שקופר טוען כי שלוש האסטרטגיות מייצגות ספקטרום של אפשרויות תגובה מצד המדינות לאיום הפצת נב"ק.

אילו הפצת נשק להשמדה המונית הייתה מוכרת כרביזיה ברמה המערכתית, אזי שינויים ברמת הרביזיה היו צריכים להשפיע על זהותה של כל מדינה חסידה. מחלוקת בתוך תת-המערכת אמורה להשפיע על הנורמות בקרב חברות המחנה, ולסייע להבהיר אילו מטרות ופעולות ינקוט המנהיג בתגובה לשרשרת הסיבתיות. זה בתורו יאפשר לקבוע כיצד כל מדינה משלבת את אסטרטגית אי-ההפצה של קופר. זאת בהתבסס על המטרות והפעילות שהמדינות המונהגות מאמצות כחלק מזהותן.

זהויות החסיד של מדינות מקרה המבחן מתבססות על שינויים שחלו במטרותיהן ובפעולותיהן ביחס למטרות ופעילות שהוגדרו לשמירת הסטאטוס קוו על ידי מנהיג המחנה מערבי. בחינת רמת הרביזיוניזם נעשתה בעזרת ניתוח הצהרות של קובעי מדיניות במסגרת לאומית ובינלאומית מצביעים על השינויים שחלו במטרותיה של כל מדינה, אם בכלל היו קיימים. צעדים שנקטו משרד האוצר, משרד ההגנה (או דומיהם) ורשויות אחרות לעצירת ההפצה מייצגים את הפעולות שנקטו ע"י כל מדינה. פיקוח על הייצוא הלאומי, תגובות צבאיות וכלכליות, וחקיקה הנובעת בין השאר מהאמנה

לנשק כימי (CWC) והחלטה 1540 של מועצת הביטחון של האו"ם (UNSC) מסייעים לקבוע את הפעולות שנקטו. בניתוח זה, פעולות משותפות של המדינות מצביעות על דמיון בהתנהגותן. דברים שנאמרו, ופעולות הנובעות, ממשטרים רב-צדדיים, אמנות בינלאומיות, יוזמות בינלאומיות (דוגמת האמנה למניעת הפצת נשק גרעיני [NPT]), היוזמה להבטחת התפוצה (PSI), אמנת הנשק הביולוגי (BWC), אמנת הנשק הכימי (CWC), הקבוצה האוסטרלית (AG), קבוצת ספקי גרעין (NSG), קבוצת פריז, UNMOVIC, ואמנות אחרות, מסייעות גם כן לחזק ניתוח המטרות והפעולות. בנוסף לכך, ממצאי המחקר נתמכים על ידי מקורות משניים של מכוני מחקר וארגונים דוגמת IISS, CSIS, מכון אולין ואחרים. כל אלה מאפשרים לבחון את זהותה של כל אחת מהמדינות (החסידות) ושינויים בזהותה על פני ציר הזמן. השוואת זהויותיהן מאפשרת לקבוע את רמת החסידיות בקרב המחנה המערבי, ולהראות כיצד השתנתה הלכידות במהלך תקופת המחקר. העדרה של תפיסת רביזיוניזם ברורה או העדר דימיון בין זהותן של חברות המחנה המערבי, יעיד שבפועל לא התקיים מחנה או שלא שררה בו חסידות. אם לא ניתן לייחס את הלכידות במחנה לרמת חסידות גבוהה, אזי ייתכן שהנחת אחדות המטרה בקרב מדינות המערב איננה נכונה.

תיאור מקרה של חסידות

הפצת נשק להשמדה המונית

שרשרת הסיבתיות של הפצת נשק להשמדה המונית

כפי שהוזכר קודם, ארבעת המרכיבים ב"שרשרת הסיבתיות" להפצת נשק להשמדה המונית של צ'רלס פרגוסון וויליאם פוטר מייצגים רביזיוניזם ברמת המערכת. איתורם מאפשר לאמת התהוות מערך, ולאחר מכן לקבוע את זהותה של כל מדינה בתגובה להפצת נב"ק. לפי צ'רלס פרגוסון וויליאם פוטר, הפצת נשק להשמדה המונית מורכבת מ"מרכיבים מרכזיים שיצטרכו להתמזג" ליצור ולפוצץ נשק להשמדה המונית.²⁶ בעוד שפרגוסון ופוטר ביססו "שרשרת סיבתיות" זו להגדרת האמצעים בעזרתם ארגוני טרור עלולים לרכוש נשק להשמדה המונית, ניתן להחיל זאת גם על שחקן מדינתי. בחינה של שרשרת הסיבתיות מראה ארבעה מרכיבים של הפצת נב"ק: ספק (Supplier), מעביר (Transporter), מממן (Financer) ומשתמש (End User).²⁷ ניתוח מדיניות של כל מדינה ביחס לאי הפצת נשק להשמדה המונית מבקש לזהות את שכיחותו של כל מרכיב באסטרטגית מניעת ההפצה הכוללת, וכך לסייע לקבוע את רמת הרביזיוניזם הנתפסת. תגובת כל מדינה ותגובת המחנה למרכיבים השונים של שרשרת ההפצה מוכיחות כי מדינות המערב זיהו את פצת הנשק להשמדה המונית כרביזיוניזם ברמת המערכת.

שינויים בתפישתן של מרכיבי ההפצה השונים קובעים את רמת הרביזיוניזם המערכתית. לכן, ניתן יהיה לקבוע את השינוי ברביזיוניזם ברמת המערכת על ידי בחינה האם כל אחת ממדינות מקרי המבחן מכירות בכלל את מרכיבי ההפצה השונים. זה בתורו יאפשר לקבוע את השינוי ברמת הרביזיוניזם המערכתי ויראה כיצד כל אחת מהמדינות משלבות את שלושת אסטרטגיות אי-ההפצה – יכולת/שלילה (capability/denial), אי-החזקה/בניית נורמה (non-) (possession/norm-building), ותוצאות/ניהול (consequence/management) – בתגובתן להפצה.

בריטניה, אוסטרליה וישראל

שלושת המדינות שנחקרות השתייכו למחנה המערבי במלחמה הקרה, וכתוצאה מכך ניתן להניח שהייתה להן תפיסה מערכתית דומה ביחס להפצת נב"ק גם לאחר סיומה. אם כי המחקר הנוכחי איננו בוחן "תרבות אסטרטגית" כמוטיבציה להתגבשות מחנה ברמת המערכת, לא ניתן להתעלם מהשפעתה הפוטנציאלית על לכידות המחנה. ישראל הוכללה במקרי המבחן בכדי להעריך

את השפעת 'תרבות אסטרטגית' על תוקף המחקר. בעוד שהשפעת בריטניה על התרבות הפוליטית הישראלית, והשפעת ארה"ב על תרבותה האסטרטגית, משייכים בבירור את ישראל לגוש המערבי של המלחמה הקרה, התרבות הישראלית אינה אנגלו-סקסית. לפיכך תרבותה שונה מאלו של יתר מדינות מקרי המבחן וממנהיגת המחנה-ארה"ב. במקביל ובאותו זמן, בריטניה ואוסטרליה חולקות תרבות אנגלו-סקסית וקשרים הדוקים בתחומי אסטרטגיה, דיפלומטיה, דת, תרבות ומסחר. קרבה זו מצמצמת את השפעות הפוליטיקה המקומית או התרבות האסטרטגית על תוקף המחקר, מאחר והיא מבססת את תהליך בחינת החסידות על 'קרקע' תרבותית משותפת.

בבחירת שלושת מקרי המבחן, מיקום גיאוגרפי ותפקיד מוכר במניעת הפצה במהלך המלחמה הקרה מילאו תפקיד מרכזי. תפקידה של אוסטרליה בהיווצרות הקבוצה האוסטרלית והשתתפותה בנורמות אי-הפצה רבות שנקבעו במהלך המלחמה הקרה, מגלה כי מדובר במועמדת אידיאלית למחקר על לכידות המחנה המערבי בתגובה להפצת נב"ק לאחר המלחמה הקרה. תפקידה של אוסטרליה בתיווך בפתרון הסופי של ה-CWC, בתחילת 1990, וניסיונותיה לחזק את ה-BWC, בסוף שנות ה-90, מעיד כי הפצת נב"ק נתפסה כרביזיוניזם ברמת המערכת על ידי אוסטרליה. מיקומה קרוב לדרום מזרח אסיה חשוב גם כן, מאחר ותפיסת הרביזיוניזם המערכתי מושפע במיוחד ממיקומה הגיאוגרפי. מספר חוקרים הרחיקו לכת וטענו כי בנושא אי ההפצה אוסטרליה הינה אחת השחקניות המשפיעות ביותר.²⁸

בריטניה הינה בחירה פחות 'טבעית' למחקר זה. השתתפותה באיחוד האירופי מקשה על הבחנת מדיניות בריטית ממדיניות האיחוד האירופי. בכל זאת, הקשר המיוחד של בריטניה עם ארה"ב, מיקומה הגיאוגרפי באירופה, יכולת הגרעינית, מעמדה במסגרת ה-NPT, והשתתפותה הברורה בנורמות אי-הפצה במהלך המלחמה הקרה, מוכיחים כי סוגיות אי הפצה מהוות חלק בלתי נפרד מהותי במדיניות החוץ שלה.

הכללת ישראל כמקרה בוחן שלישי התבססה על מיקומה הגיאוגרפי במזרח התיכון, יחסיה המיוחדים עם ארה"ב, פעילותה במהלך המלחמה הקרה בתגובה להפצת נשק גרעיני לעיראק (השמדת הכור הגרעיני העיראקי), והיותה נתונה לאיום מתקפת נב"ק מצד שחקנים מדינתיים ולא מדינתיים כאחת.²⁹ הכללת ישראל מגבילה את ההשפעה הפוטנציאלית של התרבות על תוקף המחקר.

האופי החשאי של הפעילות הישראלית בתחום מניעת ההפצה הופך את ביסוס זהותה בתגובה לרביזיוניזם ברמת המערכת לקשה במיוחד. בנוסף, השפעתה הגוברת של ארה"ב על התרבות האסטרטגית הישראלית משמעותה שבמחקר זה ישראל עוזרת לקבוע אם בכל זאת קיימת שונות בקרב מדינות עם תרבויות אסטרטגיות דומות. בנוסף, כמדינה שאינה חברה באמנות רבות לאי-הפצה, ניתן לראות האם הנורמות של המחנה משפיעות על מדיניותה ביחס לאי-הפצה. חשוב לציין כי, בעוד ישראל נחשבת מפיצת נשק להשמדה המונית – כיוון שאינה חתומה על ה-NPT או ה-BWC, והיותה חתומה (למרות שלא אשררה) את ה-CWC – ישראל לקחה על עצמה לפעול בהתאם לכמה מהמשטרים הבולטים ביותר של אי-הפצה, כולל הפיקוח על הייצוא של הקבוצה האוסטרלית.

ניתוח החסידות




Table 5: חסידיות
5 - Exemplary, 4 - Conformist, 3 - Scared, 2 - Alienated, 1 - Pragmatic

ניתוח השפעות מערכתיות על שינוי אסטרטגי שנערך בעבודה זו מציע כי החל ממצית שנות ה-90 ועד שנת 2001, זהויות החסיד של בריטניה ואוסטרליה היו נמוכות. זאת מכיוון שרמת הרביזיוניזם המערכתי נתפסה כנמוכה. הניתוח הנוכחי מבקש לקבוע אם רמת החסידיות הייתה נמוכה בתגובה לכך ולפיכך האם "המערב" הגיב בצורה מלוכדת להפצת נשק להשמדה המונית. לשם כך נערכה השוואת זהויות החסיד של כל מדינה במטרה לבסס את הזהות השולטת, ולהעריך את רמת החסידיות. בחינה זו הראתה שרמת החסידיות השתנתה בצורה משמעותית במהלך תקופת המחקר. שינויים אלו גרמו לתנודות קיצוניות בלכידות המערך המערבי לאי-הפצה. בעוד שבתחילת תקופת המחקר התאפיינה בהתנהלות מלוכדת של "המערב" בתגובה להפצת נב"ק, הרי שהיא התפוגגה במהירות כאשר שתיים ממדינות המחנה המערבי הביעו אינטרסים שונים מהאמריקאיים. אינטרסים מנוגדים אלו הובילו למתח ברמת תת-המערכת.

כפי שנראה בגרף למעלה, רמת החסידיות השתנתה במהלך תקופת המחקר. בעוד שרמת הלכידות החלה למופת לאחר המלחמה הקרה, רמת הפצת נב"ק נמוכה גרם לצניחה מהירה ברמת החסידיות. היעדר רביזיוניזם מערכתי ברור לאחר מלחמת המפרץ הראשונה (מבצע 'סופה במדבר') הוביל לשינוי בזהויות החסיד של בריטניה ואוסטרליה. משמעות שינויים אלו בזהות החסיד היא שרמת החסידיות במחנה המערבי ירדה לניכור (alienated) ב-1993.

חוסר אחדות בין המנהיג והחסידיים הבא לידי ביטוי מרמה נמוכה של חסידיות גורם למתח בתת-המערכת. בתגובה למתח זה יתכנו אחת מהתוצאות הבאות: המנהיג ישנה את מדיניותו, החסידיים ישנו את מדיניותם, שניהם יבצעו שינויים קלים על מנת להתאים עצמם לאינטרסים של המחנה, או שהמחנה יתפרק. בעוד שמתח זה לא גרם להתפרקות מחנה אי-ההפצה המערבי הוא הצביע על הבדלים מובהקים בדעות שבין המנהיג ושניים מהחסידיים המשמעותיים. למרות עליה באלמנטים של ההפצה על ידי מספר מדינות ושחקנים לא-מדינתיים באמצע שנות ה-90, הבולטת ביותר הייתה המתקפה הכימית של ארגון הטרור 'אום שינקו' על תחנת רכבת בטוקיו ב-1995, רמת החסידיות נשארה נמוכה באותה תקופה. בריטניה אוסטרליה לא הכירו באלמנטים אלו של הפצה כרביזיוניזם ברמת המערכת, ולפיכך לא הגיבו להם. זאת בניגוד לארה"ב שהכירה בשחקנים לא מדינתיים שהשתתפו בהפצת נשק להשמדה המונית ונקטה בפעולה מוגבלת כתגובה לאיום זה. לא זו בלבד שהדבר מעיד על רמת חסידות נמוכה, בתקופה זו, אלא גם מטיל ספק במנהיגותה של ארה"ב באותו תקופה. מניתוח גרף החסידיות משתמע כי אוסטרליה יכלה להתחרות על עמדת מנהיגת המחנה, כיוון שרמת החסידיות במהלך אמצע עד סוף שנות ה-90 תאמה למדי לזהות החסיד שלה.

יתר על כן, השינויים באחדות המערך בשנת 1998 היו בעיקר תוצאה של פרספקטיבה אזורית של אוסטרליה ופיצוץ של נשק גרעיני ע"י הודו ופקיסטן, שאיים על הסטאטוס קוו ברמת המערכת. בעוד שזהות החסיד של ישראל השתנתה במהלך תקופה זו, במיוחד בתגובה לעלייתה של עיראק כגורם רביזיוניסטי אפשרי, קובעי המדיניות הישראליים הציעו כי התגובה להפצה זו תישאר לארה"ב ובנות בריתה. כך, אוסטרליה וישראל נראו כמעבירות את האחריות לארה"ב כמנהיגת המחנה בתגובה לרביזיוניזם מערכתי. בעוד ששינויים אלו הקלו מעט על המתח בתוך המחנה לזמן מה, הרי שאחדות המחנה הוסיפה להישחק במהרה כשרמת החסידות השתנתה לרמה מנוכרת ואח"כ פרגמטית.

הרמה הפרגמטית של החסידיות בסוף שנות ה-90 נבעה מכך שלשלושת המדינות המונהגות היו תגובות שונות לנושא מניעת ההפצה, ומיכולתה של אוסטרליה לרסן את פעולות מניעת ההפצה האמריקאיות. רמת אחדות הנמוכה במחנה בשנת 2000 נראתה כתוצאה של מחלוקת בין ישראל וארה"ב ביחס להפצה ע"י אירן. הריסון במערך, ושינויים ברמת הרביזיוניזם, הובילו ללכודות גבוהה יותר בין אוסטרליה וארה"ב לאחר שינויים במדיניות האי-הפצה של ארה"ב. אמנם לעליה ברביזיוניזם ברמת המערכת הייתה השפעה מוגבלת על רמת החסידות של ישראל אך ללא השפעה

כלשהי על בריטניה. כך, למרות מה שנראה כעליה ברביזיוניזם המערכתי, רמת האחדות נותרה נמוכה.

בשנת 2001 המערב הגיב שוב להפצת נשק להשמדה המוני כיחידה מלוכדת, למרות שזהות החסיד של בריטניה נשארה פרגמטית עד 2002. שינוי זה היה בעיקר תגובה להפצת נב"ק ע"י שחקנים לא מדינתיים. השמירה על לכידות המחנה הייתה תוצאה של המלחמות בעיראק ואפגניסטן, גילוי רשת א.ק. חאן והפצת נשק לא קונבנציונלי בלוב ובאירן. למרות העלייה ברביזיוניזם המערכתי, חלק מהשינויים באחדות המחנה היו תוצאה של לחץ באוסטרלי ובריטי על מנהיגי ארה"ב לשנות את מדיניות אי-ההפצה שלה. חוסר ההקבלה בזוהיות החסידים במחנה, ורמת החסידיות הנמוכה שנבעה מכך בשנות ה-90, רומזים על חוסר לכידות בתגובה להפצה במחנה המערבי. עם זאת, כאשר חברות המחנה הכירו בעלייה ברמת הרביזיוניזם הרי שחלה עלייה בלכידות המערך. כתוצאה מכך המדינות פעלו באופן הדוק יותר, בתגובה למרכיבי הפצת נב"ק. כאשר האחדות התגבשה בתגובה למדינות רביזיוניסטיות ספציפיות או NSAs, הרי שארה"ב יכלה לגייס תמיכה למטרותיה ולפעולותיה, תוך שינוי במדיניותה כתגובה ללחצים של חסידיה.

מסקנות

בחינת חסידידות המכנה המערבי המוצג כאן מראה כי ארה"ב, למרות היותה המנהיגה הנומינלית, לא יכלה לשמור על רמת לכידות גבוהה במחנה עם תום המלחמה הקרה. מדינות שהיו תומכות נאמנות של ארה"ב במהלך המלחמה הקרה וסמוך לסיומה, לא קיבלו יותר את מטרותיה ופעילותיה למניעת הפצה בעידן החדש. כתוצאה מכך, נוצר שינוי ברמת הלכידות במחנה כאשר פעולות אי-ההפצה של חברות המחנה כבר לא סייעה למימוש מטרותיה של ארה"ב.

ללא ספק בחינת מדינות אלה כמדגם אינה מספיקה לקבוע את לכידות המערך המערבי בכללותו בתגובה להפצת נשק להשמדה המונית לאחר המלחמה הקרה. אולם, העובדה שחברים בולטים במחנה המערבי השתחררו בהדרגה מזהויות חסיד למופת, ולכידות המחנה הייתה נמוכה בשל כך, מעלות שאלות חשובות. ראשית, ביחס למדינות כגון בריטניה ואוסטרליה שהשתתפו במחנה ברמה חסידות נמוכה, ניתן לשאול האם אחת מהן התמודדה על מנהיגות בתקופה זו? יש לציין שבמהלך מרבית תקופת המחקר, רמת החסידידות הושפע ע"י זהות החסיד של אוסטרליה. חרף גודלו הקטן של המדגם הרי שעולות ממנו שאלות ביחס לשימוש אפשרי בחסידידות לניתוח מדיניות. אם בחינה רחבה יותר תראה שרמת החסידידות בתגובה להפצת נב"ק עוקבת אחר הזהות של מדינה או קבוצת מדינות, אזי קיימת אפשרות שמדינות אלו ישפיעו על הנורמות במערך המערבי.

שאלה אחרת שעולה ממחקר זה היא אם רמת הלכידות במחנה בשנות ה-90 ו-2000 הייתה נמוכה כפי שנראתה במדגם. יידרש מחקר מורכב יותר, על מנת לקבוע האם ממצאי המחקר אכן מייצגים את רמת הלכידות במערב.

עבודה זו הראתה כי שינויים ברביזיוניזם מערכתי של נב"ק הובילו לשינויים בזהויות אי-ההפצה של מדינות במחנה המערבי – במיוחד בריטניה, אוסטרליה וישראל. לפיכך אוששו ההשערות שהוצגו בפתח המחקר לפיהן ניסיונות לשנות את הסטטוס קוו ברמת המערכת גרמו למדיניות אי-הפצה של המדינות החסידות להתקרב יותר למדיניות המנהיג. כך, עליה ברמת הרביזיוניזם המערכתי הובילה לרמה גבוהה יותר של דמיון, ברמת הזהויות, בין חברי המחנה ולרמת חסידידות גבוהה יותר. זאת בעוד שרמת חסידידות נמוכה יותר ברביזיוניזם הובילה לחוסר-דמיון בזהויות ולרמת חסידידות נמוכה יותר.

המחקר הראה גם שבחינת לכידות המחנה והמנהיג צריכה לכלול מחקרים המנתחים את הקשר חסידים-מנהיג מבלי להתמקד בניתוח המנהיג עצמו. זאת על ידי אימוץ גישת bottom-up

במקום top-down במטרה לבחון את הצלחתו של המנהיג ביצירת אחדות. המסגרת המחקרית שהוצגה מאפשרת לנו להוסיף כלי מחקר נוסף להערכת יעילות המחנה במערכת הבינ"ל ולכידותו. בעוד שממצאי המחקר מלמדים כי בריטניה, אוסטרליה וישראל השפיעו על נורמות המחנה, הרי ששלושתן היו גם בעלות ברית ושותפות לארה"ב בתחומי מדיניות אחרים. בשל כך, יתכן כי עומק והיקף יחסים אלו השפיעו על פועלן בנושא מניעת הפצת נב"ק. המחקר הנוכחי מרמז כי מדינות אלו הפעילו סוג של ריסון על ארה"ב דרך התרחקות מרמת זהות חסיד גבוהה תוך כדי המשך שיתוף פעולה. זאת כאמצעי לשכנע את ארה"ב לשנות את מטרותיה ואת פעולותיה. כך, רמת החסידיות מייצגת אמצעי חשוב, גם עבור מקבלי החלטות, להגדרת אסטרטגיות חיוניות בתגובה לרביזיוניזם ברמת המערכת תוך שימור אחדות המחנה המערבי. בעוד שמחקר זה השתמש בהפצת נשק להשמדה המונית כרביזיוניזם ברמה המערכתית, המסגרת התיאורטית המוצגת יכולה לשמש לבחינת לכידות כל מערך בינ"ל בתגובה לסוגי רביזיוניזם שונים.

¹ For further reading on transitional periods see: Lauren, Craig, and George, *Force and Statecraft : Diplomatic Challenges of Our Time*, 110 - 15. For readings on change in the international system see: Organski, "The Power Transition."

² As will be discussed later, the determination of cohesion in any type of international cooperation must first establish what the unit of examination is. George Modelski argues that 'alignments' are a blanket term for types of international political cooperation. See: Modelski, "The Study of Alliances: A Review: George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence Robert E. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance Donald S. Zagoria, Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-61," 774.

³ Lauren, Craig, and George, *Force and Statecraft : Diplomatic Challenges of Our Time*, 110-15.

⁴ Cooper, *Competing Western Strategies against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Comparing the United States to a Close Ally*, 221.

⁵ Russett, "Delineating International Regions."; Kaplan, "International Law and the International System."; ———, *System and Process in International Politics*; Alker Jr. and Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly*; Brams, "The Structure of Influence Relationships in the International System."; ———, "Positive Coalition Theory: The Relationship between Postulated Goals and Derived Behavior."; Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander George, eds., *Change in the International System* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980).

⁶ Organski, "The Power Transition."

⁷ Tumanyan, "The Political System and the Civil Service in Transition Period in the Republic of Armenia." ; Holsti, Siverson, and George, eds., *Change in the International System*; Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*; Kupchan et al., eds., *Power in Transition: The Peaceful Change of International Order*; Wittkopf, "Faces of Internationalism in a Transitional Environment."

⁸ Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* ; Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory."; Rosenbach and Taylor, eds., *Contemporary Issues in Leadership*; Stubbs, "From Hegemony to Competitive Leadership: The Case of South East Asia." ; ———, "Reluctant Leader, Expectant Followers: Japan and Southeast Asia."; Vugt, "Evolutionary Origins of Leadership and Followership."

⁹ Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, "Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict."

¹⁰ Ibid.: 393-99. See also: Ikenberry and Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power."; Cox, *Production Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History*; Dixon and Westbrook, "Followers Revealed."; Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*.

¹¹ Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, "Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict."

¹² Joseph S. Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1991); ———, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (PublicAffairs, 2004).

¹³ Ikenberry, "The Future of International Leadership," 386.

¹⁴ Rosenbach and Taylor, eds., *Contemporary Issues in Leadership*, 86.

¹⁵ Dion, "The Concept of Political Leadership: An Analysis," 3.

¹⁶ Morris and Seeman, "The Problem of Leadership: An Interdisciplinary Approach," 151.

¹⁷ Rosenbach and Taylor, eds., *Contemporary Issues in Leadership*.

¹⁸ Stubbs, "From Hegemony to Competitive Leadership: The Case of South East Asia." ; ———, "Reluctant Leader, Expectant Followers: Japan and Southeast Asia."

¹⁹ Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, "Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict."

²⁰ Ferguson et al., *The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism*.

²¹ Cooper, *Competing Western Strategies against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Comparing the United States to a Close Ally*.

²² Pressman, "If Not Balancing, What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony," 8-10. See also: ———, *Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics*.

²³ Downer, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Greatest Threat to International Security." See also: "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Australia's Role in Fighting Proliferation." Turpen et al., "Technical Issues and Organizational Demands for Combating WMD Proliferation,"

²⁴ Kapur, "Nuclear Policies of Small States and Weaker Powers," 112; Walt, "Taming American Power," 114.

²⁵ It is important to note at this point that I am not examining the influence of strategic culture on alliance formation, nor how strategic culture can help to define threat perceptions, goals, and actions. This dissertation examines Western state responses in order to determine if the assumption that Western states have acted collectively in response to proliferation is correct.

²⁶ Ferguson et al., *The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism*, 64.

²⁷ Ibid., 6. See also: "Nuclear Threat Initiative."

²⁸ Cooper, *Competing Western Strategies against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Comparing the United States to a Close Ally*, 5.

²⁹ Brown, "Israel and the WMD Threat: Lessons for Europe."

תוכן עניינים

א	תקציר	
ב	מבוא	
ג	מסגרת המחקר	
ה	בעיית המחקר	
ו	משתנים	
ז	מטרות המחקר	
ח	הנחות	
ט	שאלות מחקר	
י	השערות	
יא	מתודולוגיה	
יב	חסידיות במחנה	
יג	תיאור מקרה של חסידות	
יד	הפצת נשק להשמדה המונית	
יז	שרשרת הסיבתיות של הפצת נשק להשמדה המונית	
יח	בריטניה, אוסטרליה וישראל	
יט	ניתוח החסידות	
כ	מסקנות	
כא	מראה מקום	
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