Rethinking the Follower - Leader Relationship: “Followership” Responses to Non-State Actor Proliferation

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Table of Contents

Abstract i

Introduction 1

Defining Alliances 1

Alliances 2

The Balancing Theories 2

Beyond Balancing 4

Unipolarity and Follower - Leader Relations 5

Problems in the literature 6

The Follower - Leader Relationship 7

Followership 7

Followership research 8

Followership in Alliances 8

Followership Typologies 9

Case Study 11

Non-State Actor Proliferation 11

Supplier 12

Financial 13

Transportation 14

Terrorist 15

State Responses 16

Analysis 17

Conclusion 17

Diagram 1: Five Followership Typologies 19

Diagram 2: Eight Followership Typologies 19

Appendix 2: Proposed Research Schedule 20

Appendix 3: Proposed Chapters 21

Endnotes 22

Bibliography 26

Abstract

This work furthers our understanding of alliance formation and intra-alliance dynamics while establishing a new means of examining alliance follower - leader relations. It proposes the use of state responses to non-state actor non-conventional weapons proliferation components as the case study to examine alliance formation and intra-alliance dynamics. In doing so it expands the neo-realist perspective of alliance literature to include non-state actors in the traditional balancing/bandwagoning dichotomy.

We begin by looking at alliances as one of the settings in which follower - leader relations occur. Alliances are defined and leadership in alliance literature is examined. We then define "followership" in relation to leadership. A model for the examination of "followership" is presented based upon three aspects of international studies...threat perception, mutual goals and action. Five "followership" typologies are borrowed from organizational psychology. Three more are then added expanding the total possible typologies to eight. This furthers the research concept proposed by Richard Stubbs[1] and creates a new model for the examination of follower - leader relations.

The case study proposed here uses four components of non-state actor non-conventional weapons proliferation as the perceived threat to determine if an alliance relationship develops. An analysis of state responses to each component can determine what, if any, type of "followership" best describes the state's interactions. No field work is presented as this concept is still in the theoretical stage of development.

Introduction

In alliance literature power, threat and interests are used to describe the reason why states will choose to cooperate and ally. The neo-realist nature of alliance literature perceives alliances as a response to a more powerful or threatening state. This allows for a systemic level examination of interstate relations. In an attempt to move away from that perspective researchers have incorporated neo-classical domestic influences in their examination of why states ally, and whom they ally with.[2] None the less, leadership in alliances is often presented as a fait d'accompli that resides with the most powerful or threatening state. The prevailing point of view is that the central figure, or leader, in an alliance is the state that is the most powerful or threatening. This paper uses present alliance literature, as well as organizational psychology, to create a system which can determine leadership in international cooperation, specifically alliances.

This work questions the leadership assumption and proposes the neutral examination of alliance members to determine leadership in alliances. Most alliance literature examines motivation as the driving force behind alliance participation. Three influences are often used to describe why states participate in alliances: the desire to benefit with the inability to do so, the realization that the opponent must be defeated for benefits to be gained and the desire to maximize the eventual payoff as part of an alliance.[3] These influences, based upon motivation, fail to include mutual goals or action taken against a perceived threat. Thus national interests are examined, but not in relation to threat perception, mutual recognition of goals and action.

This paper examines alliance literature and leadership as it is presented in that literature. It establishes a new system for determining leadership in alliances by establishing the "followership" status of each state in an alliance. It then presents components of non-state actor non-conventional weapons proliferation as the case study against which alliance follower - leader responses are examined.

Defining Alliances

There are many different forum in which international cooperation take place. Formal alliances as well as ad hoc coalitions that respond to perceived threats or issues

are just two such places. One problem that arises when examining international relations is the difficulty in differentiating between different types of interactions.

Differences between coalitions and alliances are subtle and often hard to clarify. There are four criteria that differentiate alliances and coalitions: the time-frame in which cooperation is to take place, the scope of the cooperation, the formality of the relationship and the number of actors involved in the relationship.[4] Avi Kober, in his work on coalition defection, notes that while coalitions refer to a "wide scope of activity, cooperation within the framework of alliances is confined to security matters, specifically mutual defense commitments."[5] He also points out that alliances are generally based on long-term interests while coalitions are based upon ad-hoc short-term interests.

Stephen Walt notes that using relationship formality as criteria can be problematic in differentiating between alliances and coalitions. States can have meaningful but not formal alliances. Research can become distorted using this criterion because it fails to take into account informal interactions.[6]

The number of actors is also a problematic criterion. While coalitions are considered to be broader based, alliances are seen as smaller. This, however, is not always the case. Differentiating between the two can also distort the outcome of research.

Understanding that alliance theory and coalition theory are deeply intertwined[7] we are incorporating the two under the umbrella of alliances. Thus, alliances are defined as formal, or informal, cooperation between two or more states, towards a long or short term mutual goal, based upon some threat, opportunity, interest or issue.

Alliances

The Balancing Theories

Hans Morgenthau[8] presents the basis for research into alliance formation by suggesting that weak states perceive powerful states as threatening. Kenneth Waltz[9] adds to this by pointing out that balancing, which is an aggregation of power among weaker states, must take place in order to counter a powerful state.[10]

In Waltz's balance-of-power theory alliances form between weaker states in order to balance against a more powerful state. This is true as long as a state cannot increase its own power unilaterally. On the other hand, he claims that a weak state automatically joins with a powerful one when it cannot aggregate enough power to balance.[11] This joining is called bandwagoning. In either of these situations Waltz defines the alliance leader as the state that possesses the most power. This is true in both the balancing alliance and in the bandwagoning one.

Stephen Walt[12] refines Waltz's balance-of-power theory and suggests that it is not the power of the state that is threatening. Instead he proposes a balance-of-threat theory which places geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and perceived intentions as additional aspects to the power of a state.[13]

Since intentions are now a central motivating factor the balancing/bandwagoning dichotomy takes on a structure based in threat perception. Weaker states attempt to balance against a state whose intentions are perceived as threatening as long as they have the means to do so. Weak states capitulate to the threatening state's leadership and bandwagon with it if they cannot balance against it. They hope to limit the perceived threat by appeasement. They may also bandwagon in order to profit from actions taken by the threatening state or when other options do not exist.[14]

There are several problems with both Waltz's and Walt's theories. Randall Schweller[15] points out that they are based upon reactive status quo motivations. As such they do not allow for the possibility of opportunistic alliance formation.

According to Schweller the balancing/bandwagoning dichotomy is not the search for security, as Waltz and Walt suggest, but rather security versus self-extension.[16] The international system is made up of either status quo (security) states or revisionist (self-extension) states. Schweller presents four types of state actors in his balance-of-interest theory. Lions and lambs are representative of strong status quo states and weak bandwagoning status quo states respectively. Wolves and jackals are either strong revisionist aggressors or weaker bandwagoning aggressors that wish to overthrow the status quo.[17] While Schweller examines weak state motivations he distills them down to

self interest. Lambs are presented as states that seek protection while jackals are presented as revisionist profit seekers. Leaders in this system are still the states perceived as the most powerful, irrespective of their goals or their relationship with their followers.

Schweller also suggests that bandwagoning is not necessarily the capitulation of a state that is threatened by either power or intentions. Instead it can be motivated by a desire to profit which he defines as "jackal bandwagoning," or the desire to be associated with the winning side in a war, "pile-on bandwagoning."[18] He presents four types of bandwagoning based upon the motivation of the weak state; "jackal," "pile on," "wave of the future," and "contagion." "Jackal" and "pile on" are both profit based. "Wave of the future" is security based and "contagion" is based upon proximity.[19] In all of these types of bandwagoning the leader is still the most powerful or threatening state.

Beyond Balancing

Chong Ja Ian[20] points out that the terms balancing and bandwagoning may no longer apply in the post Cold War world. In the post Cold War environment second-tier states, states that cannot change the distribution of power, can none the less take actions independent of a powerful state. He proposes four second-tier state responses to this environment: Buffering, Bonding, Binding, and Beleaguering.

Buffering represents the lessening of influence of the more powerful state through the creation of neutral, geographic or functional spheres of influence.[21] Bonding is the establishment of a function or service that other states, including the predominant state, find indispensable.[22] Binding occurs when weaker states use international institutions and agreements to restrain the actions of a powerful state.[23] Beleaguering represents an attempt to "undermine the influence and authority of the more powerful [state] as well as [its] ability to exercise power through disruption for the purposes of gaining specific concessions."[24]

Ja Ian also notes a fifth strategy that a state can undertake, hiding. This strategy represents a withdrawal into isolation as a response to international tension. He suggests that hiding may not be a viable strategy in the post Cold War environment and as such chooses to ignore it.[25]

While Ja Ian addresses the ability of states to take independent action he fails to consider the nature of leadership in the post Cold War environment. Each of these strategies represents some sort of opposition to or lessening of predominant state influence. While second-tier states may have the ability to undertake any of these strategies, they must do so within the constraints of predominant state influences. By failing to address the issue of predominant state leadership the strategies Ja Ian presents are not sufficient to understand state interactions in the post Cold War environment.

Unipolarity and Follower - Leader Relations

As Ja Ian notes the Cold War concepts of bandwagoning and balancing that were seen as basic descriptive context for the relationships between, and within, the West and the East may not be applicable in the post Cold War environment. The end of the Cold War also presents an interesting dilemma regarding follower - leader relations. Concepts like Patron - Client relations that were presented as models for understanding the relationships between, and within, alliances in the international system are no longer accurate.[26]

While these concepts are still important, the rise of a single remaining superpower seems to have created a unipolar hegemonic international system. In this environment the role of the superpower is of importance because of the influence it has in the international community.

In a unipolar environment it is not only the power of the state that makes it a leader but also its willingness to take on the role of leadership.[27] Just as a leader state must choose to be a leader, a follower must choose to take on that role in the relationship. Alliance theory does not present a structure in which a follower's acceptance of another state's goals or threat perception determines the nature of the follower - leader relationship. Leadership is simply assumed to be the purview of the most powerful or threatening state.

If we base our research upon Waltz' and Walt's neo-realist alliance theories then the United States, as the sole remaining superpower must be the leader in any alliance in which it takes part. It can either be balanced against, joined with because it cannot be

balanced against, or, according to Ja Ian, weak states should try and carve out a niche in which the powerful state has no influence. According to Schweller's theory weak states may also participate in an alliance in which the U.S. is the leader in order to profit or for their own security. None of these theories presents the possibility that a second-tier state can choose to follow the predominant state's leadership with a desire to support predominant state's goals.

Problems in the literature

This work does not attempt to establish a new theory that explains alliance formation. It uses the structure created by the balance-of-power, balance-of-threat and balance-of-interest theories to address two problems that arise within alliance literature. The first is the assumption that weak states are followers or they are opponents. In balance-of-power and balance-of threat theories the powerful or threatening state leads on one side and the most powerful balancer leads on the other. In Schweller's balance-of-interest theory the lions and wolves are leaders while the lambs and jackals must be followers. While Ja Ian's attempt to examine alliances in the post Cold War era does not address this problem directly it still presents leadership is the purview of the powerful state. The literature *assumes* that strong states will lead and that weak states for lack of any other options will follow. This paper provides a system through which we can determine the accuracy of this assumption. In so doing it incorporates Waltz', Walt's, Schweller and Ja Ian's different perspectives on alliances into one system of analysis.

The second problem is that the neo-realist nature of the literature does not allow for a non-state actor to participate in this structural dichotomy. It assumes that states ally to either counter a strong state or bandwagon with that state. It does not include the possibility that a non-state actor threat can take part in the structural dichotomy.

The system proposed below overcomes these two problems. First it allows for the examination of leadership by creating typologies that are follower specific. It also establishes a neutral structural means of examining alliance creation in response to a non-state actor threat.

The Follower - Leader Relationship

As we have shown, one problem in alliance literature is that it fails to take into account that leadership is dependent upon the existence of followers. In our examination of the follower - leader relationship we begin with the assumption of equality within the alliance. While alliances are inherently unequal, with some states being more powerful or threatening than others, the ability to determine leadership requires that we examine every state as if could be either a leader or follower. We examine the *threat perception*, *actions* and *goals* of each alliance member. To be a member of an alliance at least one of these factors must coincide with that of the alliance. Similarities must exist for the creation and sustaining of an alliance.[28]

Followership

The examination of leadership is often a top down process that has little regard for what type of followers take part in the relationship. Leadership is defined as a relationship between an actor that exercises influence and an actor who submits to that influence.[29] The leader uses this influence to set goals and to achieve them.[30] Among these goals is to foster cooperation through a commonality of purpose among different actors.[31] A state that fails to influence other states or create a commonality of purpose is not acting as a leader. "If leadership consists of getting things accomplished through others, then those 'others' are critical to the leader's effectiveness."[32]

As such, the follower is a key ingredient to leadership. If leadership is an actor exerting influence, then followership is submitting to the influence of another actor. "Followers want to feel as if they are partners with their leaders in accomplishing goals and defining a path to the future,"[33] even if the contributions made by the leaders or followers are unequal. So, followership is the examination of international cooperation from the perspective of the follower. Incorporating this idea into alliance literature we find that followership, which requires the acceptance of a perceived threat, recognition of an alliance's goals or, actions through which the alliance benefits, continues Walt's concept of a balance-of-threat while allowing for Schweller's goals (or interests) to also help define the follower - leader relationship in an alliance.

Followership research

The first use of followership in examining state interaction was undertaken by Professor Richard Stubbs of McMaster University. His use of social psychology's perspective of follower - leader relations suggests that a misunderstanding of this relationship develops when the focus is on the leader.[34]

Andrew Fenton Cooper, Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal further this theoretical basis and expand the concept of followership from the social psychology point of view.[35] They conclude that motivation is the key to understanding followership. For Cooper, Higgot and Nossal followership is "the degree to which the follower regards the leader and the leader's 'vision' (the goals that the leader seeks for the collective or the group) as worthy of active and concrete support."[36] Cooper, Higgot and Nossal applied this concept of followership to the "coalition of the willing" during the Gulf War in 1991. They found that it was not a follower - leader relationship based on mutual motivations. Except for Britain there were few states that displayed followership.

David Cooper's[37] work also uses followership as an inherent part of his investigation into *Competing Western Strategies against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*. While his analysis does not specify a differentiation between non-state actors and state actors proliferation, it shows that the "prevalent assumption that Western states have responded collectively to proliferation with an essentially cohesive strategy" is not true.[38] Peter R. Lavoy and Gayle D. Meyers in their work "U.S. Counterproliferation Cooperation with Allies" follow a similar line of investigation regarding U.S. - ally cooperation, though it does not examine followership per se.[39]

Followership in Alliances

Moving beyond the social psychology used by Stubbs, Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, and into organizational psychology two different types of followers emerge: passive and active.[40] Passive followership can be associated with blind acquiescence of a leader's decisions. Active followership is represented by the mutual understanding of goals and the active acceptance of another's status as leader in the system. [41] If we apply this to Waltz' and Walt's alliance theory we find that passive followers are similar to

those that bandwagon while active followers are often balancers. We also find that if we incorporate Schweller's different actors the lambs are passive followers while the jackals are active.

Taking the idea of organizational psychology followership typologies further, we find that Robert Kelley identifies five different types of followers in an organizational setting: *alienated, conformist, pragmatist, passive,* and *exemplary*.[42] Using alliance threat perception, goals and action as the factors in these five typologies we find that the spectrum is incomplete and there must be other possible followership typologies (see diagram 1). By adding three new follower types, *Scared, Profiteer* and *Freeloader,* we create eight followership typologies that span the full spectrum of threat perception, goals, or actions (see diagram 2). By examining these three factors we can identify which states are followers, which state is leading (as the state that identifies the threat, goals and actions that should be taken) and what type of followers the leading state has in the alliance.

Followership Typologies

The *alienated follower* acts independently against the perceived threat. It does not believe in the goals of the alliance. Instead its actions represent an attempt to act as an internal balancer in the alliance, presenting itself as a possible replacement leader. This state is similar to both Ja Ian's beleaguering state and Schweller's wolves. It attempts to undermine the leader's goals though it acts as part of the alliance because of the perceived external threat. It hopes to gain by self extension to the point that it reaches the position of alliance leadership. In the meantime it follows because it does not like any of the other options.

The *conformist* does not perceive the threat as it is defined within the alliance. It does however take action and agrees with the goals of the alliance. At first this seems impossible, however, on closer inspection the conformist perception of the goals is not based upon threat perception but rather future benefit. Similar to Schweller's "pile on" bandwagoning the conformist takes part in the alliance because it can profit. While the

conformist does not perceive the threat as a problem, it associates with the goals of the alliance and takes action so that it can benefit in the future.

The *passive follower* takes no action and does not perceive the threat. It does, however, perceive the goal of the alliance as worthy of support. The support provided is much like that of a cheerleader. While it is on the field, it does not actually play in the game. It is a follower only because it openly identifies with the goals of the alliance.

The *exemplary follower* perceives the threat and is active in pursuit of the common goals. It acts independently within the constraints of the mutual goals. It is a "bosom buddy" or "bedfellow" whose motivations, actions and perceptions coincide with that of the leader. Any independent action it takes is not an attempt to present an alternative to the leader, like the alienated follower, but rather to bolster and support the leader. While Schweller presents lions as the leading powerful state in a status quo alliance the term seems more appropriate here. As with a pride of lions the exemplary state acts in unison with the leading state so that everyone can benefit.

The *scared follower* perceives the threat. It does not, however, identify with the goals of the alliance or take any action. Similar to Shweller's lambs it seeks the protection that an alliance can give, without the alliance benefiting significantly from its inclusion. The only profit that the scared follower seeks is its own protection.

The *profiteering follower* does not perceive the threat. Nor does it accept the mutual goals of the alliance. It takes action so that it can profit from the alliance's gains. It is representative of Schweller's jackals. Its participation in the alliance is dependent upon the ability to gain something from it. This offensive realist approach allows the follower to act in its own self interests and places the alliance second to those interests.

The *freeloader* perceives the threat and also accepts the mutual goals of the alliance. It does not, however, take any action to attain those goals. It "passes the buck"[43] in the hopes of gaining without spending. This defensive realist approach suggests that by relying on others to balance the threat the state maintains its security by not depleting its power base.

The *pragmatic follower* straddles the fence dependent upon interests. As each threat arises it chooses what role to play regarding both action and acceptance of the mutual goals, though it generally identifies the perceived threat. It can be described as a conformist or passive follower regarding one threat or goal and exemplary regarding another.

Hiding

While Ja Ian suggests that hiding is not a viable option for second-tier states in the post Cold War unipolar environment it is applicable in the follower - leader dynamic. Hiding, or a withdrawal into isolation, can be undertaken by a state that chooses not to act as a follower but does not want to be seen as an opponent.[44] The subtle difference between hiding and scared followership is how the state responds to a leader's overtures. If a state recognized the threat and sides with the alliance but does not accept alliance goals or take action then it is a scared follower. If on the other hand a state pulls away and shows no signs of acknowledging the alliance's threat perception then it is hiding.

In a pure follower - leader alliance, one made up largely of exemplary followers and a leader, the balance-of-power or balance-of-threat explanations are viable and can be used to explain why states have allied. If the alliance under examination does not consists of a majority of exemplary followers this tends to suggest that the state trying to lead is not really a leader. It is, however, not necessarily a follower. In this situation the question arises as to what type of alliance exists. If it is an alliance that is made up of profit seekers then it suggests a "jackal" alliance in which the "leading state" is being used for profit. If the alliance consists of scared or freeloader followers then perhaps it is a "wave of the future" alliance and the "leader" is only accepted because of the security it provides.

Case Study

Non-State Actor Proliferation

There are many different case studies against which the follower - leader relationship can be examined. Global warming, drug smuggling, money laundering or any other perceived threat can act as the case study against which state responses can be

examined. This research project uses the examination of followership in response to non-state actor (NSA) non-conventional weapons (NCW) proliferation. The components of NSA NCW proliferation are presented by Charles Furguson and William Potter in their "chain of causation." It consists of the "principal elements that would have to coalesce for a terrorist group" to create and detonate an intact NCW.[45]

This chain begins with the formation of a terrorist group that has extreme objectives. This group must organize and begin operations. They must decide if they have the necessary technical and financial resources to execute an NCW attack. The group then chooses to use NCW in an act of terrorism. They can buy, steal, divert or receive as a gift either an intact NCW or the components necessary to build an NCW. The next step in the chain requires that they either bypass the weapon's safeguards or build a weapon. They must then transport the weapon to the target and detonate it.

A close look at the chain of causation shows four components to NSA NCW proliferation: Supplier, Transportation, Financial and Terrorist.[46] These four components represent the links between state and non-state actors, as well as the secondary links between non-state actors, that Anthony Cordesman[47] and Richard Falkenrath, Robert Newman and Bradley Thayer[48] point to as essential for NCW proliferation to occur. The response of each state to the different components will allow us to determine if a follower - leader relationship develops and what followership typology best describes that relationship.

Supplier

This component collaborates, knowingly or not, in the supply of relevant industry or technological capabilities. Glenn E. Schweitzer and Carole C. Dorsch point out that these are the organizations that can provide either material (in the form of chemicals, spores, electronic components etc.) or technology (in the form of dual use technological systems that assist in the weaponization of material).[49] These can include multinational corporations (MNC) that function in more than one country. MNCs are subject to different national laws, international regulations and regimes. This component can also includes national corporations that are generally subject to national laws and regulations

regarding the sale or shipping of dual use items or material. Nadine Gurr and Benjamine Cole note that, while neither the MNC nor the national corporation have access to all the material needed, many have access to precursors that can be weaponized or technical materials needed in the creation of a NCW.[50]

Gurr and Cole also make it clear that there are three types of individuals who fall under the umbrella of suppliers. The first are engineers or technologically proficient individuals who can assist in the creation of delivery systems or weapons. The second are scientists with weaponization knowledge of chemical, biological or nuclear materials. The third has access to source material or intact NCWs and is willing to steal or in some other way divert it to the end user. These three can be motivated by one of two things, money or ideology. While there has been much contention that morals will stop an individual from participating in the supply of NCW know-how or material it is impossible to universalize that argument.[51]

For the purpose of this work the supplier component takes on both Schweitzer and Dorsch's physical aspects as well as Gurr and Cole's aspects. As such the supplier is anyone who can provide an intact NCW or provide material, technology, or technical knowledge which can be used to create a NCW or can bypass an intact NCW's security system.

Financial

While this component does not necessarily play a direct role in the transfer of material it is essential if proliferation is to occur. It is represented by the banking systems and other formal money transfer systems. These are, by their very nature, international even if they do not have branches outside of their parent country. Some of the banks are state sponsored and others are privately owned. The laws that regulate them are both national and international. David Cooper suggests that this component of proliferation is a key element in understanding state responses to proliferation.[52]

Included in the financial component are the nonprofit organizations that collect money. Like the banks these organizations are legal and may not even be aware how the

funds they are gathering are used. This makes it difficult to differentiate between proliferation funds and other types of funding.[53]

Other, even more difficult to track, types of financial systems are the “hawala,” “chop”, “chit” or “flying money” systems that allow for the transfer of funds with little or no paper trail.[54] The legality of these systems depends upon the country in which they act as well as regulations that apply to the transfer of monies by groups other than banks.[55]

The intricacies of this component are such that providing more than a simple working definition is impossible. That being the case the financial component incorporates any NSA system that provides or transfers funds for proliferation activities. The systems can be legal or illegal, but some connection must be made to NCW proliferation.

Transportation

This component can transfer both material and people. Many of these organizations are not only used for the transportation of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear material but also narcotics, human trafficking, conventional arms and other illicit materials. This makes it difficult to differentiate between the types of smuggling taking place.

Rensselaer Lee defines two types of smuggling networks. The first is the “high end” network that is end-user initiated. This network is put together by an end-user who has already taken it upon themselves to locate a source. The end-user then finds experienced middlemen (the smuggling organization) who use “an array of sophisticated smuggling techniques...for example, interspersing the material with legally tradable radioactive isotopes, using false customs documentation, concealing it in bulk metal cargo, or shipping it out in diplomatic luggage, which is seldom checked by the authorities.”[56] It is this network that is most threatening vis-à-vis proliferation.

The second type is a source initiated network generally considered “low end.” This network is less reliable and is more often than not made up of scam artists or amateurs.[57] Since the reliability of the source comes into question the entire network is also questionable.

The transportation aspect is defined by its ability to provide national and transnational shipping of material and personnel. As Lee notes, it can use front companies, officials with access to government transport, quasi-governmental organizations and organized crime to move supplies for the end user.[58] This component can also be used to move a weapon to a target. If this component is independent of the terrorist organization then the financial component will also come into play as payment for transportation will be required. If this component is part of the end user's organization it is more difficult to identify the financial components role as it has access to the end user's financial system.

Terrorist

While terrorists did not, in the past, have an interest in mass killings or destruction, recent actions suggest that these interests have changed. Terrorist violence has become more lethal with the potential for mass casualties.[59] Examination into the proliferation of NCWs by, and to, non-state actors shows that, though it may be difficult, it is possible for a terrorist organization to manufacture or acquire non-conventional weapons. Research also shows that there are terrorists that have a desire to acquire these weapons.[60]

In order to use this component as a part of the case study of state responses to NSA NCW proliferation it is important to define the term terrorist and examine it vis-à-vis the kinds of terrorists that are most likely to use NCW. Brian Jenkins, [61] Walter Laqueur, [62] Walter Reich,[63] Charles W. Kegley,[64] and Martha Crenshaw[65] help to clarify which terrorist organizations fall within this field.

While Jenkins defines terrorism as the use or threatened use of force designed to bring about political change,[66] Laqueur adds the type of force ("illegitimate use of force") and the target "innocent people" to the means of differentiating between terrorist and other acts. [67] For analytical purposes Martha Crenshaw suggests that an organization be defined as terrorist if the *target* is not a legitimate political target, the *act* is not a legitimate military act, or there does not exist the possibility of *successfully attaining stated goals*.[68]

The terrorist component is made up of those organizations attempting to gain NCWs for the illegitimate use of force against civilian populations, thus meeting at least two of Crenshaw's factors: the nature of the weapon necessitates an illegitimate target (civilian population) and the act itself is not seen as a legitimate one (the use of NCW). This is, however, extremely problematic. First it is not unconceivable that a terrorist will not act against civilians but against legitimate targets using NCW (i.e. infusing chemical or biological weapons into a military site's air conditioning system). While the force used is considered illegitimate the act is closer to guerrilla actions than if the target had also been illegitimate.

The second problem is that the plethora of different terrorist organizations makes for wide range of different motivations behind the use of a NCW. These include: religious cults, Islamic fundamentalists, right wing extremists, left wing extremists, nationalist/separationist organizations, Christian fundamentalists, and armageddonists.[69]

State Responses

National responses to each of the above components can tell us whether states have decided to ally vis-à-vis the threat of NSA NCW proliferation. The determination of followership is based upon these responses.

State responses are determined through speeches made by policy makers, the State Department (or Foreign Office), press releases by the policy making bodies of each state, national security strategy statements (or the equivalent), actions taken by the Department of the Treasury and Department of Defense strategies (or the equivalent). Participation in international treaties and initiatives (including the Nonproliferation Treaty, Proliferation Security Initiative, the Biological Weapons Convention, Chemical Weapons Convention, Export Controls like the Australia Group, UNMOVIC and other treaties, Memorandum of Understanding and conventions), as well as the creation of national export controls, and military and economic actions show what action is being undertaken and which of the components are perceived as threats. This also includes legislation deriving from among others the Chemical Weapons Convention and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.

In addition research and analysis by think tanks (such as Brookings, Aspen, IISS, CFR, CSIS, IASPS, Olin Institute, SDSC, Lowy Institute and MRC) as well as research done regarding the different aspects of this project should be examined. Relevant material from these can be used to bolster the first source findings.

By determining if states responses include common threat perception, mutual goals or action it is possible to suggest if an alliance has formed and if some type of follower - leader relationship exists. If it does then a followership typology can be determined. This gives a clearer picture of how a predominant state and weaker states choose to interact with each other.

If, on the other hand, a follower - leader relationship does not exist then we must question if the state is hiding, attempting to balance, or if it has taken on one of the strategies proposed by Ja Ian in response to predominant state influences. Should we find that follower - leader relationships have not been established then perhaps the assumed commonality of interest among states in their response to NSA NCW proliferation should be rethought.

Analysis

This work applies an individual level analytical system to a structural realist approach to international interaction. As an empirical deductive research project this work proposes to examine followership, an inherently individual level of analytical analysis, as a response to the NSA NCW proliferation. The components of NSA NCW proliferation act as mutually recognized systemic threats against which alliances containing follower - leader relations should develop between the states under investigation. The analysis of the findings in each case study rely on qualitative analysis to reach its conclusions.

Conclusion

This work establishes a new model for examining the follower - leader dynamic, and proposes one of many possible case studies against which this dynamic can be examined. In so doing it closes a gap in alliance literature regarding the role of followers in the alliance. By examining followership the nature of leadership in the international

system can be better understood. The use of the components of NSA NCW proliferation is just one of many that need to be examined to further our understanding of followership in international relations. By using this system to examine other case studies a well rounded picture of alliances and follower - leader relations can be established.

Diagram 1: Five Followership Typologies

	Passive	Pragmatist	Conformist	Alienated	Exemplary
Threat	-	+/-	-	+	+
Goals	+	+/-	+	-	+
Actions	-	+/-	+	+	+
	Cheerleader	Anything Goes	Pile on	Beleaguering Wolf	Lion

Diagram 2: Eight Followership Typologies

	Scared	Passive	**Profiteer**	**Freeloader**	Pragmatist	Conformist	Alienated	Exemplary
Threat	+	-	**-**	+	+/-	-	+	+
Goals	**-**	+	**-**	+	+/-	+	-	+
Actions	**-**	-	+	**-**	+/-	+	+	+
	Lamb	Cheerleader	**Jackal**	**Pass the Buck**	Anything Goes	Pile on	Beleaguering Wolf	Lion

Appendix 2: Proposed Research Schedule

Continuation of Theoretical Research – 2 months

Historical Research - 1 month

Supplier – 5 months

Transportation – 5 months

Financial – 5 months

Terrorist – 5 Months

Conclusions – 3 months

Drafts – 3 months

Final Draft – 3 months

Total – 32 months

Appendix 3: Proposed Chapters

1. Introduction
2. Alliance Formation
3. Followership: The Follower - Leader dynamic in Alliance Theory
4. Non State Actor Non Conventional Weapons Proliferation: Actors in the Proliferation Chain
5. Historical Background: The Non Conventional Weapons Proliferation Threat Prior to 1989: The Cold War
6. Alliance formation and the Supplier Threat
7. Alliance formation and the Transportation Threat
8. Alliance formation and the Financial Threat
9. Alliance formation and the Terrorist Threat
10. Changes in State Followership
11. Policy Recommendations
12. Conclusions

Endnotes

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